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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the problems confronted by claims of ‘freedom of conscience’ 
in contemporary political society, and argues that freedom of conscience is a critical foundational 
component of any free political regime.  Yet, conscience is often invoked as the final authority or 
justification for any choice, regardless whether the action or choice violates the common good.  
In this case, there is a risk that conscience can become identified with subjectivism, radical 
individualism, or autonomy.  I suggest that a re-examination of the theory of conscience found in 
Aquinas, especially as it relates to human reason, natural law, and prudence, contributes toward a 
better understanding of conscience and its place in political life, especially in shaping the 
common good.  I argue that Aquinas’s understanding of conscience points to critical individual, 
relational, and transcendent elements that constitute and form conscience. 
 The first chapter examines what many scholars consider the contemporary ‘crisis of 
conscience’ that has been experienced acutely in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and I 
introduce Aquinas as the interlocutor whose understanding of conscience I examine.   
The second chapter analyzes the sources that Aquinas draws from to formulate his own twofold 
theory of conscience as consisting of synderesis and conscientia.  Specifically, I examine the 
important contributions of Aristotle, Cicero, Jerome, Origen, and Augustine.  The third and 
fourth chapters focus on Aquinas’s texts.  Chapter three evaluates the development of Aquinas’s 
work on conscience in two of his earlier works, viz. Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum and De 
Veritate.  The fourth chapter examines the Summa Theologiae and the Commentary on Romans, 
wherein Aquinas situates conscience within the framework of natural law.  The final chapter 
juxtaposes Aquinas’s terminology of the primary level of conscience, synderesis, with an 
alternative concept, viz. anamnesis.  Political philosopher Eric Voegelin has also proposed this 
term as a way of understanding human nature qua rational and political. This chapter considers 
viii 
both the possibility and implications of this alternative term for the primary level of conscience 
and helps to clarify the place of conscience in political discourse.   
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Chapter I: The Crisis of Conscience in the Modern World 
“Could…religious people be granted exemption or exemptions from generally applicable laws, if 
they went against a religious conscience? This may not have seemed so pressing in a country 
whose legislators were explicitly motivated by Christian principles, and whose laws applied to a 
broadly Christian society, where the main disagreements were between Christian 
denominations….  It is different in the twenty-first century, when political debate is 
characterized by deep disagreement between people with very different worldviews.  The issue 
of the possible protection of a religious conscience from the impact of generally applicable laws 
has become a major problem.”1 
I. A Crisis of Conscience 
 In the American political experience, freedom of conscience has been considered to be of 
primary importance within the constitutional framework of the political regime.  We need only 
consider the text of the First Amendment of the US Constitution, which guarantees and enshrines 
freedom of conscience in the free exercise and establishment clauses.2  We may also recall James 
Madison’s First Inaugural Address in 1809, wherein he states his confidence in the new 
republic’s commitment “to avoid the slightest interference with the rights of conscience or the 
functions of religion, so wisely exempted from civil jurisdiction.”3 More generally, the 
importance of freedom of conscience in the liberal political tradition has been espoused by 
Enlightenment liberal thinkers such as John Locke or John Stuart Mill.4  Yet, in the 
contemporary liberal political context, when ‘the primacy of conscience’5 is invoked as a 
justification for political action or inaction (as might be the case of conscientious objector to war, 
                                                 
1 Trigg, Roger.  Equality, Freedom, and Religion.  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 87-88.   
2 The original language in the Bill of Rights that actually referred to freedom of conscience was deleted, cf. E.A. 
Smith.  “Religion and Conscience in Constitutional Law.”Church-State Relations in Ecumenical Perspective, Ed. 
E.A. Smith.  Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1966.   
3 Madison, James.  “First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1809.” Retrieved from Liberty Fund’s Online Library of 
Liberty: 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1939&chapter=119064&layout=html#
a_2402984 
4 Cf. John Locke A Letter Concerning Toleration and J.S. Mill On Liberty. We must, however, acknowledge here 
that that modern liberalism is varied and the two thinkers listed here are examples, and not meant to be an 
exhaustive representation of the stance of the liberal tradition on conscience. 
5 Cf. Lewis, Brian.  “The Primacy of Conscience in the Roman Catholic Tradition.”Pacifica 13, October 2000.  299-
309.   
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for example), there seems to be a lack of a clear sense of both the meaning of conscience and the 
pre-eminent source of authority that it claims.  What does it mean to say that one should follow 
his own conscience?  From where do these promptings of conscience originate?  Is conscience 
simply one’s own subjectivity or private opinion that allows an individual to act as he pleases 
without reference to or consideration of anyone outside of himself?  Does conscience give a 
person license to act in whatever manner he feels prompted to act?  Does conscience make a man 
a law unto himself?  If every man is a law unto himself, then how could a political society define 
a common good, since each person would have his own idea of what should be considered good?   
These questions require us to ask further: what is conscience, why is it considered to be free, and 
why should any political regime protect its freedom?   
 One theory could argue that conscience appeals to a ‘higher law’ than human law or 
political regime as the source of its authority.  We may recall Antigone’s defiance of Creon’s law 
in favor of the law of the gods, the “unwritten and unchanging laws” that oblige her to bury her 
fallen brother against Creon’s decree.6  Yet, an appeal to a higher law is distinctly problematic, 
because we are faced with the task of identifying the source, legitimacy, and authority of this 
higher law.  Furthermore, if conscience receives its knowledge and insight from a higher law, 
how does a person have reliable access to it?  If the divine is the authentic source of the law, as 
Antigone claims, then this presupposes that everyone in any given society must share at least 
some minimal belief in the same source of divinity.  In the contemporary, liberal, pluralistic 
political setting, such is not often the case.  Perhaps the authority of conscience comes from 
within the human person himself: “More often than not, it [that is, the source, legitimacy and 
authority of a higher law] will be said to have its immediate source in man himself, either alone 
                                                 
6 Sophocles.  Antigone.  Trans. Ian Johnston.  Text found at http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/Sophocles/Antigone.htm.  
Quotation from line 512 English text and 455 Greek text.   
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or in society, and assumes the form of an inviolable dictate of conscience to which priority is 
given over all man-made laws.”7  However, when one lives in political community, do we not 
expect that the common good, which is protected by agreed upon laws, should take precedent 
over any individual good presented by the dictates of conscience?   
 To remedy the problem of a higher law usurping legal and political authority, Ernest 
Fortin points out that contemporary social science largely retreated to the theory of “legal 
positivism… [That] denies the very possibility of an appeal from established law to an elusive 
‘higher law’ whose existence is alleged never to have been demonstrated and on whose 
principles there is supposedly no general consensus among men.”8  Legal positivism posits law 
as pure convention, based upon the will of the ruler or a ‘general will’ of the citizens: “The will 
of the state, the formal general will of the citizens, is the source and criterion of law.”9  Legal 
positivism ultimately flows from a rejection of the intelligibility of any metaphysical order, even 
to the point of rejecting its existence.10  Yet, despite the rise of legal positivism and its attempt to 
eradicate reference to a ‘higher law,’ that is to the natural law, human inquiry about the existence 
of the natural law remains: “[The natural law] has always managed to resuscitate itself and 
emerge revitalized from its occasional moments of eclipse.”11  Such a higher law is meant to 
govern right and wrong actions in society, and it circumscribes the limits of both the political 
regime and the citizens within the regime.  But this too is problematic, given that many of us live 
in pluralistic cultures, and the dominant liberal ideology of our current political regime prides 
                                                 
7 Fortin, Ernest L. The Political Implications of St. Augustine’s Theory of Conscience.” Augustinian Studies Vol. 1, 
1970, 133 
8 Fortin, Ernest L. “The Political Implications of St. Augustine’s Theory of Conscience,” 134.  Fortin also points the 
reader to F. Oppenheim’s American Political Science Review 51 (1957) article entitled “The Natural Law Thesis: 
Affirmation or Denial.” Pp. 41-53.   
9 Rommen, Heinrich A. The Natural Law.  Trans. Thomas R. Hanley.  (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1998), 110. 
10 Rommen, Heinrich A. The Natural Law, Chapter VI. 
11 Kries, Douglas.  The Problem of Natural Law.(New York: Lexington Books, 2007), xiii. 
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itself on being able to accommodate “fundamental disagreements over the nature of the good.”12 
Contemporary Western societies have “socially [divorced rules] defining right action on the one 
hand and conceptions of the human good on the other.”13 
 However, this ideological strategy presents an even more serious systemic dilemma.  
How could it ever be possible to live peacefully in a political community that encourages and 
embraces fundamental disagreements about the nature of the human good?  The endpoint of such 
logic is an effort to define right action and a coherent conception of the human good that “makes 
it impossible to build up and preserve the moral order of individuals and communities.”14  Some 
might question why we ought to find an inconsistent notion of the human good a problem.  Leo 
Strauss explains this problem from the perspective of the social sciences.  According to Strauss, 
the distinction between facts and values, especially as espoused by Max Weber, is the root cause 
of the political problems experienced in the modern era.  The fact/value distinction, according to 
Strauss, advances a theory of a ‘value-free’ methodology to the study of the social sciences.  
Strauss explains that:  
[Weber] denied to man any science, empirical or rational, any knowledge, scientific or 
philosophical, of the true value system: the true value system does not exist; there is a 
variety of values which are of the same rank, whose demands conflict with one another, 
and whose conflict cannot be solved by human reason.  Social science and social 
philosophy can do no more than clarify the conflict and all its implications; the solution 
has to be left to the free and rational decision of each individual.  I contend that Weber’s 
thesis necessarily leads to nihilism or to the view that every preference, however evil, 
base, or insane, has to be judged before the tribunal of reason to be as legitimate as any 
other preference.15 
 
                                                 
12 MacIntyre, Alasdair. The Privatization of Good: An Inaugural Lecture.” The Review of Politics 52:3, 1990. 344-
361.  Quote taken from page 355.   
13 MacIntyre, Alasdair.   “The Privatization of Good: An Inaugural Lecture,” 346. 
14 Pope John Paul II.  Veritatis Splendor Encyclical Letter given on 6 August 1993.  (Boston: St. Paul Media, 1993), 
93. 
15 Strauss, Leo.  Natural Right and History.  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 41-42.   
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This promotion of a ‘value free’ political science ultimately leads to the principal crisis of 
political science that Strauss identifies as the inability of political science to confront and to 
condemn the various manifestations of corruption within political society (e.g. totalitarianism), 
affirming that “A social science that cannot speak of tyranny with the same confidence with 
which medicine speaks, for example, of cancer, cannot understand social phenomena as what 
they are.  It is therefore not scientific.  Present day social science finds itself in this condition.”16 
Other scholars, such as John Haas, argue that this modern political problem pointed out 
by Strauss in the above passages is fundamentally a “crisis of conscience” that has caused a 
much deeper political and cultural crisis, “because the failure of conscience is not seen simply in 
wicked men choosing to embrace evil in pursuit of their own selfish interests, but rather in the 
attempt of entire societies [emphasis mine] to forge their common life without recourse to 
objective standards of right and wrong.”17  Here we are confronted by another important element 
in our discernment of the nature of conscience and what its political significance should be.  
Despite what is described above as a ‘crisis of conscience,’ viz. the inability for whole political 
societies to identify a common human good, contemporary political liberalism continues to claim 
that it values the freedom of conscience as the very basis of human rights.18  Andrew Edward 
comments: 
 The basic liberal right is freedom of conscience, but it is unclear to what extent freedom 
 of conscience is limited to the sphere of belief and thought, and whether it encompasses 
 freedom of association as well as freedom of speech, and whether it extends to 
 conscientious objection and civil disobedience.  Our claims of equality are gauged in 
 terms of conscience.19 
                                                 
16 Strauss, Leo.  What is Political Philosophy? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 95 
17 Haas, John M. “Crisis of Conscience and Culture.” Crisis of Conscience.  Ed. John M. Haas.  (New York: The 
Crossroad Publishing Company, 1996), 24  
18 Cf. Edward, Andrew. Conscience and its Critics: Protestant Conscience, Enlightenment Reason, and Modern 
Subjectivity.  (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 3.  See also the Introduction.  
19 Edward, Andrew. Conscience and its Critics, 6. 
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Edward points out both that the very understanding of what conscience is (although considered 
sacrosanct for many contemporary liberals) and why it is politically important, remains unclear.  
Does freedom of conscience simply mean freedom for subjective thinking or opinion?  Does 
freedom of conscience mean freedom to worship in whatever religion of your choosing?  Or, 
does freedom of conscience refer to the freedom to order one’s life as a citizen of a particular 
political society, governed by particular laws and rules, in whatever way is deemed morally 
acceptable to an individual?  Often in contemporary politics, conscience is invoked as the final 
authority or as the justification for any choice, regardless of whether the action or choice taken 
by the individual violates the law or the common good.  We hear of the inviolability of the 
‘primacy of conscience’ that must be protected even if the action taken is commonly considered 
to be immoral.20  In this case, there is a risk that conscience can become identified with 
subjectivism, radical individualism, or autonomy.  At worst, conscience is reduced to being 
identified as emotions, feelings, opinions, or personal preference.  Have the claims of conscience 
morphed from being “a bulwark against government encroachment into a more generally 
applicable right to individual autonomy?”21  Alasdair MacIntyre identifies this truncated sense of 
conscience as emotivism, that is “the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically 
all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, 
insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character.”22 
For adherents of these particular manifestations of conscience, the primary political 
problem is a lack of consensus on a common notion of the human good because each person 
judges what is good based on opinions, preference, attitudes, conviction or feelings.  However, 
                                                 
20 Cf. footnote 4 above.  
21 Vischer, Robert K.  Conscience and the Common Good: Reclaiming the Space between the Person and the State.  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3. 
22 MacIntyre, Alasdair.  After Virtue.  Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.   
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as MacIntyre and others believe, conscience is not merely a means to confirm our subjective 
desires or opinions, but rather it is and should be the means of discovering truth.  Ernest Fortin 
sums up this critical point, stating:  
 [Conscience] is not just an innate moral sense found in all or most men or a general 
 awareness of certain broad limitations to which human conduct is subject. Nor is it a 
 mere reflection or internalization of the ethical values and standards of a given society. It 
 cannot for that matter be reduced to a question of loyalty to oneself and to one's 
 commitments, whatever those commitments might be. And it is even less a simple matter 
 of sentiment divorced from reason and superior to it, as the romantic notion popularized 
 by Rousseau would have it.  What it basically assumes is that man's life as a whole is 
 governed by rational principles that are naturally known and universally valid even under 
 the most extreme circumstances.23 
If this view of conscience is lost in a political society, that is to say, a view of conscience that is 
governed by shared, universally known rational principles, this loss results in a lack of 
homonoia, that “life of the spirit, which is common to all, [through which] the existence of man 
becomes existence in community.”24  In other words, if, as Aristotle says, that “every city is 
some sort of partnership [that is] constituted for the sake of some good,” a political community 
without agreement on the common good finds itself in serious crisis.25  This is particularly the 
problem of liberalism, according to Alasdair MacIntyre, “for it is a central tenet of recent liberal 
moral and political theory that public institutions and more especially the institutions of 
government should be systematically neutral as between rival conceptions of what the human 
good is.”26  Perhaps John Locke best captures this liberal understanding of conscience, arguing 
that it is “nothing else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or pravity of our 
                                                 
23 Fortin, Ernest. “The Political Implications of St. Augustine’s Theory of Conscience,” 144.   
24 Voegelin, Eric.  “On the German University and the Order of German Society: A Reconsideration of the Nazi 
Era.”  The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin: Published Essays 1966-1985.  Volume 12.Ed. Ellis Sandoz.(Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 7. 
25 Aristotle. Politics.  Trans. Carnes Lord.  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 1252a. 
26 MacIntyre, Alasdair.  “The Privatization of Good: An Inaugural Lecture,” 346. 
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own actions.”27  However, this view remains a rather narrowly subjective concept of conscience.  
The danger, at least as some have articulated such danger, is that the “resulting variations among 
individual consciences [render] it almost useless for creating the measure of agreement necessary 
to society.”28  In short, if conscience claims simply mean personal preference, then conscience 
claims become meaningless, and the claim with most force (whether persuasive or coercive 
force) wins.   
 A related problematic understanding of conscience perceives it simply as the freedom or 
right to do as one pleases, since it has come from one’s own conscience.  In the opinion of some 
scholars, such a formulation is a radical deformation of the nature of conscience:  
 The erroneous conscience…. [appears] as subjectivity’s protective shell, into which man 
 can escape and there hide from reality.  Liberalism’s idea of conscience was, in fact, 
 presupposed here….  It is the faculty that dispenses with truth. It thereby becomes the 
 justification of subjectivity, which would not like to have itself called into question.  
 Similarly, it becomes the justification for social conformity.  As mediating values  
 between the different subjectivities, social conformity is intended to make living together 
 possible. The obligation to seek truth terminates, as do any doubts about the general  
 inclination of society and what is has been accustomed to.  Being convinced of oneself,  
 as well as conforming to others, is sufficient.29 
 
Joseph Ratzinger’s preceding quote points to two glaring contemporary problems.  First, 
conscience as radical subjectivism or radical autonomy becomes meaningless lending itself to be 
easily swept up into social conformity—perhaps even an ideological social conformity that is 
dangerous or unjust.  Let us consider an historical example that illustrates the political 
manifestation of this ‘problem of conscience’ discussed above.  We need not look very far back 
into history to see that the ideological ethics manifested in modernity led to a crisis in both the 
                                                 
27 Locke, John.  Essay Concerning Human Understanding.  I, ii, 8.Quoted in Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: 
Continuity and Vision in Western Political Thought.(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), 337. 
28 Wolin, Sheldon.  Politics and Vision, 337. 
29 Ratzinger, Joseph.  “Conscience and Truth.”  On Conscience.  (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 16-17.  On 
the liberal transformation of conscience into social conformity, see Sheldon S. Wolin Politics and Vision, Chapter 9.   
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knowledge and practice of sound moral judgment and actions.  In 1963, Hannah Arendt 
published her coverage and reflections of the Eichmann trial, entitled Eichmann in Jerusalem, 
and stunned her readers with the harrowing conclusion that Nazi commanders such as Eichmann 
carried out their crimes with a banal attitude of indifference toward the clear violation of human 
dignity and the destruction of human life.  The trial of Eichmann exemplified as she says, the 
“strange interdependence of thoughtlessness and evil.”30  According to Arendt, the most 
perplexing and disturbing question at the center of the Eichmann trial was his complete lack of a 
‘crisis of conscience’ (meaning he experienced no moral qualms) for his role in the death of 
millions.  Arendt writes: “[And] as for his conscience, [Eichmann] remembered perfectly well 
that he would have had a bad conscience only if he had not done what he had been ordered to 
do—to ship millions of men, women, and children to their death with great zeal and the most 
meticulous care.”31  In his defense, Eichmann argues that he was simply following the Kantian 
principle that “a law was a law, there could be no exceptions.”32  Eichmann, it would seem, 
escaped the prompting of conscience in this matter, by appealing to legal positivism.  Those who 
put him on trial did not find such a defense very convincing.   
 Eichmann suffered no ‘crisis of conscience’ not because he lacked the capacity, but rather 
because his willful acceptance of the Nazi ideology had dulled and deformed his conscience so 
that the social and political values of the Nazis, i.e. hatred and liquidation of Jews, had been 
“internalized and, as such, [operated] as the individual’s conscience. Conscience thus [became 
for Eichmann] social rather than individual.”33  This deformation of conscience into a social 
                                                 
30 Arendt, Hannah.  Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil.(New York: Penguin, 1994), 288. 
31 Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem, 25. 
32 Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem, 137.  Arendt does try to exonerate Kant from Eichmann’s invocation, 
remarking that Eichmann distorted Kant’s philosophy to become what she calls “a version of Kant ‘for the 
household use of the little man.’” See page 137.   
33 Wolin, Sheldon S.  Politics and Vision, 343. 
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collectivism, with its emphasis on social conformity to an ideology certainly does not and did not 
exonerate Eichmann, for as Eric Voegelin rightly reminds us, “No one is obliged to take part in 
the spiritual crisis of a society; on the contrary, everyone is obliged to avoid this folly and live 
his life in order.”34  Where was this interior order in Eichmann that should have caused him to 
act differently?  The problem in the case of Nazi Germany was the complete and willful closure 
of the mind of an entire society to the promptings of conscience, and the equally willful 
acceptance of a collectivist ideology in its place.  If false conscience is explained here as social 
or collectivist conformity, then perhaps by contrast we might discern some sense of what 
authentic conscience actually is.  Traditionally, conscience has been understood as the ability to 
discern between good and evil and to choose what is good accordingly.35  It thus has both a 
legislative and active connotation.  Conscience tells the individual what is right or wrong, and 
dictates appropriate action based on this judgment.  It is not simply a means of “[confirming] our 
subjective desires, [but rather] the means of discovering objective truth and acting upon it.”36 Of 
course both before the Nazi regime and after it, the very idea of ‘objective truth’ has become 
controversial for most of Western societies.  After all, the Nazis claimed an ‘objective truth’ 
based upon on what they believed were empirically, biologically, and scientifically verifiable 
facts about the superiority of the Aryan race.  Yet without a doubt, we know they were wrong.  
But their claim to an objective truth was channeled a priori through a seemingly legitimately, 
collectively defined and politically acceptable process of legal positivism.  Can any person or 
any body politic validly claim authority on truth objectively by pursuing this strategy?  
 The example of the totalitarian Nazi regime expresses another related way in which the 
meaning of conscience is violated.  In the Eichmann example, there is a clear lack or a willful 
                                                 
34 Voegelin, Eric.  Science, Politics, and Gnosticism.(Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2004), 17. 
35 Cf. John M. Haas.  “Crisis of Conscience and Culture.”    
36Hass, John M., “Crisis of Conscience and Culture,” 22. 
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ignorance of the proper function of conscience that discerns right from wrong and directs action 
accordingly.  But many within this regime objected to the Nazi atrocities precisely on the basis 
of conscience, such as the Scholl siblings, Hans and Sophie.37  They were categorically denied 
the capacity of conscience to validly question or reject the ideology and actions of the Nazi 
regime, illustrating a fundamental and required characteristic for any ideologically based regime: 
the destruction of the freedom of conscience that governments should protect.38  Joseph 
Ratzinger comments, “The destruction of conscience is the real prerequisite for totalitarian 
followers and totalitarian rule.  Where conscience prevails, there is a limit to the dominion of 
human command and human choice, something sacred that must remain inviolate and that in its 
ultimate sovereignty eludes all control, whether someone else’s or one’s own.”39  
 While the extreme example of totalitarianism may seem obvious to us, and even passé for 
contemporary Western political societies, there are perhaps several new frontiers that threaten 
the freedom of conscience even within our own American regime.  For example, Ryan T. 
Anderson writes that the recent passage of the Obama administrations’ health care plan (the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act or PPACA) significantly attenuates the protection of 
conscience for health care professionals who may object to the assertion that abortion should be 
provided as essential basic health care for women.  Anderson writes, “While the Senate was 
drafting the bill, it explicitly rejected the Weldon Amendment, long accepted language that 
provides conscience protection for those opposed to abortion, particularly for health care 
providers. . . .  Conscience protections that apply in most other areas of federal law do not apply 
                                                 
37 I chose the Scholl siblings as my example since their pamphlets directly mention conscience.  On the Scholl 
siblings’ objection to the Nazis on the basis of conscience, see the six leaflets of the White Rose Society from 1942, 
especially the second and fourth leaflets at www.whiterosesociety.org/WRS_pamphlets_home_html.   
38 On the guarantee of the protection of conscience by governments, see for example, the UN’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, particularly Article 1: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ and the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.   
39 Ratzinger, Joseph.  “Conscience in its Time.”  Church, Ecumenism, and Politics: New Endeavors in Ecclesiology. 
Trans. Michael J. Miller et. al.  (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2008), 160. 
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to PPACA.”40Even more recently, the department of Health and Human Services in the United 
States issued a mandate that some religious organizations and institutions have called a flagrant 
violation of conscience protection and religious freedom in the United States.41  This mandate, 
delivered by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, Kathleen Sebilius, 
requires that nearly all health insurance plans offer and pay for contraceptive services, 
sterilization procedures, and abortifacient drugs to women of reproductive age.  Such actions 
seriously violate the consciences of Catholics, other Christians, Jews, Muslims, and other 
religious and non-religious citizens alike.42  These religious organizations, institutions, 
businesses, and individuals claim a violation of conscience because they will be forced by the 
coercive power of a federal mandate to provide, to promote, and to pay for services for their 
employees that they declare morally objectionable on the grounds of their religious faith.  The 
alleged compromise offered for conscience protection that the current administration has 
contrived excludes religiously-affiliated hospitals, universities, and other institutions as well as 
individuals or families from exemption.  Nor have any rules been put in place for such a 
compromise.43 
 The current debate on healthcare in the United States raises several fundament issues 
regarding the idea and fundamental expression of freedom of conscience.  This controversy 
                                                 
40 Anderson, Ryan T. “Protected in Law, Cared for in Life.” First Things 215: (2011).  P. 44. 
41 Cf. www.usccb.org/news/2012/12-012.cfm.  
42 Cf Sebilius’s mandate: www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/01/2012012a.html and response from United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops  http://usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/conscience-
protection/upload/preventiveservicesbackgrounder-3.pdf and response from Evangelical and Jewish leaders 
http://www.jasonboyte.com/docs/To%20President.NonCatholics.RelExemptionSigned.pdf.   
43 Cf. Document published by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops: http://usccb.org/issues-and-
action/religious-liberty/conscience-protection/upload/preventiveservicesbackgrounder-3.pdf.  In August 2011, the 
Senate introduced a bill to protect conscience under the new PPACA: S. 1467 The Respect for Conscience Act of 
2011.  At this writing, the bill is in committee.  http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s112-1467.  The 
White House also issued a statement of ‘compromise,’ on this issue, but many remain skeptical.  Cf. Yuval Levin on 
the compromise: http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/290763/compromise-yuval-levin.  An accommodation was 
declared by the administration in February 2013, but this proposed ‘accommodation’ still has many problems.  Cf. 
www.usccb.org/news/2013/13-037.cfm.   
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initially brings into focus the issue of why the objection of conscience should be held as essential 
in any free society, especially when conscientious objection could be used by some to shirk their 
civic responsibilities or to deny any citizen what the state deems an essential good or service that 
should be available to all by law.  It could be argued that justice demands that all citizens must 
contribute to the common good of their political community, even if that contribution makes 
demands on them that they would prefer not to perform, such as taxation, an example quite 
familiar to Americans.  How ought a political society both promote and protect the common 
good and the rights of individuals, including the rights of conscience?  This debate must also 
consider the relationship of religious beliefs and creeds to the very idea of conscience and the 
right to religious freedom.  Religious freedom, of course, is deeply engrained in the American 
political psyche via the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; and Americans have 
historically protected and promoted religious freedom through preferential policies both at home 
and abroad.44  Former American diplomat Thomas Farr even argues that promotion of religious 
freedom in countries such China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia should be a primary goal of American 
foreign policy.  Rather than promoting a secular worldview that views religion as “inherently 
irrational and emotive,” Farr argues that the United States should promote religious freedom 
‘properly understood.’45  Farr explains:  
 Properly understood, then, freedom of religion is the right to pursue the religious quest, to 
 embrace or reject the interior and public obligations that ensue, and to enter or exit 
 religious communities that reflect, or do not reflect, one's understanding of religious 
 truth.  If people are not free in all these senses, they cannot be said to be living a fully 
 human life.  To restrict this right unduly, or to persecute someone for exercising it 
 peacefully, is to mount an assault on human dignity.  In political terms religious freedom 
                                                 
44 This is not to argue that the United States has always promoted an absolute or unqualified freedom of religion. 
Even at the time of the American Founding, several states had established religions in their constitutions.  For a 
thoughtful take on the development of religious freedom in America, cf. Philip Hamburger’s Separation of Church 
and State.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.   
45 Farr, Thomas.  World of Faith and Freedom: Why International Religious Liberty is Vital to American National 
Security. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 47 and Introduction. 
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 is the right of every person to an immunity from coercion by civil or other human 
 authority in pursuing, or not pursuing, the truths of religion.46 
Religious freedom presupposes another, more fundamental right, viz. the right of conscience. 
The right of conscience “has a natural public dimension.  Moral obligations flow from a 
conscience that is bound by its apprehension of religious truths, whether derived by faith, reason, 
or both.  Those obligations often require a religious believer to take or refrain from taking certain 
actions. Accordingly, freedom of conscience implies a right to live publicly in accord with the 
truths one has discovered during the religious enterprise and to enter the public square with those 
truths.”47  Farr offers several contemporary examples of nations that do not allow such freedom 
of religion or the freedom of conscience.48 
 The protection of the conscience also conflicts with the deeply held democratic value of 
equality.  Roger Trigg explains that since equality is connected with political justice, “which 
entails equal treatment before under the law,” oftentimes ‘conscientious objectors’ to a particular 
public policy may find their position in conflict with the pursuit of equal treatment of all citizens 
under the law.49  Let us consider a very pertinent and recent example in the United States: same-
sex unions and marriages.  On June 19, 2012, a female employee (Jane Doe) of St. Joseph’s 
Medical Center in Westchester County, New York filed a class action suit against the center 
because she could not get medical insurance benefits for her spouse, a woman (Jane Roe).50  
Although same-sex marriages are now recognized in the state of New York, St. Joseph’s Medical 
Center—a Catholic institution—is regulated by the federal, not the state government; thus it is 
                                                 
46 Farr, Thomas.  World of Faith and Freedom, 22. 
47 Farr, Thomas.  World of Faith and Freedom, 22-23.   
48 Farr examines the political suppression of religion (or certain religions) in countries such as Saudi Arabia, 
Afghanistan, Iran, and China.   
49 Trigg, Roger.  Equality, Freedom, and Religion, 127. 
50 Roe and Doe v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield and St. Joseph’s Medical Center: 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/2012/20120619stjosephscomplaint.pdf.  There are other recent 
examples dealing with marriage and conscientious objection by a business owner including the New Mexico case 
Elane Photography vs. Willock.   
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lawfully protected by the Defense of Marriage Act conscientiously to object, on the grounds of 
its religious creed, to providing such benefits to same-sex partners.51  Janes Doe and Roe are 
challenging the Catholic institution and the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act.  
The argument is as follows:   
 New York State law consummates and recognizes the marriage of same-sex couples as 
 legal and binding and requires that those marriages should be accorded the same rights, 
 benefits and privileges as a heterosexual marriages pursuant to the Marriage Equality 
 Act [Marriage Equality Act is New York state law]. Because DOMA [Defense of 
 Marriage Act, i.e. federal law] unlawfully discriminates against same-sex spouses, it is 
 unconstitutional and therefore should not be used as a basis to deny Plaintiffs their right 
 to medical benefits under the Plan.  In the absence of DOMA, ERISA [Employment 
 Retirement Security Act of 1974] would (and should under the Tenth Amendment) 
 follow the law of New York and thus mandate non-discriminatory coverage.52 
 
Roe and Doe claim that they are subject to a discriminatory law and are not being treated equally 
under the law.  This case illustrates how these two different rights claims, viz. conscience rights 
and equality rights, are often in conflict with one another in democratic societies.  Janes Roe and 
Doe claim that a right to marriage and its benefits is being denied to them.  Theirs is an issue of 
equal treatment and justice.  However, St. Joseph’s Medical Center claims that the right to 
freedom of conscience and freedom to exercise their religious beliefs precludes them from 
legitimizing the rights claims of Roe and Doe.  Roger Trigg explains:  
Rights, in this instance those of homosexuals, often appear to trump any claim to a right 
of religious freedom [and of conscience].  When such rights clash, it seems, the solution 
is for one to win, and not for any attempt to be made to satisfy both sides….  Much 
depends on how highly we rate individual freedom, and the freedom of institutions, 
particularly religious ones.  When the issue of equality is to the fore, bringing in its trails 
appeals to human dignity and human rights, it may be tempting always to override such 
considerations.53 
 
                                                 
51 Cf. New York Times article: “Employee Sues for Benefits to Cover Same-Sex Partner.”  June 19, 2012 by Sharon 
Otterman.http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/nyregion/st-josephs-medical-center-sued-over-benefits-by-same-sex-
couple.html 
52Roe and Doe v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield and St. Joseph’s Medical Center, §26-
27.http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/2012/20120619stjosephscomplaint.pdf 
53 Trigg, Roger.  Equality, Freedom, and Religion, 8-9.   
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Mary Ann Glendon points out the problem of framing public discourse in the context of rights, 
arguing that it has led to an overall impoverishment of political discourse in America.  She writes 
that the framing of American public discourse in terms of clashing ‘rights’ leads to:  
 An intemperate rhetoric of personal liberty [that] corrodes the social foundations on 
 which individual freedom and security ultimately rest. . . .  It is a crisis at the very heart 
 of the American experiment in self-government, for it concerns the state of public 
 deliberation about the right ordering of our lives together.  In the home of free speech, 
 genuine exchange of ideas about matters of high public importance has come to a virtual 
 standstill.54 
 
Since conscience protections, the freedom of conscience and of religion, and the very nature of 
political and human rights are increasingly questioned and at odds with each other (and in some 
places even denied) in many nations, including, it would seem, in our own American regime, 
perhaps a deeper investigation of the meaning, intellectual roots, and political relevancy of 
conscience is in order.55 
II. What is Conscience?: A Theoretical Background 
 In the previous section, I have outlined what many scholars consider the contemporary 
‘crisis of conscience’ that has been experienced acutely in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries.  In summary, three main factors have been identified that are linked to an obfuscation 
of the meaning and political role of conscience.  First, the lack of a shared sense of the common 
good has led to what some call a ‘crisis of conscience’ in contemporary liberal democracies.  
This shared sense of the common good has traditionally been based upon a philosophical 
anthropology assuming a rational basis for morality, which seems to be increasingly rejected in 
favor of individual autonomy, personal preference, and individualism. A political regime that 
                                                 
54 Glendon, Mary Ann.  Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse.  (New York: The Free Press, 
1991), x. 
55 The HHS Mandate is the most contentious issue being debated about religious freedom.  For a response from the 
secular press on this issue, cf. Kadlec, Charles: http://www.forbes.com/sites/charleskadlec/2012/02/13/the-audacity-
of-power-president-obama-vs-the-catholic-church/. 
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tries to protect the rights of conscience risks that conscience claims may be wrongfully or 
unjustly used to promote a radically displaced autonomy.  The political community may lack the 
means to discern or rebuke this abuse of conscience protection, a protection that establishes the 
appeal to the common good that serves the community and its laws.  Second, the example of 
totalitarianism discloses how the ideological commitments of a regime destroy conscience by 
insisting on the total adherence to its own collectivist ideas as a substitute for individual 
conscience.  Third, when the right to freedom of conscience is not promoted or protected by the 
law, then there is no other safe or reliable method for anyone to object to any perceived injustice 
perpetrated by the regime.  Without such safeguards, political society becomes detrimentally 
dependent upon “the law of the stronger [rather than] the strength of the law.”56  Put differently, 
instead of a government of laws, the regime becomes a government of men, arbitrarily based on 
the will of the powers that be.  This synopsis illustrates an intimate connection between the 
freedom of conscience and social and political life.  However, a more complete understanding of 
this relationship requires knowing what conscience is.   
The idea of conscience first emerges from the combination of two ancient Greek words, 
viz. oida, meaning ‘I know,’ and the prefix sun or syn, meaning ‘together,’ as Eric D’Arcy, W.D. 
Davies, and C.A. Pierce each discuss in their studies on the origin of conscience.57  The Greek 
term for conscience, syneidesis, was used initially less as a technical or philosophical term and 
more as a term in popular parlance.  For example, Eric D’Arcy, Douglas Kries, and Ernest Fortin 
point out that the Greek term for conscience, syneidesis (and later used by the medieval 
                                                 
56 Ratzinger, Joseph.  “That Which Holds the World Together: The Pre-Political Moral Foundations of a Free State,” 
in The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion.  Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger and Jürgen Habermas.  
Trans. Brian McNeil, C.R.V.  (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2006), 58. 
57 Cf. D’Arcy, Eric.  Conscience and its Right to Freedom.  New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961; Davies, W.D. 
“Conscience.” In The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible.  Ed. Buttrick, George Arthur et al.  New York: Abingdon 
Press, 1962; Pierce, C.A. Conscience in the New Testament.  London: SCM Press, 1955. of C.S. Lewis’s Studies on 
Words.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.   
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Scholastics as synderesis) is rarely used in Plato and never used in Aristotle.58  The Greek word 
was used to mean “to share knowledge with oneself,” “to know with oneself,” or “to be a witness 
for or against oneself.”59  This understanding of syneidesis points toward the common 
understanding of conscience as something that exists at the core of each individual person, 
hearkening to him about a particular action or choice.  However, the Greek term could also mean 
“[to] know together with” or “[to] share (with someone) the knowledge that.”60  This meaning 
points to the reality of thinking together with others about something.  C.S. Lewis also points out 
that the prefix sun can have “a vaguely intensive force, so that the compound verb [i.e. sunoida 
or synoida] can simply mean ‘I know well,’ and perhaps a little more than ‘I know,’” thus 
pointing toward an interior awareness or consciousness in an individual human person.  The 
corresponding Latin term conscientia becomes the literal translation for syneidesis, and it is a 
compound word comprised of ‘cum’ meaning with and ‘scire’ meaning to know.  Conscientia 
was first used in a philosophical sense by the Epicureans.61  Both in the Latin and Greek classical 
usage, the sense of the word also implied a kind of secret knowledge shared between two or 
more persons or a sense of being in someone else’s confidence.62  In the typical Classical usage, 
this knowledge is also presumed “to be of evil unless the reverse is explicitly stated.”63  The 
critical point for understanding this pre-Christian Greek meaning and use of syneidesis is to note 
                                                 
58 Cf. Kries, Douglas.  The Problem of Natural Law chapter 1; D’Arcy, Eric.  Conscience and its Right to Freedom, 
chapter 1; and Fortin, Ernest.  “Augustine, Aquinas, and the Problem of Natural Law.” 
59 Cf. Potts, Timothy C. Conscience in Medieval Philosophy.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. P. 2. 
Potts quotes W. D. Davies from the 1962 edition of The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible on the definition of 
syneidesis. Importantly, Potts also points us to another late Greek term, synteresis, which, he writes could also be a 
corruption of syneidesis.  However, he notes that synteresis “most commonly means ‘preservation’ or 
maintenance’….  But the ‘syn-‘ prefix can also have a reflexive force, which gives it the sense of observing or 
watching over oneself and, perhaps, thereby preserving oneself from wrongdoing.” p. 10 
60Lewis, C.S. Studies in Words, 181. 
61 Potts, Timothy C. Conscience in Medieval Philosophy.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 2. Also 
see Fortin, Ernest. “The Political Implications of St. Augustine’s Theory of Conscience.”  The term is also widely 
used in the Cynic and Stoic writers,.  I will examine these sources in the next chapter.  
62 Cf. Lewis, C.S.  Studies in Words, 184-185.   
63Lewis, C.S. Studies in Words, 188. 
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that it was specifically evoked as some interior faculty or some shared knowledge that painfully 
chastised and judged a person for his evil actions.  Additionally, it is often associated with the 
divine for example; the Furies attack Orestes for his conscience in the Aeschylus’s Orestia.64  
D’Arcy and Davies both demonstrate that the ancient use of the term syneidesis does not 
necessarily act as a guide for future actions or contain a positive connotation of a ‘good 
conscience’ that guides action.65  A ‘good conscience’ in this Classical sense exists when a 
person is aware of no evil deed that he has done.  Conscience in its ancient, pre-Christian sense, 
functions in a ‘judicial’ manner by passing judgment on a past action and causing pain in the 
soul if the action is found to be evil.66 
The meaning of syneidesis and conscientia shifts significantly in the writings of St. Paul.  
According to Eric D’Arcy, the idea of conscience is transformed and expanded in St. Paul’s 
writings to mean a moral guide for discerning appropriate human actions.  D’Arcy demonstrates 
that conscience, “is to play a directive role before an action takes place… in St. Paul, conscience 
is credited with a legislative function, and it induces an obligation in the proper sense.”67  
However, as Ernest Fortin points out, St. Paul does not develop a comprehensive theory of 
conscience but frames his discussion of it as it relates to the place of the Gentiles in the Church 
and their relationship to the tenets of Mosaic Law.68  It is in the early Christian Church Fathers 
that we see the beginning of the cultivation and expansion of a theory of conscience that 
incorporates its significant role in the discernment between right and wrong moral action, as well 
                                                 
64 Cf. Davies, W.D. “Conscience.” In The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible.  Ed. Buttrick, George Arthur et al.  
New York: Abingdon Press, 1962.  For a general overview of the ancient Greek connation of conscience, see 
especially section 2 of this entry.   
65 Davies, W.D. “Conscience,” 673.   
66 D’Arcy, Eric.  Conscience and Its Right to Freedom, 8. 
67 D’Arcy, Eric.  Conscience and Its Right to Freedom, 11-12.  It is however, interesting to note C.A. Pierce in his 
study Conscience in the New Testament.  London: SCM Press, 1955, posits that St. Paul only begins to use the word 
synderesis because it was in popular use among the people of Corinth.  Cf. especially chapter VI.  
68 Fortin, Ernest L. The Political Implications of St. Augustine’s Theory of Conscience.” Augustinian Studies Vol. 1, 
1970, 135. 
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as a judicial role on past actions.  A robust theory of conscience that operationally blends the 
judicial, directive, and legislative functions of conscience, according to D’Arcy, begins in the 
early Church Fathers.69 
The etymology of the word points to a very important aspect not explicitly stated in the 
previous section.  Both the Greek syneidesis and the Latin conscientia are compound words that 
denote a shared knowledge, whether that knowledge is shared with another, with the divine, or 
with oneself.  Perhaps part of what makes conscience so difficult to define is this very 
etymological meaning.  On the one hand, this knowledge can be shared with someone else 
(making it common with someone other an individual) or it is shared with another or others or 
with the divine.  Thus, conscience has both an individual, social-relational, and a transcendental 
dimension.  Robert Vischer explains what he calls the ‘relational’ dimension of conscience:  
Conscience cannot be adequately explained as a freestanding individual construct.  It 
might be expressed and defended by the individual, but its substance and real-world 
implications are relational by their very nature.  Cultivating and maintaining the 
conditions necessary for these relationships to thrive should be a priority for our society if 
we are serious about freedom of conscience. . . .  Conscience, by its very nature, directs 
our gaze outward, to sources of formation, to communities of discernment, and to venues 
for expression.70 
 
Vischer points out perhaps one of the most critical points for understanding conscience: by its 
nature, it points beyond itself.  Even though it is expressed in an individual human person’s 
judgments and actions, these judgments and actions are made within the context of something or 
someone else.  In effect, a proper understanding of conscience will require an investigation of 
this relational dimension of conscience.71  The relational dimension, or perhaps more aptly the 
relational dimension of conscience is somehow influenced and formed by human relationships, 
                                                 
69 D’Arcy, Eric.  Conscience and Its Right to Freedom, Cf. Chapter 1. 
70 Vischer, Robert K. Conscience and the Common Good, 4. 
71 I have chosen to use Vischer’s term ‘relational’ instead of social or communal because the word ‘relational’ 
captures a deeper sense of community and real, concrete, lived interpersonal relationships with others.   
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and by institutions of civil society such as churches, universities, and businesses as well as by 
political institutions.  Gaining a better sense of the foundational elements of conscience to 
understand both the individual and the relational dimensions will enable us to accurately address 
the current crises of conscience, especially with respect to why the freedom of conscience ought 
to be politically protected.  Put differently, “if our society is to facilitate an authentic and robust 
liberty of conscience, it cannot reflexively favor individual autonomy against group authority; it 
must also work to cultivate the spaces in which individuals come together to live out the shared 
dictates of conscience.”72 
Thus far, we have ascertained two different functional properties of conscience, viz. the 
ancient judicial function of conscience and the Pauline directive or legislative functions.  We 
have recognized that the claims of conscience have been invoked politically by individual 
citizens as a protection against government coercion.  We have also identified a relational 
dimension to conscience, as individuals make moral decisions in the context of their 
relationships and communities.  However, these still do not determine what the essence of 
conscience actually is.  For this assessment, it will helpful to consider medieval Scholasticism 
because for the medieval scholars, classifying the different functions of conscience had become a 
standard practice.73  When the concept of conscience began to be more deeply explored in the 
medieval universities, the academic literature relied largely on scriptural commentaries produced 
by two of the early Christian Church Fathers, Origen and Jerome.  We will also examine these 
texts in the following chapter, but for now, suffice it to say that both Origen and Jerome 
classified conscience as an integral and indispensable element of the human psyche.  As 
medieval scholars developed theological and philosophical anthropologies based upon the 
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Scriptural commentaries of these and other Patristic writers, and theorized about the structure of 
the human soul, their specific academic study of conscience reached its zenith in the medieval 
universities, becoming “a standard component…[in] university seminars (written up as Debated 
Questions) and textbooks (Summae).”74  Between the years 1145-1151, Peter Lombard wrote the 
standard textbook on theology for the medieval university, and it was a compulsory prerequisite 
for the ‘masters’ students to write a commentary on this text.  This commentary included a 
significant contribution to be made on the topic of conscience.75  Within Peter Lombard’s work, 
drawing from the Patristic sources, the medieval theory of conscience began to develop its two-
fold classification to describe its function.  The primary, ineradicable structural element of 
conscience is the defined by the term Greek synderesis (the corruption of syneidesis) as 
mentioned above.  The Latin term conscientia is used to describe a second component of 
conscience, which is the component part of conscience that applies to human acts.  The medieval 
debate concerning conscience largely centers on where these two elements of conscience reside 
in the soul (the will, the reason, etc.) and how they both function in guiding human choice and 
human action, especially in relation to the experience of evil.   
 One distinguished medieval scholar, Thomas Aquinas, takes up this question of 
conscience not only in his scholarly commentary on Peter Lombard’s work, but also in his own 
academic disputations and Scriptural commentaries, and perhaps most famously, in his own 
textbook for beginning theology students, the Summa Theologiae.  It is essential for our political 
investigation of Aquinas’s idea of conscience that we look to the context of both his 
philosophical anthropology and his discussion of law.  Aquinas connects his philosophical 
anthropology to law and politics in several critical ways that prescribe the limits that politics 
                                                 
74 Potts, Timothy C.  Conscience in Medieval Philosophy, 1. 
75 Potts, Timothy C. Conscience in Medieval Philosophy, 1.  The text upon which the medieval students produced 
commentaries was from Peter Lombard’s Judgments or Sentences 2.39.   
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must observe with respect to the human person; and these limits are based upon both respect for 
and observance of the freedom of conscience as embodied in the law and in legal practice.  
Aquinas’s respect for the freedom of conscience is based in his understanding of the human 
person.  I will argue that the relational dimension of conscience is also to be found in Aquinas’s 
work, also based upon his understanding of the human person, particularly on his fundamental 
assertion of a shared rational basis for moral thinking.  Therefore, this dissertation will probe the 
political implications of Thomas Aquinas’s discourse on the idea of conscience in order to 
comprehend his distinctive contributions to our understanding of the role of conscience as a 
fundamental, valid, and authoritative factor influencing political thought, political philosophy, 
and political society.  I will examine the ways in which the philosophical anthropology of 
Aquinas, one that offers a vision of the human person as both a rational and political being, 
contributes to a balanced understanding of both the individual and relational aspects of 
conscience.  
III. Why Aquinas? 
 At first glance, it may seem odd that Aquinas be considered a suitable source to engage 
the political problems of conscience that are endemic to modernity, especially when we consider 
that his most influential work, the Summa Theologiae, is a text directed to beginning theology 
students in the medieval university.  Although he included in this work a ‘Treatise on Law’, he 
wrote no treatise on politics proper.  He left his commentary on Aristotle’s Politics almost 
entirely unfinished, commenting on only the first two and half books of the text.76  Aquinas 
never dedicates a complete work to the political question par excellence: “What is the best 
                                                 
76 Cf. Mary M. Keys Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Promise of the Common Good. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006.  From page 18: “Yet Aquinas left his Commentary on the ‘Politics’ radically incomplete.  Of the eight 
books of the Politics, Aquinas treats only the first two and half, his text finishing with an explication of Book III, 
chapter 8. . . .  Then his commentary ceases.”  
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regime?”; and when he does deal with this question, he gives seemingly contradictory remarks.77  
However, we can begin to appreciate the idea of the political significance of Aquinas’s work 
with a brief consideration of some relevant biographical facts about his life.78  The exact date of 
Thomas Aquinas’s birth is unknown, but it is thought to be between 1224 and 1225.  The 
thirteenth century into which Thomas was born was not a quiet or congenial time:  
What we must expect to find in the thirteenth century is constant change; changes 
produce movements, and movements occasion clashes….  Among them must be noted 
the conflict between secular and papal powers, evangelism and the rise of mendicant 
orders, spread of the mystical and prophetical doctrines of Abbot Joachim, and the 
growth of scholasticism in the schools of Western Europe.79 
 
The rise of scholasticism, to which Thomas himself heavily contributed and helped to define, 
was the West’s intellectual response to the re-introduction of the Aristotelian corpus by 
prominent Muslim and Jewish scholars.  Thomas came into this academically vigorous and 
politically restive cultural milieu as one of nine children born to nobleman Landulf d’Aquino and 
Theodora in Roccasecca, Italy.  Thomas was a younger son and therefore not to inherit the 
family estate, so his parents inclined him toward a distinguished ‘career’ in religious life that 
would befit a nobleman at the near-by Benedictine monastery of Monte Cassino.  They brought 
him there around the age of five to begin his education as a future Benedictine monk.  It is said 
that his parents had hoped he would become abbot of that influential monastery, and they were 
quite devastated when Thomas acted against their wishes and chose instead to enter the 
mendicant order of the Dominicans in 1244, with which he became acquainted while he was 
studying arts and philosophy at the University of Naples from 1239-1244.80  As a man of noble 
                                                 
77 Cf. Aquinas’s account in his treatise On Kingship compared with his account in the Summa Theologiae I-II 95: 4 
and I-II 105:1.   
78 For the biographical information in this section, however, I will rely primarily on James Weisheipl’s work, 
particularly from chapter 1.  Any other citations will be annotated separately.   
79 Weisheipl, James O.P. Friar Thomas D’Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works.  (New York: Doubleday, 1974), 2. 
80 It is here that most scholars believe Thomas was also first introduced to the work of Aristotle, which was 
forbidden in Paris at the time. Cf. Weisheipl, James p. 15.   
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birth, Thomas was expected to maintain a nobleman’s office, such as abbot of one of Italy’s 
finest monasteries – a monastery to which the family of Aquino had given much of their wealth.  
Thomas, however, was himself a man of conscience.  He rejected such an office and such a life, 
instead embracing a humble lifestyle as an impoverished monk.  It is famously told that 
Thomas’s brother, Reginaldo was sent by their mother to kidnap Thomas when he left to join the 
mendicant Order of Preachers so that the family could attempt to convince him otherwise.81 
 The radicalism of Thomas’s conscientious decision cannot be overstated.  During this 
period of history, the Roman Catholic Church was perhaps one of the wealthiest and most 
powerful political forces in medieval Western Europe.  The D’Aquino family was very involved 
in the politicking between popes and emperors, and Thomas’s brother Reginaldo, a courtier of 
the emperor, was put to death in 1246 for having conspired with the papacy to murder the 
emperor Frederick.  Placing Thomas in the abbey of Monte Cassino was a politically astute move 
for the Aquino family, who sought to promote best the family and expand its fortune.  Yet, 
Thomas’s opinion on these religious and political disputes is made obvious not only in his 
defiance of the family’s wishes when he left the Benedictines for the Order of Preachers, but also 
in his academic writings.  For example, in his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, 
Thomas writes that, “the Pope, in virtue of his canonical office, is the spiritual head of the 
Church and nothing else; every other political or worldly accretion to this essential spiritual 
authority is a historical accident.”82  Such a comment at this time in the history of Christendom 
was in fact quite radical.   
                                                 
81 There are many anecdotes about the kidnapping of Thomas by his family.  Almost all biographers of Aquinas note 
that while he was on his way to Paris with the Dominicans, his relatives kidnapped him to try to convince him to 
remain with the Benedictines at Monte Cassino.  Cf. Weisheipl, James.  Chapter I. 
82 Quotation is a summary of Thomas’s Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, II, Distinction 44 found in Weisheipl, 
James, 8.  Interestingly, when Thomas was captured by his brother, who was at the time at the emperor Frederick’s 
service, the Dominicans appealed to the papacy to free Thomas from his family.  Papal emissaries were sent to 
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 Not only was Thomas defying his family’s wishes by joining a mendicant order, but he 
also challenged medieval society at large and especially the academic culture that emerged at the 
new universities, who were all skeptical of the newly established mendicant orders.  Thomas 
Aquinas experienced the outright animosity from the ‘secular’ clergy (meaning that these were 
not members of religious orders but were still priests) toward the mendicants in the university.83  
In 1256, Thomas, along with Bonaventure, a Franciscan, were both denied membership in the 
theology faculty at the University of Paris because they were mendicant friars, and so they had to 
wait until the next year when they were begrudgingly accepted by Canon Christian de Verdun 
under the firm command of the Bishop of Paris and several papal Bulls.84  During the rest of his 
academic career, Thomas was constantly balancing his written academic treatises with treatises 
and disputations defending the mendicant orders, especially their place in the university and in 
the Church, and particularly against accusations that they were antichrists invading the university 
and perniciously infecting the life of the whole universal Church.85 
 The character and nature of Thomas’s work also illustrates his resolute adherence to the 
promptings of his own conscience.  As a Dominican scholar, he allied with fellow mendicant 
orders such as the Franciscans in the fight for their rightful place in the university; but when it 
came to the study and exegesis of Aristotle, Thomas certainly came into conflict with both his 
fellow mendicant and diocesan ‘secular’ colleagues.  Aquinas engaged the works of Aristotle and 
his non-Christian commentators with a respectful rigor and an honest commitment to truth 
during a time when Aristotle’s work was considered heretical by many members of the academy, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Frederick to no avail, since he both knew about the incident, and because Frederick “had no friendly feeling for the 
Dominicans, anyway, since they represented papal authority in his own realm.” Weisheipl, James, 33.   
83 In this context, secular does not refer to non-religious, but means those priests who were not members of religious 
orders.  These priests were diocesan clergy members.  
84Cf. Bourke, Vernon J.  Aquinas’ Search for Wisdom.  (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1965), 59-63.   
85Cf. Bourke, Vernon J.  Aquinas’ Search for Wisdom, 56. 
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thereby earning him a reputation among his colleagues as being academically dissident and 
dangerous.86  According to Vernon Bourke, Thomas’s reputation as dangerous can be 
summarized in three points.  The first point just mentioned above, that as a mendicant religious, 
fellow professors were suspicious of him.  Secondly, he was severely criticized for his 
interpretation of Aristotle by the ‘Latin Averroist’ school led by Siger de Brabant.  The Latin 
Averroists and Aquinas differed on matters relating to the structure of the human intellect, the 
eternal status of the world, and the function of the human will.  The Latin Averroists taught that 
“the human will is a passive potency that is actuated in its volitions by intellectual judgments 
regarding good and evil.  To many [medieval] theologians, this was tantamount to denying free 
will.”87  Aquinas’s reply to this particular conflict (he argued that the will was partly passive and 
partly active) caused grave suspicion of him among the more conservative theologians in the 
medieval university.88  This points to the third element marking Thomas as ‘dangerous’: “More 
and more he became an object of suspicion to the more traditional theologians in the Orders, 
both Dominican and Franciscan, and to the diocesan authorities.”89  This conflict culminated in 
1277 when Bishop Etienne Tempier of Paris issued a condemnation of 219 philosophical 
postulates including 20 academic theories based on the insight and teaching of Aquinas.  A 
fellow colleague at the University of Paris, John Peckman, who later became the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, used his Episcopal authority to condemn many of Thomas Aquinas’s ideas in his 
diocese.90  This historical background information illustrates that despite considerable 
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89Bourke, Vernon J.  Aquinas’ Search for Wisdom, 168. 
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opposition, Thomas tenaciously pursued truth as honestly as possible and in accord with his own 
conscience.  Furthermore, it provides an excellent support to our premise of the importance of 
his ideas upon the proper understanding of conscience within the order of political society.   
IV. Aquinas and Contemporary Politics 
 It was not until after Thomas was elevated to sainthood in the Roman Catholic Church 
in1325 that his teachings were no longer condemned as heretical.  Despite the lifting of this 
stigma of heresy, Thomas Aquinas was not then and certainly not even today always appreciated 
or fully embraced by many scholars.  After a surge in Thomistic studies in the twentieth century 
post World War II, many contemporary scholars, and especially political theorists remain 
skeptical about Aquinas’ contribution to political philosophy qua philosophy.  There are some 
who even insinuate that the doctrine of natural law and especially the Thomistic treatment of 
conscience, for instance, are untenable without the aid of revealed theology, and therefore should 
be considered unscientific and unacceptable as a philosophical theory based purely on a common 
human reason.  For example, Leo Strauss argues in Natural Right and History:  
 The Thomistic doctrine of natural right, or more generally expressed, of natural law is 
 free from the hesitations and ambiguities which are characteristic of the teachings, not 
 only of Plato and Cicero, but of Aristotle as well. . . .  The doctrine of synderesis or of 
 conscience explains why the natural law can always be duly promulgated to all men and 
 hence be universally obligatory.  It is reasonable to assume that these profound changes 
 were due to the influence of the belief in biblical revelation.  If this assumption should 
 prove to be correct, one would be forced to wonder, however, whether the natural law as 
 Thomas Aquinas understands it is natural law strictly speaking, i.e., a law knowable to 
 the unassisted human mind, to the human mind which is not illumined by divine 
 revelation.91 
Strauss is uncomfortable with the doctrine of conscience, or ‘synderesis,’ a term for one level of 
conscience employed by Aquinas, not only because this idea does not appear in any Classical 
texts, but also because it demands that the precepts of natural law, which are universally 
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available and knowable to all men in all times be absolute, unmalleable, and unchangeable. Yet, 
he writes, such precepts “must be mutable in order to cope with the inventiveness of evil.”92 
Instead of natural law based on precepts known to men through their consciences, Strauss opts 
for what he calls Classical natural right theory, a theory which avoids the extremes of both the 
absolutism of natural law (or at least absolutism as he perceives it) and of moral relativism, 
which claims no distinction between right and wrong.    
 According to Strauss, the natural right theory of Plato and Aristotle is mutable because it 
recognizes: 
 A universally valid hierarchy of ends, but [according to natural right] there are not 
 universally valid rules of action…. [W]hen deciding what ought to be done, i.e., what to  
 be done by this individual (or this individual group) here and now, one has to consider  
 not only which of the various competing objectives is higher in rank but also which is  
 most urgent in the circumstances. What is most urgent is legitimately preferred to what is 
 less urgent, and the most urgent is in many cases lower in rank than the less urgent. But  
 one cannot make a universal rule that urgency is a higher consideration than rank 
 [emphasis mine].  For it is our duty to make the highest activity, as much as we can, the  
 most urgent or the most needful thing. And the maximum of effort which can be expected 
 necessarily varies from individual to individual.  The only universally standard is the  
 hierarchy of ends. This standard is sufficient for passing judgment on the level of 
 nobility of individuals and groups and of actions and institutions.  But it is insufficient for 
 guiding our actions.93 
 
Closer scrutiny of this passage from Strauss gives a better sense of his rejection of the doctrine of 
conscience, especially in relationship to the natural law.  According to Strauss’s analysis of 
Aquinas, conscience is what makes intelligible to all human beings the basic precepts of the 
natural law.  Natural law commands an absolute set of precepts that give to us universal rules 
governing human action.  Strauss assumes a perspective in his assertion that any set of absolute 
or universal rules governing human action is unacceptable to and incompatible with the shifting 
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currents of political reality.  Political reality, in his view, requires that certain individuals, 
groups, or institutions exist under particular conditions, and therefore must disregard universal 
rules in favor of universal hierarchy of ends for the preservation of society.94  What is acceptable 
for political society is a ‘universally valid hierarchy of ends,’ or a way of determining the ‘less 
urgent’ ends from the ‘more urgent’ ones. Yet, Strauss at the end of this passage introduces 
another element in the determination of urgency; that is, our duty to make the highest activity the 
most urgent and the judgments we make of the nobility of individuals, groups, and institutions. 
What remains unclear in this Straussian schema is a method or criteria by which to determine the 
most urgent ends or highest activity to achieve these ends within a society.  His natural right 
theory claims no such capacity.  Strauss leaves us wondering what, if anything, can provide such 
criteria.   
 Strauss relates another more significant objection to natural law and the doctrine of 
conscience.  He contends that the Thomistic view of natural law, one that proposes real, tangible, 
and universal criteria for judging right and wrong moral action, is based upon biblical revelation, 
and therefore inaccessible to those who do not profess belief in such revelation.95  Revelation is 
dependent upon a divine source for its legitimacy and not all may agree on the nature and 
authority of such a divine source.  It is this problem that Strauss’s student, Harry Jaffa, explores 
more extensively in his Thomism and Aristotelianism.  Jaffa explicitly compares the writings of 
Aristotle with Aquinas’s commentaries on Aristotle to disclose a more accurate description of 
the difference between natural right and natural law.  Like Strauss, Jaffa recognizes that modern 
social science operates by a rejection of systems of values, and is challenged by “any effort to 
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bring ‘values’ within the compass of science.”96  Contemporary social science presumes all value 
judgments that determine what ‘ought’ to be done as essentially arbitrary and radically 
unscientific.97  How to determine whether a system of values is actually true is a territory that the 
social sciences acutely avoid.   
 Jaffa more forcefully contends that any promotion of values in the public sphere 
associated with religion must be avoided.  He acknowledges that religious faith may determine 
values within its believers, but a fundamental principle of contemporary democratic liberalism is 
to keep religious values outside the public sphere and inconsequential to political decisions.  
Jaffa proposes instead a reconsideration of Aristotelian political and moral philosophy based 
upon natural reason as the primary guide for value judgments and objective political decisions.  
According to Jaffa, Aquinas’s system does not offer the same basis.  He writes: 
 [I]n Thomas’ own system theology, or, more correctly, revealed theology, takes 
 precedence over the teachings of natural reason.  And, although Thomas affirms the 
 independence and the separability from revealed theology of the teachings of natural 
 reason, those who dissent from his theology have the understandable suspicion that such 
 ‘harmony’ as Thomas finds between the teachings of reason and of revelation is primarily 
 due to a corruption of the former….  [This may has also lead] to the further suspicion that 
 the doctrine itself, to be susceptible to such ‘harmonization,’ must somehow be deficient.  
 If it can be ‘harmonized’ with a system of revealed theology which appears in all its vital 
 aspects so manifestly opposed to it, how can it have any real inner core capable of 
 providing independent practical guidance?98 
Jaffa’s essential question regarding the appropriateness of the application of Aquinas’s thought 
to political science is whether there is “anything in the nature of man…which leads him to know 
the goodness and desirability of certain kinds of moral conduct, analogous to the way in which 
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he is led to recognize the intrinsic goodness of theoretical knowledge?”99  Thomas Aquinas 
answers affirmatively to this question, pointing to conscience, or more precisely, the primary 
level of conscience called synderesis as the natural habit of the human person by which human 
beings know naturally (that is, instinctive to their nature as human beings) the first principles of 
practical reason as expressed in the natural law.  Synderesis, therefore, acts as a guide to 
recognize and discern moral choice and action.100  Jaffa questions the existence of such a natural 
habit: “Is there a natural habit by which we are commanded to do the acts of the virtues, and by 
which we have a sufficient knowledge of these actions to be able to carry out the commands? 
This would evidently have to be the case if the natural law is promulgated; and of course, if it 
were not promulgated it would not have its strictly legal character.”101  For Aquinas, synderesis 
is connected to human knowledge of natural law, which directs human choice and action.  It is 
through conscience that all human beings apprehend the first principles of practical reason.   
 However, Jaffa rejects the place of natural law as a guiding system of values for the 
social sciences.  Synderesis, he contends, is too vague a concept and it is not found among the 
Classical authors, particularly not in Aristotle:  
 One thing…is perfectly clear, namely: that there is no mention of synderesis (or of any 
 possible equivalent) by Aristotle….  Thomas borrows the idea of a natural habit of the 
 principles relative to the end, which Aristotle sets forth with regard to speculative 
 knowledge, and says that the same thing must be true of moral action.  Why it must be 
 true Thomas nowhere says.  Nor does he offer any evidence that it is true.102 
 
If human beings do not have a clear knowledge of natural law, how then are moral choices to be 
made?  What determines the criteria and standards for morality?  Further, how can communities 
and society at large think together about the common good?  Jaffa offers a solution based upon 
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his reading of the natural right tradition of Aristotle. He advocates a Classical natural right 
approach that provides a regime-centered morality. It is worth quoting Jaffa at length to 
understand his point: 
 [L]egal justice commands all the acts of all the virtues from the point of view of the 
 common good, as conceived by any given political order or regime.  But some political 
 orders are better than others. Therefore, the general character of morality will vary from 
 regime to regime. Now if the general character of morality varies, then the precepts of a 
 universal code cannot determine what is naturally just for all men everywhere [emphasis 
 mine]. Thomas’ rigid scheme is inconsistent with Aristotle’s principle that what is just is 
 roughly equated with what is legally just, if what is legally just depends upon the nature 
 of the regime and not upon a code of natural right.  But what if it be supposed that the 
 constitution or regime is a very poor one? We refer, first, to Aristotle’s statement at the 
 end of Book IV, concerning shame: the good man will defer to the standard of common 
 opinion, even if it be wide of the truth . . . .  The good man, therefore, defers to the law of 
 imperfect communities, and hence to its moral code; and what the good man does is 
 morally right.  In other words, not to obey the law and the customs of one’s community is 
 usually unjust, and hence contrary to natural right.  As natural right enjoins obedience to 
 any legal justice which may reasonably be said to aim at the common good, it would 
 seem to follow that for the most part, it would seem to follow that for the most part, the 
 mutability of natural right follows, pari passu, the mutability of constitutions. . . .  The 
 common good is the end of the political community.  Some communities have very 
 imperfect notions of what constitutes the common good, yet the preservation of that 
 imperfect order may yield more of what is truly good than any attempted change.103 
Jaffa proposes the Aristotelian paradigm of a regime centered morality, one that is deeply rooted 
in the common good of the community, even if that concept of the common good could be 
distorted, unjust, or imperfect.  A universal code of morality, one that would be accessible to all 
human beings by nature through their conscience poses a problem and a direct challenge to a 
moral code determined by a political regime—a moral code that may require simply by its day-
to-day demands on its citizens a violation of a fundamental tenet of that moral code, viz. to 
promote and to secure the common good.   
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 In her study Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Promise of the Common Good, Mary Keys 
closely examines Jaffa’s challenges to Aquinas and offers an alternative interpretation of 
Aquinas’s work in relation to political science.  She argues that Aquinas’s insights into political 
life, specifically his emphasis on virtue and the common good can help to “moderate as well as 
ennoble civic endeavors.”104  Keys first explains more fully the meaning of the common good, 
especially as contemporary liberal democratic societies conceive of it.  She specifically calls 
attention to the American example, which seeks to reconcile the claims of individual rights and 
responsibilities and the comprehensive concept of the common good of all citizens.  She 
challenges the American regime’s conception of the ‘common good.’  By emphasizing the 
insistence in American politics on a strict separation between Church and State, Keys illustrates 
the difficulty for us today to imagine “a virtue-promoting, morally substantive, version of the 
concept that is not religious or a religious one that is not unreasonable and repressive when it 
informs practice.”105  Aquinas’s natural law theory is often conflated with such religious belief 
that is ‘unreasonable and repressive.’  But Keys rejects the imposition of this interpretation of 
Aquinas, and argues instead that it is precisely because of his religious orientation, that Aquinas 
is able to explore “new panoramas and possibilities for philosophic questioning and 
development, many of which remain socially and politically relevant even for those who did not 
share his religious convictions.”106  As an explanation of how Aquinas is able to achieve this, 
Keys argues that he examines three Aristotelian political-philosophic foundations; viz., the idea 
that human beings are by nature political beings, the classification of regime types corresponds 
to the “conceptions of citizenship and civic virtue,” and the idea that political science should 
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offer an account for the best possible regime.107  Keys asserts that the Aristotelian account 
particularly of the second and third foundations is unsatisfactory for Aquinas, because Aristotle 
does not take seriously enough the “common good of justice and its transpolitical reach,” but 
rather “[forsakes] foundational work too quickly in favor of focusing on regime particularities 
and preservation.  Where the political dialectic of regimes leads Aristotle to a thorough inquiry 
of the best regime…in Politics VII and VIII, for Aquinas it prompts a return to the source, to the 
common and even universal moral dimensions of social and civic life.”108 
 Keys continues to examine Aquinas’s concept of the common good and universal moral 
dimensions of social life found particularly in his account of the natural law: “Aquinas’s natural 
law theory comprises a subtle yet significant philosophic revision of Aristotle’s framework, 
incorporating a new theory of principles of practical reasoning to complement Aristotle’s 
speculative first principles and adding an account of synderesis and conscience to Aristotle’s 
psychology.”109  Why does Aquinas introduce these new elements of a natural law, viz. 
principles of practical reason, conscience, and synderesis?  Why and how would these ‘new 
foundations’ help to amplify and to clarify our understanding of political reality?  Although Keys 
argues that Aquinas shifts the emphasis of morality to the interior of the human person, how 
might his understanding of the common good contribute to a relational sense of conscience?   
In Strauss, Jaffa, and Keys’ accounts of Aristotelian political science, the focus is on “the 
specific principles, aims, institutions, flaws, and mechanisms for strengthening the various 
regime types, including oligarchy and tyranny.”110  The result of such a focus is a regime-
centered determination of morality that may too easily transgress the freedom of the human 
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person, especially in an unjust regime, such as oligarchy or tyranny.  What would be the fate, for 
example, of the conscientious objector in such an unjust regime?  We have had many recent 
answers to this question in the Middle East where in the past two years, we have seen a majority 
of the people in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen objecting to (and in some cases, 
ousting) their political leaders, most of whom are considered corrupt dictators or even tyrants. In 
these regimes conscientious objection was disapproved and incapacitated with the only possible 
resolution being subversion and revolution.  Aquinas’s theory of natural law moves beyond 
regime particularities and offers other criteria upon which we can know the common human 
good and how to achieve it.  It places “greater emphasis on the interiority of the individual and 
on the court of conscience where that individual is always responsible to others.”111  The critical 
insight for Aquinas’s account is the transpolitical end (telos) of all human beings.  Therefore, 
Aquinas emphasizes that “[the] political community aims at or seeks the common good, the 
highest good to be found and approximated or achieved in human affairs and by human actions.  
Political community does not itself constitute that good.”112 
 Ernest L. Fortin, along with Mary Keys, also stresses the importance of a theory of 
conscience as an element of the human person that essentially limits the scope of positive law 
and political regimes.  According to Fortin, the political importance of conscience is based upon 
its “appeal to a higher law in the light of which particular laws and the acts commanded by them 
are deemed objectionable or unjust. . . .  The crucial political implication [of conscience] is that 
human life requires a universality that it did not have and could not have as long as the polis and 
its regime represented for most men a total way of life.  Civil society is displaced as the locus of 
                                                 
111 Keys, Mary M.  Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Promise of the Common Good, 124. 
112 Keys, Mary M.  Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Promise of the Common Good, 86.   
37 
  
virtue and the object of man’s deepest and most noble attachments.”113  Fortin explains that one 
of the central insights of Aquinas’s contribution to political philosophy is his theory of natural 
law that allows for the realization and actualization of  
 [A] human excellence [that is] no longer defined or circumscribed by the conditions of 
 political life.  Through knowledge of the natural law man accedes directly the common 
 order of reason, over and above the political order to which he belongs as a citizen of a 
 particular society.  By sharing in that law he finds himself, along with all other intelligent 
 beings, a member of a universal community or cosmopolis ruled by divine providence  
 and whose justice is vastly superior to that of any human regime. . . .  Civil society ceases 
 to be uniquely responsible for the totality of moral virtue and is itself judged by a higher  
 standard to which human actions must conform universally.114 
 
What is emphasized in Aquinas’s account of our knowledge of the natural law is not only the 
idea of conscience, but also its foundation in shared human reason which points all human beings 
to a shared end—an end that is not and cannot ever be fulfilled by any political regime.  This is a 
critical element in Aquinas’s notion of conscience, and it is one that distinguished his own theory 
from those of his contemporaries.   
 Fortin elaborates his assertion that Aquinas’s most unique contribution to political 
science is the natural law.  Some justification for this assertion can be seen by considering 
Aristotle’s externally directed question, “What is a good man?”  Aquinas refines the question 
slightly by adding a new dimension, “Why should one be a good man?” and “How does one 
choose moral good?”  The new dimension turns the question to the interior life of the individual 
human person, and the guide to that interior life is defined by Aquinas as conscience, which, he 
describes as a habit of reason.  But for Aquinas, there is an additional dimension to conscience, 
viz. the connection between human reason and the Divine.  Conscience points the person beyond 
his own beliefs or individual preferences.  Fortin explains:  
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 As a law of nature, the natural law shares in reason and cannot be reduced exclusively to 
 the will of God.  The actions that it commands or forbids are intrinsically good or bad; 
 they are not good or bad simply as a result of their being commanded or forbidden by 
 God.  As a law, however, it also contains an explicit reference to God’s will, to which it 
 owes its moving force.  It thus stands midway between the natural right doctrine of the 
 nonreligious philosophic tradition on the one hand and the strict voluntarism of the 
 nonphilosophic religious tradition on the other.”115 
The very notion that natural law is grounded in human reason yet still capable of being 
influenced by a Divine source of authority is precisely what makes it a difficult theory for 
contemporary political science.  
 Yet the idea of a universality of the natural law as proposed by Aquinas leads to another 
political problem.  Fortin and Keys posit that Aquinas is not satisfied with the Aristotelian, or 
even the more general Classical account of political life that places the consummate human good 
within a political regime.  Any moral order determined solely by a political regime is 
problematic for Aquinas.  Aquinas emphasizes in his account of political life the shift away from 
the exterior political regime to the interior dimension of the individual human person, and that 
interior life is guided by the principles of conscience that transcend the social-political order in 
which the individual lives and participates.  Thereby, Aquinas’s theory of conscience advances 
the contention that one’s adherence to conscience over the positive law merits the respect if not 
the approval of society at large since the man who appeals to its dictates is presumably faithful to 
a law that transcends both himself and society.116  Further, this law that transcends any particular 
political regime is accessible to all and shared by all – pointing toward the relational element of 
conscience.   
The appeal to conscience has its authority in some greater, interior law that commands 
our obedience even to the point of disobeying the legally coercive power of a given positive law.  
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Yet, those who enforce the positive law are not always accepting of an appeal to conscience; for, 
as Fortin points out, “it is frequently impossible to determine with any degree of certitude 
whether [a conscientious] dissenter is sincere or merely guided by selfish motives, especially if 
the law from which he seeks exemption makes harsh or unpleasant demands on him.”117 
With this argument, both the existence and legitimacy of appeals to conscience are frequently 
denied.  We might consider the famous example of Socrates who was charged with transgressing 
the laws of Athens.  Rather than disobey the promptings of his conscience (or his daimon since 
the terms ‘conscience’ is not a word that Socrates used), Socrates suffers the penalty of death.  
Socrates’ death dramatically illustrates that when the power of conscience threatens the power of 
a political regime, conscience often loses. 
 Fortin claims that Aquinas’s unique and most essential enterprise was his integration of 
Christian principles into Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic philosophy.  This vision differed from his 
contemporaries, who viewed the sciences of the world from a more Augustinian point of view, 
which interpreted the sciences as illuminating man’s final end—the sciences form an integrated 
whole illumined by faith.  Aquinas, on the other hand, makes a clear distinction between the 
science of faith and those of philosophy, although like Augustine before him, however, he 
assumes no fundamental disagreement between faith and reason.118  However, when the 
perennial questions are posed about how human beings ought to live and to order themselves 
both individually and in communities, this vision of Aquinas anticipates that different answers 
offered by faith and by reason become more acute.  Reason may answer that the right order to 
life is based on convention, or advocate that the natural right tradition may offer the solution that 
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human beings should live according to the true principles of nature.  But those principles are 
accessible to only a few of the truly wise philosophers.   
 Faith, or more precisely, Christian faith, offers a vision of living well that is accessible to 
all because Christ came to save all and all human beings share the same telos of eternal life.  
Thus, there is a shared sense of the common good that all humans have.  Living well means 
following Christ and acting in accordance with the will of God that is known through “the grace 
of the Spirit [that] constitutes supreme virtue or the best life possible for a human being. 
[However,] is it possible to claim that [these] seemingly quite different ways of life can be the 
best possible ways of life?”119  Natural law seeks to alleviate the tension between the presumable 
conflicting answers of faith and reason by integrating both in the account for basic human 
inclinations.  However, still unaddressed are two essential contentions concerning the theory of 
natural law, specifically, the epistemological questions of the knowledge it contains and the 
mode of intelligible access to its precepts.  In other words, how can individual human beings, 
each of whom may disagree about the nature of the good, uniformly know the basic moral 
principles offered in the natural law?  In answer, Aquinas points to conscience.  
 Yet again we come full circle as we regard the assertion of Douglas Kries.  Kries 
contends that it is precisely the idea of conscience that the contemporary scholars of political 
science finds difficult to accept.  Natural law assumes a basic knowledge of moral principles 
based on the doctrine of synderesis. The doctrine of synderesis assumes that the knowledge of 
moral principles is no longer “the purview of philosophers alone. . . .  The strenuous ascent out 
of the cave through the dialectical process embedded in liberal education is not essential; 
synderesis gives the human intellect the basic tools for solving the problems.  Nor is the 
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knowledge of natural right any longer limited to philosophers.”120  Kries further clarifies this 
hesitation to accept such knowledge of moral principles: 
 Theologians, particularly those of the Reformed Tradition of Christianity, tend to reject 
 natural law teaching because, as a concept imported into Christianity from  arrogant 
 philosophy, it underestimates the complete fallenness of human nature, including the 
 human intellect’s inability to grasp moral truth on its own.  Philosophers, on the other 
 hand, particularly those who adhere to ancient or classical natural right teaching and 
 suspect that natural is a concept imported into philosophy from irrational Christianity [i.e.
 political philosophers who follow the thinking of Leo Strauss on this particular topic], 
 tend to reject natural law because it overestimates the intellectual abilities and proclivities 
 of human beings who are not philosophically adept.121 
Kries argues that for natural law to have any authority in the public sphere, it will have to either 
“reconsider or even set aside certain aspects of its teaching on conscience.”122  He examines 
several contemporary schools of thought that conflict with natural law specifically because of its 
insistence on a universal knowledge of basic moral principles through conscience, and he argues 
that simply “bracketing the claims about conscience” could perhaps allow for a stronger 
consensus on moral claims.123  The weakness of Kries’ conclusion is that he does not explain 
how the claims of conscience could be ‘bracketed out’ or what the implications of doing so 
would be.  What kind of moral consensus could be made if it remains unclear as to how and 
whether human beings can know anything about morality?  Significantly, he also does not 
examine whether or not the claims of conscience, particularly as given in Thomas Aquinas’s 
account of the natural law, are in fact a true.  
 Additionally significant to this debate concern the matter of conscience is presented by 
Alasdair MacIntyre.  In Whose Justice, Which Rationality?, Alasdair MacIntyre situates his 
treatment of Aquinas’s account of conscience in the context of his account of human 
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inclinations, moral knowledge, and action.  Aquinas teaches that human beings engage in 
practical rational activities, especially in ethical decision-making.  Ethical decision making, that 
is to say, the decisions made with the consultation of conscience, is therefore intimately linked to 
natural human inclinations and to human reason.  MacIntyre explains:  
 There is the directedness of each person qua being toward persisting in that being, 
 toward self-preservation.  There is the directedness of each person qua animal expressed 
 in the purposiveness of the bearing and education of children to participate in the forms 
 of human life.  And there is the directedness of each person qua rational and social being 
 in the purposiveness of the pursuit of those rational goods which include the pursuit of 
 knowledge of God.124 
 
According to MacIntyre, it is essential that our human inclinations are ordered, and the order of 
these inclinations determines our pursuit of particular goods.  Yet, the order of these inclinations 
(and hence of the human good) requires the proficient exercise of our rationality when we are 
faced with a decision regarding a variety of goods.  For example, “We subordinate our need for 
self-preservation if the lives of our children or the security of our community are gravely 
endangered.”125  The choice to subordinate our own good (i.e. self preservation) for the good of 
another requires the exercise of ethical (i.e. practical) reasoning. But how does one make this 
choice?  MacIntyre replies, “Each individual has within him or herself, on Aquinas’ view, a 
capacity for giving the right answers, but this capacity has to be elicited.”126  Conscience is the 
wellspring of this capacity.  MacIntyre’s response to what conscience elicits is couched within 
the context of the knowledge of good and evil, which directs moral action.  If, as Thomas 
Aquinas asserts, the first principles and precepts of natural law are universally known to 
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individual human beings because they are self-evident, how can moral disagreements exist? Or, 
as MacIntyre explains,  
 If Aquinas’s account is true, we should, so it seems, expect to encounter a much higher 
 degree of uniformity in moral belief and moral judgment than we actually find.  It is also 
 that on Aquinas’s account the primary precepts of the natural law satisfy the requirements 
 of practical reason and all sets of precepts incompatible with them fail to do so. We 
 should also expect…that in rational enquiry and debate the superiority of those precepts 
 would generally become evident without any great difficulty.  But this too is not the case.  
 So there is a problem.127 
 
The question of moral consensus presupposes at least three other fundamental questions, viz. 
what is good and how do human beings know what is good, and further, how might we discern 
the ways to pursue good and to avoid evil?128 
 John Finnis also offers a unique view of the natural law and how it fits into to 
contemporary political dialogue.  Known as one of the ‘New Natural Law’ proponents, Finnis’s 
central argument regarding the natural law is the rejection of the influence of either an account of 
nature or metaphysics that grounds the natural law.129  He bases his argument by drawing both 
from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Thomas Aquinas’s commentary on this text.  Aristotle 
and Aquinas identify four distinct ‘orders’ of science.  He writes: 
 Central to [Thomas Aquinas’s account of social theory, political theory, legal theory,  
 and theory of justice] is the conclusion that the sciences are of four irreducibly distinct  
 kinds: (1) Science of matters and relationships unaffected by our thinking, i.e. of the  
 ‘order of nature’...; (2) the science of the order we can bring into our own thinking, i.e.,  
 logic in its widest sense; (3) the sciences of the order we can bring into our deliberation,  
 choosing, and voluntary actions, i.e. the moral, economic, and political sciences  
 compendiously called philosophia moralis; (4) the sciences of the multitude of practical 
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 arts, the technologies or techniques which, by bringing order into mater of any kind  
 external to our thinking and willing, yield ‘things constituted by human reason.’130 
  
There are several key points that are essential to understanding social and political life according 
to Finnis’s account.  First, he places human actions and political society “constituted by human 
actions” in the third order listed above, i.e. in the order of deliberation, choosing, and voluntary 
action.  This is central to Finnis’s argument, for he contends that “human actions and societies 
cannot adequately be described, explained, justified, or criticized unless they are understood as 
also, and centrally, the carrying out of free choices.  For neither the making of free choices nor 
any of their consequences regarded as such can be reducible to nature, logic, or technique,” that 
is to say, the making of free choices cannot fit into any other order of reality as classified 
above.131  It is precisely the element of free choice, writes Finnis, that many political scientists 
since Thomas Hobbes reject when theorizing about social and political phenomena.132 
 For Finnis, it is essential that the philosophia moralis is placed in this ‘third order,’ the 
realm that relates to human actions and is governed by practical reason.  He insists that it remains 
entirely outside of and unconnected to questions about what is (which would pertain to the first 
order according to this schema).  To sum up the point, Finnis maintains that an ‘ought’ cannot be 
derived from an ‘is.’133  He writes: 
 [The] epistemic source of the first practical principles is not human nature or a prior, 
 theoretical understanding of human nature (though a theoretical knowledge of the 
 efficacy, as means, of certain chooseable conduct is relevant to our knowledge of first 
 practical principles).  Rather, the epistemic relationship is the reverse: any deep 
 understanding of human nature, i.e. the capacities which will be fulfilled by action which 
 participates in  and realizes those goods, those perfections, is an understanding which has 
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 amongst its sources our primary, undemonstrated by genuine practical knowledge of 
 those goods and purposes.134 
 
These first practical principles are listed as the precepts of the natural law in Aquinas’s Summa 
Theologiae.135  According to Finnis, the first principles of practical reason are not dependent 
upon a theoretical knowledge of human nature.  They are pre-philosophical and self-evident 
principles that guide human action through the natural law.  But how can we call these first 
practical principles the principles of natural law if they are not based upon a theoretical 
understanding of human nature?  Finnis answers: “One understands human nature by 
understanding human capacities, those capacities by understanding human acts, and those acts by 
understanding their objects.”136  By arguing that, “capacities are known from their activities and 
natures from their capacities,” Finnis constructs his argument so that practical and theoretical 
intellects are autonomous.137  Finnis’s point is an epistemological one: “His point is that we 
come to knowledge of human nature from knowledge of human action; therefore we do not come 
to knowledge of human action or of what we ought to do from nature.”138  This would seem to 
solve the problem of deriving a moral directive (ought) from a claim of nature (is).   
 An additional critical question that Finnis raises is “Is that pre-philosophical grasp of first 
principles independent of our knowledge of brute facts about the world?”139  Further, how would 
conscience fit into knowing these first principles and how they relate to the ‘brute facts’ about 
the world?  Thomas Aquinas never anticipated a ‘naturalistic’ fallacy of deriving an ‘ought’ from 
an ‘is, and according to Ralph McInerny, the fixation of the New Natural Law proponents on the 
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fact/value distinction (or the is/ought problem) presents a dubious theory of practical reason 
because its capabilities have been truncated.  McInerny explains: 
 A view of practical reason which regards knowledge of the world to be irrelevant to it 
 is clearly a view different from what we encounter in Aristotle or St. Thomas.  The theory 
 of practical reason developed by St. Thomas is a good deal more complicated than  
 the…view Grisez and Finnis seem to espouse.140 
 
McInerny asserts that Aquinas presents a much more substantial theory of practical reason than 
the New Natural Law theorists allow for; and their rejection of certain facts about the human 
person as ‘morally irrelevant’ undermines Aquinas and seriously weakens the impact of the New 
Natural Law theory as presented by thinkers such John Finnis and Germain Grisez.141  Our own 
assumption argues that more complete treatment of these controversial questions relating to 
human nature, its relationship to natural law, and the relationship between conscience, practical 
reason, natural law, and moral action can be found in a closer re-examination of Aquinas’s 
treatment of them.142  The New Natural Law theory attempts to fuse the process of ethic decision 
making to a particular understanding of practical reason, but Gerald McKenny observes that 
perhaps there are simply too many disagreements about the nature of human reason, and it has 
become “futile…simply to appeal to reason in the face of moral disagreement today.  In this 
respect, the Christian natural law tradition appears to share the fate of the Enlightenment project 
itself, which proved unable to ground moral and political values in reason alone.... Both fail to 
                                                 
140 McInerny, Ralph.  Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas.  (Washington, D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 1st Edition, 54-55 
141 Cf. Ralph McInerny.  Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, 56.   
142 To my knowledge, the New Natural Law school has not worked out a theory of conscience as it relates to the 
natural law.  Germain Grisez in his The Way of the Lord Jesus Christ Volume I includes a 20 page section on 
conscience as it relates to Catholic moral theology (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), and John Finnis has 
written a short critical essay, “Conscience and the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk,” offering a critique of John 
Cardinal Newman’s view of conscience that is printed in a collection of essays entitled, Newman After a Hundred 
Years, Eds. Ker and Hill, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.  By my reading, the New Natural Law school 
seems to conflate conscience as Aquinas explains it with how they explain practical reason.  Compare Grisez, Boyle, 
and Finnis’s article “Practical Principles, Moral Truths, and Ultimate Ends” in American Journal of Jurisprudence 
(32): 1987, pp. 99-152 to Ralph McInerny’s chapter on “Prudence and Conscience” in Ethica Thomistica: The 
Moral Philosophy of  Thomas Aquinas, Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1982.   
47 
  
show in a convincing way how this tradition [i.e. the natural law tradition] can effectively 
overcome moral disagreements today.”143 
In Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Alasdair MacIntyre restates this same position but 
connects to the particular component of justice within the framework of politics.  He contends 
that there are many variations on the meaning of justice, causing an atmosphere of “conflicting 
conceptions of justice” which stems from the underlying problem that Gerald McKenny points to 
above, viz. the discord about the meaning of practical rationality.144  We should consider how 
MacIntyre makes this connection.  While MacIntyre certainly acknowledges that the questions 
related to theories of morality and to the meaning of justice are legitimate matters for speculative 
inquiry, he makes a critical connection between these two theoretical questions and their 
practical implications: 
 Fundamental moral disagreements are indeed a matter for theoretical, philosophical 
 enquiry, just because in such moral disagreement each contending party presupposes a 
 view of human nature for which truth is claimed…. But disagreements concerning 
 the truth of this or that theoretical account of the human end initially come to our 
 attention, not directly but indirectly, at first in the form of practical disagreements about 
 how we ought to act here and now.145 
MacIntyre suggests that our encounters with critical moral, social, and political disagreements 
are intricately linked to the disagreements about human ends, and this debate leads to conflict 
about what ought to be done here and now. One of these very disagreements is precisely about 
the capabilities of our practical reason.  Here, we pose the question, what has any of this to do 
with our conscience?  Aquinas answers by indispensably situating conscience into a resonating 
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relationship with practical reason.  Therefore any proper understanding of conscience 
presupposes a proper understanding of practical reason. 
 The foregoing discussion reviewed the treatment of Aquinas within contemporary 
political science.  His work and ideas continue to provoke vigorous debate within political 
philosophy.  We considered how Strauss and Jaffa hold that the doctrine of synderesis (and of 
natural law) is a specifically Christian accretion that deviates from the Classic tradition of Plato 
and Aristotle.  Kries’ solution to this problem is simply to set aside or bracket out the claims of 
synderesis: “If the traditional emphasis upon the universal knowledge of natural law is bracketed, 
then, the realm of what could be asserted as belong to the natural law would be broadened.”146  
Yet, other scholars like Mary Keys and Ernest Fortin take very seriously the critiques of Strauss 
and Jaffa, but assert that the strength of the natural law foundation of Aquinas’s political 
philosophy is its “greater emphasis on the interiority of the individual and on the court of 
conscience where that individual is always responsible to others, whether individuals or 
communities.”147  We examined how other scholars such as John Finnis and the New Natural 
Law co-theorists solve the problem by arguing that the contents of synderesis are universally 
knowable, although they believe that it is not necessary to offer any account of metaphysical 
reality.148  Alasdair MacIntyre, while sympathetic to the goals of the New Natural Law project, 
remains skeptical that an accurate or adequate account of natural law can be given without 
reference to some kind of expression of metaphysics.  Russell Hittinger further criticizes the 
New Natural Law theorists on this point: “Any effort to extract a part of the ethic [in this case, 
the ethic of natural law] in the absence of its proper foundations, or to assign that part to some 
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other foundation, is tantamount to constructing a materially different ethic.”149  The fundamental 
question is, “to what degree is practical reasoning itself dependent on an order of being that is 
not simply arbitrary but one with its own intrinsic order in nature, in human nature?”150  We are 
led once again to the problem posed by Jaffa and Strauss: Is the natural law and doctrine of 
synderesis intelligible without reference to divine Revelation, or at least to some theory of 
metaphysics?  Medievalist Brian Tierney offers a helpful view on this matter.  In his study On 
the Idea of Natural Rights, Tierney argues that the medieval philosophers (of which Aquinas is 
one) were not arguing only from the assumption of “Christian revelation or from some all-
embracing natural-law theory of cosmic harmony but from an understanding of human nature as 
rational, self-aware, and morally responsible” [emphasis mine].151  He proposes that to 
understand Aquinas’s vision of conscience and natural law, we ought to examine his account of a 
shared human nature as rational.  This theme will be explored throughout the dissertation.   
  However, it cannot be denied that Thomas Aquinas is unapologetically Christian.  As 
such, he also argues that there is indeed a highest human good (summum bonum) for the human 
person that cannot be fulfilled by the political regime.152  The highest good and last end of the 
human person for Aquinas is achieved “through union with God...in which along man’s 
happiness consists.”153  The highest human good for Aquinas is the Beatific Vision – a friendship 
(relationship) with God formed through faith in love.  I suggest that although Aquinas writes 
within a fully Christian tradition, his work is an “essential resource for political theorists today, 
precisely because it delves deeply into the philosophic-anthropologic and ethical foundations of 
                                                 
149 Hittinger, Russell.  A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory, 195. 
150 Schall, James.  “The Intellectual Context of Natural Law.”  American Journal of Jurisprudence 38 (1993), 102. 
151 Tierney, Brian.  The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law 1150-
1625.  (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1997), 76. 
152 Cf. Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 1, articles 4-8.   
153 Cf. Summa Theologiae. I-II, Q. 3, art. 8.   
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social and civic life, and so better enable us to envision the purpose of politics.”154  These deeper 
philosophic-anthropologic and ethical foundations, I argue, are precisely Aquinas’s most 
essential insights into human conscience.  Specifically, by a deeper examination of how Aquinas 
classifies the two-fold nature of conscience as synderesis and conscientia, especially relating 
them to a shared rationality as expressed in the natural law, Aquinas offers a balanced (and 
timely) approach to the individual, relational, and transcendent dimensions of conscience.  By 
examining his theory in these contexts, I aim to offer a robust re-consideration of the political 
relevance of conscience and to offer a concrete vision of how Aquinas might help enable us to 
think together about the common goods in our shared moral, social, and political life.   
V. Chapter Descriptions 
In the next chapter, I will give a more detailed historical analysis of the sources that 
Aquinas draws from in order to construct his own theory of conscience, arguing that Aquinas’s 
most innovative contribution is his reliance upon Aristotle, particularly Aristotle’s account of 
reason, and upon Augustine’s theological framework.  The third chapter will focus on the 
intrinsic connection of conscience to practical reason and how Aquinas posits that human beings 
come to know moral precepts in his two earlier works on conscience, viz. his Commentary on the 
Sentences of Peter Lombard and his Disputed Questions on Truth.  The fourth chapter will 
examine the connection Aquinas makes between conscience and law, particularly the natural 
law, and it will also address how Aquinas would argue for freedom of conscience in political life.  
I will examine the Summa Theologiae and Aquinas’s Commentary on Romans.  The fifth and 
final chapter will juxtapose Aquinas’s terminology of the primary level of conscience as 
synderesis with an alternative term proposed by Joseph Ratzinger, J. Budziszewski, and Eric 
Voegelin, viz. anamnesis.  I aim to examine whether synderesis or anamnesis best contributes to 
                                                 
154 Keys, Mary M.  Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Promise of the Common Good, 4. 
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a robust theory of conscience that encapsulates all of its dimensions: individual, relational, and 
transcendental.  Political philosopher Eric Voegelin has also proposed the term anamnesis as a 
way of understanding human nature qua rational and political.  This concluding chapter will 
consider the implications of this alternative term for the primary level of conscience and seek to 
re-propose the importance of the primacy of conscience for our own political discourse.   
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Chapter II: Theoretical and Historical Foundations of Conscience 
“We must allow the innermost element within us to speak.  And that element knows that the 
Good exists….  Now this Good does not hover vaguely somewhere in remote and inaccessible 
space.  It is in contact with me; it touches me.  There exists in me something that responds to the 
Good, as the eye responds to light—Conscience.”1 
 When we consider the political relevance of a theory of conscience, we should recall an 
essential element of free government, viz. government based on consent.  This consent, argues 
Charles N.R. McCoy is “based on man’s moral freedom.”2  Consent also requires others with 
whom you consent about common shared goals.  Conscience, I argue, is the bulwark of man’s 
moral freedom upon which free government is based and by which government is also limited, 
providing a “safeguard against mere conformity and conventionality.”3  In this chapter, we will 
examine the foundational framework and sources from which Aquinas structures his theory of 
conscience in order to understand the connection he makes between human conscience and 
human freedom.  This will give critical insight into the function of conscience in the formation of 
the law and in the promotion of freedom of the human person.  Thomas explains conscience in 
the Summa Theologiae in the context of human nature and law (particularly the natural law).  
Thus, in this dissertation I will examine the political implications of Aquinas’s particular context 
when he discusses conscience.  However, the Summa Theologiae is not the first place where he 
outlines his views on the matter, and his own thinking develops as new academic discoveries 
come to the medieval academy, particularly the introduction of Aristotle’s writings and the 
Islamic and Jewish commentaries on Aristotle.  However, before we investigate the particular 
                                                 
1 Guardini, Romano.  Conscience.  (London: Sheed and Ward, 1932), 23-24.   
2 McCoy, Charles N.R.  The Structure of Political Thought: A Study in the History of Political Ideas.  (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1963), 136. 
3 McCoy, Charles N.R. The Structure of Political Thought, 154.  Also see Ratzinger, Joseph “Conscience and Truth” 
in On Conscience.  (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 11-42.   
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works in which Aquinas develops his theory of conscience, we should first consider the sources 
from which he draws that influenced his own formulation.   
 Aquinas draws from two important sources in the development of his theory of 
conscience, viz. Classical sources, most importantly Aristotle, and the early Christian Patristic 
sources, perhaps most importantly, Augustine.  I argue first that Aquinas’s interpretation of 
Aristotle’s work is a critical element to understanding the specifically political significance of 
Aquinas’s account of conscience.  Aquinas was also heavily influenced by Neo-Platonic sources 
and ancient Roman sources, but I will focus primarily on how Aristotle influenced Thomas’s 
formulation on conscience.  The Patristic sources are equally important for Aquinas, especially 
the contribution of Augustine.  I will examine how Augustine’s emphasis on free will plays an 
important role in the formation of Aquinas’s theory of conscience that Aquinas uniquely 
connects with Aristotle’s understanding of human reason.  The work of two other crucial 
Patristic sources, viz. Jerome and Origen, launched the very idea of conscience (particularly of 
synderesis) as a matter of inquiry and investigation for medieval university scholars. While this 
chapter will briefly survey the some of the other critical Classical and Patristic sources upon 
which Aquinas draws, I will focus the majority of this chapter on the important contributions of 
Aristotle and Augustine, as these two thinkers were at the center of the academic controversies 
during Aquinas’s time.4  Aquinas’s great genius is the synthesis of Aristotle’s “view of practical 
reasoning and…[Augustine’s] development of the Pauline doctrine of the defective human 
will.”5  The chapter will be divided into two main parts examining the theoretical and historical 
background of the term synderesis, which is used by the Scholastics to explain conscience and its 
                                                 
4 Cf. Vernon K. Bourke, Aquinas’ Search for Wisdom and G.K. Chesterton’s volume St. Thomas Aquinas: ‘The 
Dumb Ox,’ New York: Doubleday, 1933, 1956.  Although this latter book was written for a popular audience, 
Chesterton explains succinctly the complicated academic conflicts in which Aquinas participated.   
5 MacIntyre, Alasdair.  Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 184.   
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function in moral and political life.  The first section will address the Classical sources, 
especially the Aristotelian contributions.  The second section will focus on the Patristic 
contributions, particularly the use (and subsequent corruption of) of the term syneidesis by 
Origen and Jerome, and Augustine’s contribution to understanding conscience.   
I. Theoretical and Historical Background 
A. Classical Sources 
 Although a theory of conscience is not explicitly elaborated by the Greek philosophers, I 
will argue that some critically important elements of Aquinas’s account of conscience depend 
much upon Aristotle’s moral theory, particularly Aristotle’s articulation of practical reason.6  I 
will also briefly sketch the roots of conscience in ancient Roman philosophy—translated as 
conscientia.  D’Arcy helpfully characterizes the Classical use of synderesis/conscientia as 
‘judicial,’ meaning judgment of past actions, and Davies explains the Hellenistic roots of the idea 
of conscience and points to important Epicurean sources for the term.7  Most scholars agree that 
in each of these Classical sources “the use of conscience in a moral context refers primarily, if 
not exclusively, to a sanction or reward for past acts.”8  The Greek word synderesis used by the 
Scholastics is a corruption of the word syneidesis. Although not considered a purely 
philosophical term, in ancient Greek works spanning from the sixth century BC to the seventh 
century AD, the term syneidesis and its derivatives appear in “every possible sort of writer…It is 
in fact an ‘everyday’ [word], and belonging rather to ‘folk-wisdom.’”9  C.A. Pierce argues that 
                                                 
6 Michael B. Crowe argues that Aquinas’s theory of natural law depends heavily on Neo-Platonic elements.  I will 
examine this thesis in the final chapter where I will compare the Scholastic term synderesis with the Platonic term 
anamnesis.   
7 Cf. D’Arcy, Eric.  Conscience and its Right to Freedom.  London: Sheed and Ward, 1961.  Chapter 1 and Davies, 
W.D. “Conscience.”  The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible.  New York: Abingdon Press, 1962.  Vol. 1. 
8 Doherty, Reginald, O.P. The Judgments of Conscience and Prudence.  River Forest, IL: Aquinas Library, 1961.  P. 
30. 
9 Pierce, C.A.  Conscience in the New Testament.  London: SCM Press, 1955.  P. 17.  Pierce also has a list of Greek 
references on pages 132-147 of this book.   
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the Greek term syneidesis does not have a systematic philosophical development prior to its 
Christian usage, but instead was used colloquially and picked up by St. Paul in his pastoral 
letters.  The common usage connoted three important elements with respect the nature, reference, 
and function of syneidesis.10  First, it was considered to be “an element of human nature as such; 
but at the same time of human nature as integrally involved in an ordered universe.”11  This is a 
very important piece of evidence, because this usage connects the term to a sense of some kind 
of natural law (an ordered universe) within which human nature participates.  Natural law is 
considered by some to be a purely Christian invention, but Pierce cites a writer as early as 
Xenophon (410 B.C.) for this use of the word in this sense, certainly predating Christianity.12  
Secondly, the use of the prefix syn-, which is a reflexive pronoun, illustrates that the term is 
concerned solely with an individual man’s interior acts: “the knowledge a or awareness that a 
man has, the witness that he is in a position to bear-is internal.”13  According to Don Marietta, 
the term “syneidesis is derived from the verb synoida, a compound of oida (eidenai), which 
means to know immediately or intuitively, as opposed to acquiring knowledge through reasoning 
(noein). This sense of the verb continues to be basic to the meaning of the nouns syneidesis, 
synesis, and syneidos. Conscience is a form of knowing.”14  The meaning of these terms have 
various usages typically referring to consciousness or awareness, according to Marietta, 
                                                 
10 Cf. Pierce, C.A.  Conscience in the New Testament.(London: SCM Press, 1955), Chapter IV. 
11 Pierce, C.A.  Conscience in the New Testament, 40.  Pierce cites Xenophon’s Apology 24 (Ex 23) wherein 
Socrates states that he is content to let the syneidesis of his accusers punish them for conjuring perjured evidence 
against him.  He says that he satisfied that “in the nature of things they will suffer greatly from such knowledge 
within themselves of sacrilege and injustice.” (p. 40).   
12 Cf. Discussion of Jaffa and Strauss in chapter 1.  This statement should be qualified to say that the ancient Greek 
understanding of nature certainly differs from how a Christian would view nature, especially given their respective 
notions of the Divine.  The sense of nature that C.A. Pierce ascribes to the Greeks is a “fixed and determinant order 
of things-as-they-are.” Cf. p. 40.  For a further explanation on the matter of nature and natural law, refer to the 
introduction to Michael B. Crowe’s The Changing Profile of the Natural Law.   
13 Pierce, C.A.  Conscience in the New Testament, P. 41.   
14 Marietta, Don E., Jr.  “Conscience in Greek Stoicism.”  Numen 17 (3): 1970, 177.   
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gradually came to be used as meaning an awareness of one’s evil deeds.15  He argues that the 
development of the moral meaning of syneidesis derives from the 
 Hellenistic concern for ethics and the individual's inner attitudes fostered the 
 development of the concept of conscience. The term syneidesis and its cognates were 
 used in reference to both ethical and non-ethical matters. The Greeks did not distinguish 
 between conscience and consciousness as speakers of English do. The ethical and non-
 ethical aspects (which are distinguished by the English word "conscience") were 
 conveyed by the same word, and only the context indicated the moral quality of the 
 object of the consciousness. This shows that syneidesis was basically a form of awareness 
 or knowing.16 
 
The ancient usage of the word, however, is almost always of past actions.  Thus, the reference of 
syneidesis “is to the specific past act or act…committed by the subject himself…. [N]ormally the 
act, acts, condition or character are bad.”17  Conscience in the Classical usage and reference, 
albeit popularly so, has a judicial quality that judges a person for his own bad actions that 
transgressed the order of nature as it is.  As a result, the function of conscience is that it causes 
pain and torment in the psyche of the one who suffers its pangs.  The ancient Greek connation of 
syneidesis is “the pain suffered by man, as man, and therefore as a creature involved in the order 
of things, when, by his acts completed or initiated, he transgresses the moral limits of his 
nature.”18 
When the term is translated in the Latin conscientia, Cicero is the primary pre-Christian 
author in whose writing the term conscientia is frequently found.19  The term conscientia is 
usually thought to be developed most prominently by the Stoic thinkers of antiquity, particularly 
                                                 
15 Marietta, Don E., Jr.  “Conscience in Greek Stoicism,” 177. 
16 Marietta, Don E., Jr.  “Conscience in Greek Stoicism,” 178. 
17 Pierce, C.A.  Conscience in the New Testament, 45.  However, Marietta offers evidence that the Greek term 
syneidesis can also act as judge of good actions, and hence give peace instead of pain.  Cf.  Marietta, Don E., Jr.  
“Conscience in Greek Stoicism,” 181 and following. 
18 Pierce, C.A.  Conscience in the New Testament, 54. 
19 Davies, W.D. “Conscience.” The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible.  New York: Abingdon Press, 1962.  Vol. 1, 
672.  According to Davies, Cicero uses the term 75 times throughout his corpus. 
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the Roman Stoics.  However, scholarship in the latter half of the twentieth century on the topic of 
conscience suggests that there is not a strong Stoic development of the term, but instead an 
Epicurean usage that is much more pronounced.20  W.D. Davies writes: 
 When we ask whether the Latin writers reveal in Stoicism an emphasis on conscience, the 
 answer is in the negative….  [T]he use of ‘conscience’ in Stoicism cannot have been 
 central, and whenever the term does occur in Stoic connections, it undergoes  
 modification.  Thus the strong conscience, desiderated by Seneca, really signifies strong 
 character.  The Latin writers, therefore, lend no support to the view that conscience was a  
 peculiarly Stoic doctrine, while they suggest that, in its Latin form at least, conscience  
 was a concept much employed in literary circles.21 
 
Further, when Cicero does mention conscience, it is usually when explaining or responding to 
the Epicureans.22  For the Epicureans, conscience has a particular purpose, one that perhaps 
tends toward an anti-political end.  According to Ernest Fortin, the “hallmark of the Epicurean 
doctrine [of conscience] is that it integrates conscience into a hedonistic framework.”23  To 
illustrate the point, I will consider the first book of Cicero’s De Finibus wherein the interlocutor 
Torquatus gives a summation of the Epicurean view of philosophy in an effort to convince 
Cicero of its veracity.  In his account, Torquatus defends the view that man’s final end and 
ultimate good is the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain.  Not to be considered 
simplistically as an intemperate man, Torquatus qualifies the argument: 
 What does [a person] perceive and judge as the basis for pursuing or avoiding anything 
except pleasure of pain?  Some Epicureans wish to refine this doctrine: they say that it is 
not enough to judge what is good or bad by the senses.  Rather they claim that intellect 
and reason can also grasp that pleasure is to be sought for its own sake, and likewise pain 
                                                 
20 Don E. Marietta, Jr. makes the case that the Stoic philosopher’s contributed an important element to the 
philosophical formation of conscience, but the literature in general does show that even if the Stoics do mention 
conscience, they tend to do so in response to the Epicureans.   
21 Davies, W.D. “Conscience,” 672.  See also C. A. Pierce Conscience in the New Testament, especially chapter 1 
entitled, “The Fallacy of Stoic Origin.” 
22 Fortin, Ernest.  “The Political Implications of St. Augustine’s Theory of Conscience,” 140.    
23 Fortin, Ernest.  “The Political Implications of St. Augustine’s Theory of Conscience,” 138.   
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to be avoided.  Hence, that there is as it were a natural and innate concept in our minds by 
which we are aware that one is to be sought, the other shunned.24 
 
Torquatus next offers a utilitarian method of discerning pleasure and pain.  Painful things or 
situations can only be pursued if they lead to a more pleasurable end; pleasurable things or 
situations should be avoided if they cause a more painful end.  He elucidates his point by using 
as examples the four cardinal virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage, and justice.25  Each virtue 
demonstrates a particular way in which pleasure is better than pain.  According to the Epicurean 
view, “the root cause of life’s troubles is ignorance of what is good and bad…. It is only the wise 
person, by pruning back all foolishness and error, who can live without misery and fear.”26  
Wisdom ought not to be pursued for its own sake, but for the sake of the pleasure it yields by 
removing fear and misery.  Likewise, temperance ought to be pursued to keep a person from 
pursuing pleasures so indiscriminately that he becomes a slave to the passions.  Courageous 
actions lead to glory—again still a greater pleasure than the act of courage itself, by Torquatus’s 
telling.   
The interesting case Torquatus makes is with respect to justice, because he does not 
actually address specific ways in which just actions can give pleasure, but he does address how 
unjust actions in the form of dishonesty, foolhardiness, lust, and cowardice (which are vices 
associated with the other cardinal virtues) can give pain.  It is in this context that Torquatus 
mentions conscience.  Justice, he argues, contains in itself pleasure, because it never harms 
anyone, brings benefits, and quiets the spirit.27  Then Torquatus adds, “Foolhardiness, lust, and 
                                                 
24 Cicero, De Finibus.  Trans. Raphael Woolf.  Ed. Julia Annas.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
Book I, 32.  It is interesting to note how similarly this language sounds to the first precept of the natural law in 
Aquinas, wherein good to be done and pursued and evil to be shunned.  However, the difference in this case is that 
Torquatus (holding the Epicurean view) is replacing good with pleasure and evil with pain.   
25 Cf. Cicero, De Finibus, Book I, §42-53.   
26Cicero, De Finibus, Book I, §43; 44.P. 17. 
27Cicero, De Finibus, Book I, §50. 
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cowardice unfailingly agitate and disturb the spirits and cause trouble.  In the same way, when 
dishonesty takes root in one’s heart, its very presence is disturbing.  And once it is activated, 
however secret the deed, there is never a guarantee that it will remain secret.”28  Torquatus 
deflects from the question of justice and turns instead to other vices such as he names above–
considered by him to be vices because they disturb the spirit with the fear of being found out:  
“But even if those who appear to be well enough fortified and defended against discovery by 
their fellow humans still live in fear of the gods….  Any contribution that wicked deeds can 
make to lessening the discomforts of life is outweighed by the bad conscience, the legal 
penalties, and the hatred of one’s fellow-citizens.”29  Conscience does function ‘judicially’ as a 
judge of past actions, punishing with fear the person who acts with ‘dishonesty, foolhardiness, 
lust, or cowardice.’  However, it is not because the Epicurean believes that these acts are bad in 
themselves, rather because the person committing them will always fear that his actions will be 
discovered.  The pangs of conscience that the Epicurean may suffer are simply based on the fear 
of being found out or discovered, either by his fellow men or by the gods, but they do not alert 
him to disorder in his soul.  None of the virtues are pursued for their own sake, but simply as a 
means to an end, “Those who accept [the virtues] do so only by necessity or for the sake of a 
lesser evil.  Far from being a primary phenomenon, [the virtues arise] out of the situation created 
by man’s universal desire for his own advantage, if need be at the expense of others.”30  For the 
Epicurean, conscience seems to have a role that alerts a man when his interests could be at stake 
because of a past action he committed.   
                                                 
28 Cicero.  De Finibus, Book I, §50.   
29Cicero, De Finibus, Book I, §51. 
30 Fortin, Ernest.  “The Political Implications of St. Augustine’s Theory of Conscience,” 138.   
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Cicero specifically replies to Torquatus’s emphasis on a guilty conscience, calling it a 
weak and feeble argument.31  In his De Legibus, Cicero offers a very different view of moral 
virtue, particularly of justice.  While by the Epicurean account, justice is used as a means, Cicero 
advocates a view of nature that human beings are “born for justice, and that right is based, not 
upon men’s opinions, but upon nature.”32  Justice is thus natural to human beings, and they are 
so constituted, 
As to share the sense of Justice with one another and to pass it on to all men. And in this 
 whole discussion I want it understood that what I shall call Nature is [that which is 
 implanted in us by nature]; that, however, the corruption caused by bad habits is so great 
 that the sparks of fire, so to speak, which Nature has kindled in us are extinguished by 
 this corruption, and the vices which are their opposites spring up and are established.  But 
 if the judgments of men were in agreement with Nature, so that, as the poet says, they 
 considered ‘nothing alien to them which concerns mankind,’ then Justice would be 
 equally observed by all.  For those creatures who have received the gift of reason from 
 Nature have also received right reason, and therefore they have also received the gift of 
 Law, which is right reason applied to command and prohibition.  And they have received 
 Law, they have received Justice also.  Now all men have received reason; therefore they 
 all have received Justice.33 
 
It is not conscience, but rather right reason that for Cicero guides man to live according to virtue 
and to act justly.  Moreover, this right reason is given to all human beings and is reflected in both 
nature and in law.  He does, however, mention conscience in connection with remorse of acts of 
vice.  A guilty conscience, according to Cicero, reflects Nature’s injunction to act justly by 
tormenting one who acts against it.34  Cicero’s emphasis, especially contra the Epicureans, is that 
by nature human beings are enjoined to be just, “Justice does not exist at all, if it does not exist 
                                                 
31 Cicero.  De Finibus, Book II, §53 and 54. 
32 Cicero.  De Legibus. Trans. Clinton Walker Keyes.  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1943), Book I, § 
X, 28.   
33 Cicero.  De Legibus.  Book I, § XI, 33. 
34 Cicero.  De Legibus.  Book I, § XIII, 40.  Itaque poenas luunt non tam iudciis (quae quondam nusquam errant, 
hodie multifariam nulla sunt, ubi sunt, tamen persaepe falsa sunt), set ut eos agitent insectenturque furiae non 
ardentibus taedis sicut in fabulis, sed angore conscientiae fraudisque cruciatu.  Quodsi hominess ab iniuria poena, 
non natura arcere deberet, quaenam sollicitudo vexaret impios sublato suppliciorum metu? 
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in Nature,” or perhaps more properly “in our natural inclination to love our fellow-men.”35  What 
we see in Cicero are several important developments.  First, he insists that virtue and particularly 
justice are not means to an end or for the purpose of serving utilitarian ends, but are natural to 
human beings and in accordance with right reason.  This right reason is based upon law that is 
applied to command and prohibition as quoted above.  These developments we will see are 
incorporated into Aquinas’s account of conscience, especially as it relates to the natural law.   
B. Aristotle and Conscience 
 The Classical author who is the most influential on Aquinas’s thought is Aristotle, and it 
is my argument that of the Classical sources, Aristotle’s work contributed most significantly to 
Aquinas’s theory of conscience.  Such a consideration is not typically explored by scholars, as 
many believe that Aristotelian natural right and Aquinas’s natural law are based upon two 
opposite sources, viz. natural insights and observation of the world and special revelation, 
respectively.  Ross J. Corbett puts it succinctly, “Natural law does require…that its contents be 
knowable by natural lights, meaning without special revelation.”36  But is such a ‘natural law’ 
found in Aristotle’s work?  The key discussion on natural law and natural right is found in 
Aristotle’s treatment of political justice in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics.  Aristotle states 
that “What is just by nature in the political sense can be subdivided into what is just by nature 
and what is just by convention.”37  What is just by nature, while “not dependent upon any human 
opinion for its being right,”38 is “nevertheless changeable, as are all things human.”39  For 
Aristotle, what is just or right by nature is tied to a particular regime, and while it may change, 
                                                 
35 Cicero.  De Legibus.  Book I, § XV, 42.   
36 Corbett, Ross J.  “The Philosophic Context of the Development of Natural Law.” Paper Presented at the 2012  
Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, IL.  Retrieved from: http://conference.mpsanet.org/ 
OnlineDirectory/Search.aspx?section=34&session=1.  It is worth noting that Corbett believes that the key discussion 
on natural law in Aristotle can be found in books II and III of the Nicomachean Ethics.   
37 Aristotle.  Nicomachean Ethics, 1134b  
38 Jaffa, Harry V.  Thomism and Aristotelianism, 174. 
39 Aristotle.  Nicomachean Ethics, 1134b.   
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there is a regime that is best by nature in all circumstance.  The critical point here is that natural 
right is tied to political justice.40  Unlike natural law, natural right as it is contingent upon 
political regime; it is changeable, and further, it is not necessarily accessible to all and may not 
necessarily inform moral choices.  For example, Ross Corbett writes, “Not all morally serious 
people would agree that it was originally a matter of indifference whether one sacrificed a goat 
or two sheep (cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1134b 25-35).  All morally serious people do agree, on the 
other hand, that some things are just wrong.  The question is, what are they, and how do we 
articulate them?”41 
 Aquinas supplies an answer in synderesis, or the special natural habit by which we know 
the first practical principles.42  This special natural habit informs our conscience by working to 
“induce to good and prevent evil.”43  However, Harry Jaffa and other scholars find this claim 
untenable, pointing out that Aristotle simply does not use the term synderesis (or more properly 
syneidesis) and, Aristotle has a very different notion of natural right than Aquinas’s natural 
law.44  Jaffa points to Aquinas’s commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics.  Again, let us consider 
the passage from Book V where Aristotle distinguishes between natural right and legal right.  
Both are contained in political justice.  Aristotle’s text reads: “What is by nature just has the 
same force everywhere and does not depend on what we regard or do not regard as just.”45  In his 
commentary on just this sentence, Aquinas interprets Aristotle in the following manner: 
 First [Aristotle] explains natural justice in two ways: in one way according to its effect or 
 power, saying that that justice is natural which everywhere has the same force and power 
 to induce to good and prevent evil.  This happens because nature, the cause of this justice, 
                                                 
40 Cf. Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, 1135a. 
41 Corbett, Ross J. “The Question of Natural Law in Aristotle.”History of Political Thought.  Vol. 20 (2): 2009, 234.   
42 Cf. Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae, I, Q. 79, Art. 12, Corpus. 
43 Aquinas, Thomas.  Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics.  Trans. C.I. Litzinger, O.P. (Notre Dame, IN: Dumb 
Ox Books, 1993), Lecture XII on Book V.  §1018, p. 325.   
44 Jaffa, Harry V. Thomism and Aristotelianism, Chapter VIII.   
45 Aristotle.  Nicomachean Ethics, 1134b.   
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 is the same everywhere among all men…. In the other way he explains this justice 
 according to its cause, when he says that natural justice does not consist in what seems to 
 be, i.e. it does not arise from human conjecture but from nature.  In speculative matters 
 there are some things naturally known, like indemonstrable principles….  Likewise in  
 practical matters there are some principles naturally known as it were, as evil must be  
 avoided, no one is to be unjustly injured, theft must not be committed and so on…46 
 
Aristotle of course makes no mention in this passage or in any previous or subsequent part of the 
Nicomachean Ethics that natural justice induces to good and prevents evil, nor that there are 
naturally known principles of practical reason to direct human beings in practical moral matters. 
Jaffa accuses Aquinas of imputing his own religiously-based agenda of natural law onto 
Aristotle.  The evidence of synderesis or of natural law, Jaffa argues, is simply not present in 
Aristotle’s corpus.  What is most troubling for Jaffa is the statement of a natural and 
unchangeable notion of good.  If the good is unchangeable, then a statesmen will be rendered 
unable to respond to situations that may require him to “reluctantly [deviate] from what is 
normally right in order to save the cause of justice and human itself.”47 
 Mary M. Keys argues that Aquinas’s version of natural law (including the natural habit of 
synderesis by which we know its unchangeable principles) owe more to the Patristic (and 
especially Augustinian) tradition than to Aristotle because of the insight of man’s transpolitical 
end.48  Vernon Bourke more emphatically states that the synderesis principle stating that “good 
should be done and evil avoided” is found in the Scriptures in Psalm 33:15: Diverte a malo et fac 
bonum.  Bourke argues that the first thinker to ascribe this rule to the content of synderesis is 
Alcuin, who drew from Augustine’s commentary on Psalm 33 in his Ennartiones in Psalmos.  
                                                 
46 Aquinas, Thomas.  Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics.  Lecture XII on Book V.  §1018  
47 Strauss, Leo.  Natural Right and History, 162.  Cf. also pages 25-27 above.  Interestingly, Jaffa offers an example 
where Strauss does not. Jaffa considers the issue of Aristotle’s endorsement of birth control and abortion to curb 
population growth as one example when a statesman may need to deviate from what is normally right.  Something 
that Jaffa leaves out of that analysis is Aristotle’s own appeal to something higher than a statesman’s concern about 
population growth, for according to Aristotle, birth control and abortion must be lawfully regulated depending upon 
when life and sensation begin.  (Cf. Aristotle’s Politics, 1335b). 
48 Keys, Mary M.  Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common Good, 117. 
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Thus, he concludes that the underlying formulation of synderesis must be attributed to 
Augustine, rather than to Aristotle or any other pre-Christian thinker: “It seems that people not 
influenced by the Bible have little to say about the synderesis rule.  One may wonder, then, just 
how ‘natural’ is our knowledge of this basic imperative.”49While the exact formulation “pursue 
good and avoid evil” may not be found in Greek philosophical sources, one may point to Plato’s 
Republic, specifically the myth of Gyges (Book II, 359c-362a), the myth of Er (Book X, 614b-
621d), and indeed the entire life of Socrates as a witness to pursuing what is good and avoiding 
what is evil.  In Aristotle’s work, we see in the opening lines of the Politics and the 
Nicomachean Ethics, respectively, an emphasis on the human pursuit of the good: 
 Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a 
 view to some good; for everyone always acts in order to obtain that which they think 
 good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community,  which 
 the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than 
 any other, and at the highest good.50 
 
and 
 
 Every art or applied science and every systematic investigation, and similarly every 
 action and choice seem to aim at some good; the good, therefore, has been well defined 
 as the things at which all things aim.51 
  
Here we see Aristotle emphasizing the primacy of good in practical matters.  Further, Bourke 
does not address the connection that Thomas Aquinas makes between the principle of synderesis, 
                                                 
49Bourke, Vernon J.  Joy in Augustine’s Ethics.  The St. Augustine Lecture, 1978.  Ed. Robert P. Russell, O.S.A. 
(Villanova: Villanova Press, 1978), Appendix V, 105.  Cf. Bourke, Vernon J. “The Background of Aquinas’ 
Synderesis Principle.”  Graceful Reason: Essays in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Presented to Joseph Owens, 
CSSR.  Ed. Lloyd P. Gerson.  (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1983), 346-360.  Here, Bourke does 
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argues that this formulation is too general and does not adequately give the principle of synderesis to pursue good 
and avoid evil.  Here, he also points to an Augustinian origin for this formulation.   
50 Aristotle.  Politics.1252a.   
51 Aristotle.  Nicomachean Ethics. 1094a.  I am indebted to John J. Schrems’s article “A Reexamination of Harry V. 
Jaffa’s Thomism and Aristotelianism” in The Political Science Reviewer 18: (1988), 163-195 for pointing out this 
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human inclinations, and human experience.  Perhaps Aquinas’s treatment of these components 
will make the synderesis principle, natural law, human choice, and even conscience more 
generally applicable to common human experience than they might initially appear to be.   
 Michael B. Crowe acknowledges some key elements of Aristotle’s thought to Aquinas’s 
formulation of synderesis and conscientia, but argues that this contribution is limited: 
 Most closely concerned with the development of natural law theory are some of the 
 general positions adopted by Aristotle in epistemology. There is his conception of the 
 intellectus agens as a natural light which enables us to have right knowledge of the first 
 principles.  With this may be compared the doctrine concerning the intuitive reason 
 brought into play in the acquisition of the first principles of moral reasoning. There is 
 here some affinity with the scholastic teaching on synderesis and the habit of first 
 practical principles but, as will be seen, it cannot be  pushed too far.52 
 
For Crowe, this affinity with synderesis in Aristotle comes from Aquinas’s using an Aristotelian 
argument to prove that it cannot err.  For example, in De Veritate, Aquinas answers the question 
regarding whether synderesis can err with the following argument: 
 Consequently, all changeable things are reduced to some first unchangeable thing.  
 Hence, too, it is that all speculative knowledge is derived from some most certain 
 knowledge concerning which there can be no error.  This in the knowledge of first 
 principles, in reference to which everything else which is known is examined and by 
 reason of which every truth is approved and every falsehood rejected.  If error could take 
 place in these, there would be no certainty in the whole of knowledge which follows.  As 
 a result, for probity to be possible in human actions, there must be some permanent 
 principle which has unwavering integrity, in reference to which all human works are  
 examined, so that permanent principle will resist all evil and assent to all good.  This is  
 synderesis, whose task is to warn against evil and incline to good.53 
 
According to Crowe, the argument that Aquinas gives to prove of the existence and infallibility 
of synderesis is decidedly Aristotelian, but the terminology is not found in Aristotle.  Given this 
                                                 
52 Crowe, Michael B.  The Changing Profile of the Natural Law.  (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1977), 20. 
53 Aquinas, Thomas.  De Veritate.  Trans. James V. McGlynn, SJ.  (Chicago: Regnery, 1953), Q. 16, art. 2.  Parallel 
passages can be found in the Summa Theologiae, I, Q. 79, art. 12 and in Scriptum in libros IV Sententiarum, II, D. 
24, art.2 and 3. 
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preponderance of evidence that illustrates the idea of conscience not being present in Aristotle 
(and perhaps even inimical to Aristotle’s work as Jaffa suggests), how may it be argued that 
Aristotle’s influence is an essential part of Aquinas’s theory of conscience?   
 Some scholars, such as Hayden Ramsay, suggest that perhaps this matter warrants 
another look and a different approach.  He does not argue that the word synderesis can be found 
in Aristotle or that moral principles are both naturally known and unchangeable in Aristotle’s 
moral theory: to do so simply cannot be verified.  It may be helpful to recall that much of the 
development of Aristotle’s moral theory develops because of his objection of Plato’s 
identification of virtue and knowledge.  Charles McCoy explains: 
 Plato was prompted to hold the Doctrine of Ideas because he had observed that all 
 knowledge takes place through some kind of similitude, and that since it is a fact that 
 things understood in the intellect are understood under conditions of immateriality and 
 immobility, it seemed to him that things must similarly exist in themselves.  The 
 consequence of this view was that all knowledge was reduced to a kind of metaphysics, 
 which  itself bore the imprint of purely logical being.  Now the contribution of Aristotle 
 was to show that while it is true that all knowledge takes place through some kind of 
 similitude, the conditions of immateriality and immobility under which the intellect 
 receives the species of material and movable bodies does not imply that these latter are 
 themselves without matter: for what is received by the knower is received according to 
 the mode of the recipient.54 
 
To illustrate the point, there exists no over-arching, unchangeable Form of Humanity, but only 
individual, embodied, concrete particular human beings.  We only experience particular human 
beings, but somehow we understand that each person falls into the category of human being and 
not into the category of cat or of tree.  What might such an approach to human knowledge have 
to do with morality?   
  To begin to answer these questions, it is worth noting a similarity between Aristotle and 
the Christian theologians who developed the theoretical language of conscience.  The theoretical 
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framework of conscience develops as an attempt to reconcile a tension between human 
knowledge, human action, and human choice.  A key text in Scripture that theologians point to is 
Romans 7:15, “For that which I work, I understand not.  For I do not that good which I will: but 
evil which I hate, that I do.”  The theory of conscience progresses along this investigation of the 
interior separation in the human psyche between knowledge and action, or to put it another way: 
it is a confrontation with the problem of evil experienced both in oneself and in society.  This 
tension is explored in Plato’s work as well as in the work of Aristotle.  Aristotle investigates this 
problem when he examines the topic of ‘moral weakness’ in book VII of the Nicomachean 
Ethics.  Aristotle here critiques the Socratic-Platonic view that “no one acts contrary to what is 
best in the conviction that what he is doing is bad, but through ignorance of the fact that it is 
bad.” 55  In other words, in his investigation of moral weakness, Aristotle criticizes the Platonic 
connection between virtue and knowledge; only those who truly have no knowledge of what is 
good will act contrary to it.  Rather, he recognizes, much like the Pauline insight, that those who 
are morally weak are capable of “[deliberation] but do not abide by their decisions.”56  Thus, 
questions about the nature of conscience are explored because of the problem of evil: how is it 
that evil exists in the world if we know what is right?  How does evil exist in me when I know 
what is right?  Further, what sources exist to avoid evil and to enable individual to pursue good?  
How does our knowledge affect our choices and our actions?   
 This experience of evil in the world is a common human experience, and the language of 
conscience was used even by the ancients to explain and to explore it.  Recall that C.A. Pierce 
documents an extensive use of the term syneidesis and its grammatical variations in ancient 
Greek popular culture.  Marietta states that it is a way of knowing.  Perhaps, instead of 
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contrasting natural right to natural law and in doing so conclude that Aristotle does not posit a 
concept of synderesis, or any knowledge of the first practical principles, we may consider 
Ramsay’s approach to the investigation of conscience, viz. that on closer examination, “we may 
find that conscience is ultimately grounded not in Christian theology and Stoic morals, but in 
logos itself, the experience of reason as the Greek and later philosophical traditions understood 
this.”57  It is this sense of reason— a robust reason that is capable of discerning good and bad, 
right from wrong and choosing actions in accordance with that discernment—that establishes the 
theoretical foundation for moral actions, and more specifically, for conscience.  This classical 
understanding of reason, shared with many thinkers like Aquinas, points to an “experiential order 
that has been there all along.”58  The ‘experiential order’ is guided by conscience, and although 
Aristotle never explicitly mentions the nomenclature of conscience, many important foundational 
elements of it are established in his work. First, in the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition, there is 
an emphasis on the interiority of the human person and on how an individual’s internal order of 
the soul affects the order of a political society.  The notion of conscience as Aquinas develops it 
shifts to focus on the interiority of the human person, “where that individual is always 
responsible to others, whether individuals or communities.”59  This point is easily discerned, as 
Aristotle himself tells that the student of politics must know about the interior workings of the 
human soul, and offers his reflections on the virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics as a prologue to 
his Politics.60  Before inquiring into what the best regime might be, one must know something 
about what the best human being and the best human life ought to be.  Aristotle inherits this 
theoretical framework from both Plato and Socrates before him.  Second, Aristotle’s 
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philosophical anthropology that a thing’s nature (and more specifically—a person’s nature) is 
teleological, and that it “not only provides the end to which a thing is directed, but also the 
sources from which a thing achieves its telos: things that exist by nature have interior principles 
ordering them toward their ends.”61  For example, Angela McKay argues that Aquinas’s 
understanding of nature, for which he depends heavily on Aristotle, provides critical insight on 
this point, because “for Aquinas, as for Aristotle, nature provides things not merely with the end 
that they are ordered to, but with the very principles that allow them to arrive at their ends.”62  
One could argue that these principles are contained in the primary level of conscience, 
synderesis, which orders a human person to his end.  Finally, the very idea of a moral law that 
has its foundation in rational directedness to pursue goods that promote human flourishing and 
human happiness is heavily drawn from Aristotle; this makes the human good intelligible, and 
especially influences Aquinas’s understanding of practical reason and the virtue of prudence.   
 Let us first consider Aristotle’s view of nature.  Angela McKay builds her case for an 
Aristotelian foundation of synderesis by turning first to Aristotle’s Physics and to the 
Aristotelian account of nature that underlies Aquinas’s own formulation of human nature.  For 
both Aristotle and Aquinas, everything that exists in nature contains “a principle and a cause of 
being moved or of rest in the thing to which it belongs primarily and in virtue of that thing, but 
not accidentally.”63  There is a final cause or end to which everything in nature tends.  In his 
commentary on the Physics, Aquinas states, “It is of the nature of an end for the sake of which 
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something comes to be.”64  Thus, the end of something is the very reason for a thing’s existence.  
However, nature itself contains those principles of motion and rest that direct a thing to its end, 
“To truly understand what it is for something to have a nature, one must understand nature not 
only in terms of a thing’s end, but in terms of nature’s ability to direct them to their ends.”65  
What might this look like in the context of human nature?  
 First, Aquinas, like Aristotle, defines the human person as a rational agent whose actions 
tend toward some end, i.e. human beings are by nature teleological creatures.  He cites 
Aristotle’s Physics, giving the familiar argument that “all things contained in a genus are derived 
from the principle of that genus.  Now the end is the principle in human operations.”66  Aquinas 
further explains how a human being acts toward an end and precisely what principle exists in the 
human person directing him toward his end, “Now man differs from irrational animals in this, 
that he is master of his actions.  Wherefore those actions are properly called human of which 
man is a master.”67  By what means is a human person capable of being ‘master of his actions’?  
According to Aquinas, a person is master of his actions through the exercise two faculties, viz. 
the reason and the will.  Let us concentrate first on reason. According to Aquinas, reason is a 
power of the soul that is synonymous with the intellectual power that functions “by way of 
inquiry and discovery” to advance “from certain things simply understood–namely, the first 
principles; and again by way of judgment returns by analysis to first in principles in the light of 
which it examines what it has found.”68  First principles are the beginning points of human 
inquiry, for “they are from the beginning and cannot be reduced to anything previous.”69  
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Further, human reason is a principle of action by which human beings act to achieve their end.  
In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas explains: 
 Now, there is no question that intellectual agents act for the sake of an end, because they 
 think ahead of time in their intellects of the things which they achieve though action; and 
 their action stems from such preconception.  This is what it means for an intellect to be 
 the principle of action.  Just as the entire likeness of the result achieved by the actions of 
 an intellectual agent exists in the intellect that preconceives it, so, to, does the likeness of 
 a natural resultant pre-exist in the natural agent; and as a consequence of this, the action 
 is determined to a definite result.70 
 
However, it is not by rational powers alone that a human person is moved toward his end.  Free 
will (which will be addressed in the subsequent section of this chapter on Augustine’s 
contribution to conscience) directs the rational animal toward his end, as the will, according to 
Aquinas, is connected to reason by its function as the rational appetite.71  David Burrell 
succinctly explains: 
 Willing is for Aquinas a rational appetite.  Humankind’s inclination to its proper end 
 follows upon a person’s grasp of that goal…. This appetite for a goal follows upon 
 perceiving that something is a desirable end, but perceiving alone could not generate the 
 wanting.  In this respect, will and intellect remain distinct.  As Aquinas sees it, willing is 
 meant to incline towards the goods which reason indicates.72 
 
 What has not yet been determined, however, is precisely the end to which reason and will 
direct the human person.  Following Aristotle, Aquinas determines that the final end and 
perfection of the human person is happiness, “Now a man’s excellence is in proportion, 
especially, to his happiness, which is man’s perfect good; and to its parts, i.e., those goods by 
which he has a certain share of happiness.”73  Some of those goods by which a human person 
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attains happiness are the virtues.74  But the question arises, how are the virtues present in the 
human person?  According to Aristotle, virtues are not present in the human person by nature, 
although he states that “we are by nature equipped with the ability to receive them, and habits 
bring this ability to completion and fulfillment.”75  Aristotle does not give any specific 
explanation about precisely how human beings are equipped by nature to receive the virtues 
(particularly the moral virtues), and Aquinas develops this further by proposing that “in man’s 
reason are to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge 
and action (i.e. first principles of speculative and practical reason respectively), which are the 
nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues.”76  Human beings have a natural aptitude for virtue, 
and the special habit of practical reason, which guides human beings about what to be done, i.e. 
human action, is called synderesis.  Synderesis then becomes for Aquinas the starting point or the 
“foundation for [practical] reason to rest upon;”77 it is part of that which guides human beings 
toward their end.  Since synderesis is a special natural habit, it includes those principles that 
enable human nature to attain its proper end.  As Angela McKay concludes, synderesis “provides 
the explanatory force behind man’s natural desire for the good of reason, and it is this natural 
habitual knowledge that provides the foundation for all further reasoning about moral matters.  It 
is primarily this natural habitual knowledge, together with the light of reason, that enables man 
to create in himself the dispositions that order him toward the good of reason.”78 
 Let us next consider Aquinas’s emphasis on human reason as the starting point for moral 
knowledge and action.  This is a critical point, as Aquinas, drawing from Aristotle, emphasizes 
that what is good is both knowable and intelligible. Yet, if we accept that all human beings 
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possess knowledge of certain universally intelligible moral principles, then we have to grapple 
with the problem of moral evil.  For example, consider Aristotle’s account of the incontinent 
man in Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle makes a distinction between the man who 
is self-indulgent and the man who is morally weak or incontinent: “For a self-indulgent person is 
led on by his own choice, since he believes that he should always pursue the pleasure of the 
moment. A morally weak man, on the other hand, does not think he should, but pursues it, 
nonetheless.”79  Aristotle attempts to explain the division in the morally weak person between 
knowledge of a moral good and the inability to act according to one’s knowledge, which he 
states is “the defeat of reason in moral weakness.”80  To put this into perspective, it will be 
helpful to briefly outline the structure of the human soul and more specifically the activity of 
human reason in the soul according to Aristotle. 
In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle posits that the soul consists of two basic 
elements, the rational and the irrational.  These two basic elements exists in a hierarchy with the 
rational guiding the activities of the soul (activities such as choice and deliberation).  The 
irrational is subdivided into the vegetative, the appetitive or irascible (i.e. the passions) and 
reason is further subdivided into two component parts, viz. the dianoetic or deliberative faculty 
and the noetic faculty by which man grasps first principles.  Corresponding to these two parts of 
the soul are two sets of virtues, the moral virtues, which are attained through experience and 
habit and restrain the irrational part of the soul; and the intellectual virtues, which are attained 
through education and learning and form the rational part of the soul.81  The specific nature of 
the human person is reason, as reason differentiates human beings from all other beings.  Reason 
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guides human beings by “[exhorting] them to follow the right path and to do what is best.”82  
Thus, we have an important emphasis on reason’s ability to guide human beings in practical 
matters by doing something very akin to the role of conscience: an exhortation to follow what is 
right and best.  This sounds similar to the Thomistic formulation that synderesis induces to good 
and murmurs at evil (instigare ad bonum et murmurare de malo).83 
But Aristotle is perhaps not as clear about a natural habit of containing the first principles 
of practical reason.  He is clear that there is a part of the soul (nous in Greek and intellectus in 
Latin) that contains the first principles of speculative reason, and he does make a distinction 
between nous and the kind of deliberative function that directs practical matters.  He posits that 
“there are three elements in the soul which control action and truth: sense perception, 
intelligence (nous), and desire.”84  Aristotle points out here, however, that sense perception, 
intelligence, and desire direct both our actions and truth.  He goes on to explain: 
Of these sense perception does not initiate any action.  We can see this from the fact that 
animals have sense perception but have no share in action.  What affirmation and 
negation are in the realm of thought, pursuit and avoidance are in the realm of desire.  
Therefore since moral virtue is characteristic involving choice, and since choice is a 
deliberate desire, it follows that, if the choice is to be good, the reasoning must be true 
and the desire correct.  This then is the kind of thought and the kind of truth that is 
practical and concerned with action.  One the other hand, in the kind of thought involved 
in theoretical knowledge and not in action or production, the good and the bad state are, 
respectively, truth and falsehood; in fact the attainment of truth is the function of the 
intellectual faculty as a whole.  But in intellectual activity concerned with action, the 
good state is truth in harmony with correct desire.85 
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Aristotle gives several important elements here that Aquinas develops.  First, he draws a parallel 
between the function of nous, that by which we know the first principles of speculative reason, 
and the function of what Aquinas calls synderesis, that by which we know the principles of 
practical reason. Affirmation and negation in the realm of nous are parallel to pursuit and 
avoidance in the realm of human actions or praxis.  This very language of pursuit and avoidance 
certainly illustrates that for Aristotle, the language of moral choice and guidance for human 
action is a rational activity.  Therefore, reason provides a fundamental moral framework as 
rational norms that direct pursuit of human goods.  However, as Douglas Kries points out, reason 
cannot initiate action on its own; it needs something more.86  Aristotle introduces two other 
elements: choice and desire.  Moral actions involve choice, which Aristotle defines as a 
deliberate desire.  Further, he connects the attainment of truth in speculative matters with the 
attainment of good in practical matters and connects truth and good action with the disposition of 
an appropriately ordered desire that pursues a good or avoids what is not good.  While moral 
actions are ultimately grounded in reason, they require that which is not rational, desire, for their 
attainment.  But this desire must be appropriately ordered through reason, thereby establishing a 
rational foundation for moral inquiry and pursuit of human goods.   
 There is another important piece of evidence that points toward foundational ideas about 
conscience in chapter 8 of book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics.  It is a passage wherein Aristotle 
explains the distinctions between practical wisdom or prudence (phronesis), intelligence (nous), 
and scientific knowledge (episteme),87 and it is perhaps the foundation upon which Aquinas 
builds the idea of synderesis as the special habit containing the first principles of practical 
reason.  Aristotle writes: 
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 They [scientific knowledge and practical wisdom] have some agreement with 
 understanding [i.e. intelligence].  Understanding indeed concerns those principles 
 requiring no proof.  But prudence deals with a singular ultimate, an object not of 
 scientific knowledge but of a kind of sense—not that by which we perceive proper 
 sensible—but the sense whereby in mathematics we perceive the external triangle (to 
 which we conform our reasoning).88 
 
Aristotle seems unclear on the exact relationship between these three modes of knowledge and 
Aquinas interprets him as explaining that, “both science (episteme) and prudence (phronesis) are 
receptive of, or in contact with understanding (nous), i.e. have some agreement with it as a habit 
of principles.”89  Here Thomas gives no further explanation except in saying that understanding 
“concerns certain principles or ultimates” that are “indemonstrable…[and] cannot be established 
by reason but become immediately known in themselves.”90  Prudence, on the other hand, deals 
with “a singular practicable that must be taken as a principle in things to be done.”91  Aquinas 
makes no mention however of synderesis as that which contains the first indemonstrable 
principles of practical reason.  All that Aquinas has established here is that understanding (nous) 
and prudence or practical wisdom (phronesis) are somehow receptive of one another by having 
‘some agreement” as a “habit of principles.”    
 If we turn to the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas gives a more detailed explanation about the 
relationship between prudence (phronesis) and understanding (nous).  In the Secunda Secundae, 
he explicitly asks the question, “Whether understanding [i.e. nous] is a part of prudence?”92  In 
the third objection to this article, Aquinas points precisely to Book VI of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, “Prudence is about singular matters of action (Ethics vi, 7) whereas understanding takes 
                                                 
88 Aristotle.  Nicomachean Ethics, 1142a. 
89 Aquinas, Thomas.  Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  Book VI, Lecture VII, §1214.   
90 Aquinas, Thomas.  Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  Book VI, Lecture VII, §1214. 
91 Aquinas, Thomas.  Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  Book VI, Lecture VII, §1214. 
92 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  II-II, Q. 49, art. 2.   
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cognizance of universal and immaterial objects (De Anima iii, 4).  Therefore understanding is 
not a part of prudence.”93  In the corpus of the article, Aquinas explains: 
 Understanding denotes here…the right estimate about some final principle, which is 
 taken as self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first principles of 
 demonstrations.  Now every deduction of reason proceeds from certain statements which 
 are taken as primary: wherefore every process of reasoning must needs proceed from 
 some understanding.  Therefore, since prudence is right reason applied to action, the 
 whole process of prudence must needs have its source in understanding.  Hence it is that 
 understanding is reckoned a part of prudence.94 
 
Interestingly, Aquinas does not use the language of synderesis in this passage, and it is yet to be 
determined how prudence and synderesis work together to direct human action.  What we see 
here is further evidence of a rational basis for morality, and one that is known naturally to all 
human beings.  Since prudence (or practical wisdom) exercises the faculty of reason, it must 
‘proceed from some understanding.’  He goes on to explain how this process occurs, and in this 
passage we do see a variation of the language of synderesis (i.e., pursue good and avoid evil), 
although it is here lumped together with nous, whereby we know the first speculative principles: 
 The reasoning of prudence terminates…in the particular matter of action to which…it 
 applies the knowledge of some universal principle. Now a singular conclusion is argued 
 from a universal and from singular proposition.  Wherefore reasoning of prudence must 
 proceed from a twofold understanding.  The one is cognizant of universals, and this 
 belongs to the understanding (nous) which is an intellectual virtue, whereby we know 
 naturally not only speculative principles, but also practical universal principles, such as 
 ‘One man should do evil to no man,’ as shown above.95 
 
This passage is reminiscent of Aquinas’s commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 
whereby he states that prudence and nous are somehow receptive of one another, but he still does 
                                                 
93 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  II-II, Q. 49, art.2, Obj. 3. 
94 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  II-II, Q. 49, art.2, Corpus. 
95 Here, the text points to another passage from the II-II, Q. 47, art. 6.  In this question on prudence “whether 
prudence determines the end of the moral virtues,” Aquinas does mention synderesis. The quotation above is from 
Summa Theologiae, II-II, Q. 49, art. 2, ad 1. 
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not go into depth about the role of synderesis.  The relationship between understanding (nous), 
practical wisdom (phronesis) and synderesis still remains to be determined.   
 What has become evident from the preceding analysis is that for Aquinas, our 
consciences, guided as they are by nous, phronesis, and synderesis are “not just knowledge of 
propositions about morality.”96  They inform our actions and choices, require a kind of desire to 
move us into action, and enable us to pursue our good and final end—happiness.  While even a 
cursory glance at the sources certainly proves that Aristotle does not use the terminology of 
synderesis or syneidesis, there is a foundation in Aristotle’s work that lays an essential 
foundation for Aquinas’s development of conscience and the over-arching principles of natural 
law.  It does not mean that Aristotle explicitly acknowledges the natural law, but rather that his 
work is not inimical to such a development.  Aquinas certainly had textual evidence upon which 
to base his assertion that there exists a natural habit by which we know the first principles of 
practical reason.  Further, developing a theory of conscience to help describe theoretically and 
conceptually the function of a common human experience does not have to be an aberration of 
what Aristotle intended to do.  In fact, it is by following Aristotle’s own methodology, with a 
basis in human inclinations and experience, that Aquinas is able to do so.  However the lack of a 
terminology being found in Aristotle must necessarily point us beyond him.  Aquinas provides 
not simply “another way to read Aristotle, but a way to think with Aristotle and beyond him.”97  
Let us then turn to consider those thinkers ‘beyond Aristotle’ who have also importantly 
contributed to Aquinas’s development of conscience.   
 
 
                                                 
96 Ramsay, Hayden.  “Conscience: Aquinas—With a Hint of Aristotle,” 22. 
97 Schall, James V. “The Uniqueness of the Political Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas.”  Perspectives in Political 
Science, 26 (Spring 1997), 85-91.Obtained from http://georgetown.edu/faculty/schallj/11.htm. 
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II. Theoretical and Historical Background 
A. Patristic Sources: Origins of ‘Synderesis’ in the work of St. Jerome 
 When we consider the Scholastic version of conscience, we must begin by understanding 
the term synderesis, as we have now established that the Scholastics debated and developed the 
idea of conscience within the framework of these two terms synderesis and conscientia and how 
they are related to one another.  According to scholars, the debate about the relationship between 
synderesis and conscientia predates Thomas’s work and “that the medieval debate was originally 
spurred by the introduction of the strange term synderesis into the conversation, and that the term 
entered the discussion by means of an enigmatic passage in Jerome’s Commentary on Ezekiel.98  
As we know, the term synderesis is of rather obscure origins because it is a corruption of the 
Greek term syneidesis.  Scholars such as D. Odon Lottin and Jacques de Blic have shown that the 
corruption took place somehow in the copying of Jerome’s Commentary on Ezekiel.99 
 The passage from Jerome’s Commentary on Ezekiel is from the beginning of the book of 
Ezekiel in the Old Testament. In the first chapter, Ezekiel describes a vision from the God of 
Israel wherein he sees a creature with four different faces and four wings.  The creature is 
comprised of four faces, that of a man, a lion, an ox (or calf), and over all of these, an eagle.  The 
passage reads as follows: 
 And as for the likeness of their faces: there was the face of a man, and the face of a lion 
 on the right side of all the four: and the face of an ox, on the left side of all the four: and 
 the face of an eagle over all the four.100 
 
                                                 
98 Kries, Douglas.  “Origen, Plato, and Conscience (‘Synderesis’) in Jerome’s Ezekiel’s Commentary.”Traditio.Vol. 
57 (2002), 67. 
99 Greek word and meaning from Davies, W.D. “Conscience.” The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, 672.  On 
the corruption of the term, cf. Jacques de Blic.  “Syndérèse ou Conscience?”Revue d’Ascétique et de Mystique.  25: 
1949.146-157 and D. Odon Lottin.  Psychologie et Morale Aux XII et XIII Siècles.  Louvain, Belgium: Abbaye du 
Mont César. Vol. II, 1948.  Cf. pp. 103-105.   
100 Ezekiel 1: 10.  Similitudo autem vultus eorum. Facies hominis et facies leonis a dextris ipsorum quatouor, facies 
autem bovis a sinistris ipsorum quatuor, et facies aquilae desuper ipsorum quatuor.  Latin from Jerome’s Vulgate 
and English translation from Douay-Rheims. 
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Jerome immediately gives an interpretation of Ezekiel’s vision following the Book of 
Revelation, viz. that the four faces are symbols referring to the four Evangelists, Matthew, Mark, 
Luke, and John.101  He then references alternative interpretations by those who follow the foolish 
wisdom of the philosophers (‘philosophorum stultam sequuntur sapientiam’) and by many who 
joined with Plato (‘plerique juxta Platonem’).  Douglas Kries suggests that Jerome identifies 
those following the foolish philosophers with those following Plato; however that evidence is not 
clear in Jerome’s text.  Who may be such followers of Plato?  According to Kries, Origen 
adopted Plato’s tripartite division of the soul in his own theological anthropology and connected 
with the Pauline anthropology of spirit, soul, and body in 1 Thess. 5:23.102  Kries then makes a 
connection between Origen’s theological anthropology and Plato’s tripartite division of the soul.  
Kries argues his case by explaining that in the following passage from Jerome, Jerome is actually 
referring to Origen’s Platonic interpretation of this passage, which he himself translated from 
Greek into Latin.103  The passage reads:  
 And most, following Plato, assign the rational, irascible, and concupiscible parts of the 
 soul—which he calls the logikon, the thumikon, and the epithumetikon—to the human, the 
 lion, and the calf.  They posit reason, reflection, mind, deliberation, and wisdom as the 
 same power and place it in the citadel of the brain.  But savageness, anger, and violence, 
 situated in the gallbladder, they place in the lion.  Next, lust, avarice, and the desire for all 
 the pleasures they place in the liver, that is in the calf, who cleaves to the works of the 
                                                 
101Super quod quid nobis videretur in supradicio pleniusque in Apocalyspi Joannis herum animentium species ac 
nomina referentur ad quattor Evangelia.  Quibus quomodo posit omnium animalium description coaptari tentabimus 
suo loco dicere. Alii vero qui philosophorum stultam qui sequuntur sapientiam, duo hemisphaeria in duobus templi 
Cheribum, nos et Antipodas quasi supinos et cadentes hominess suspicantur.  Plerique, juxta Platonem, rationale 
animae, et irascitivum, et concupiscitivum, quod ille λογικόνet θυτήρησιν et έπιθυμητικόν vocat, ad hominem et 
leonem ac vitulum referent… Quartamque ponunt quae super haec et extra haec tria est, quam Graeci vocant 
συντήρησιν, quae scintilla conscientiae in Cain quoque pectore, postquam ejectus est de paradise, non extinguitur, et 
qua victim voluptatibus vel furore, ipsaque interdum rationis decepti similitudine, nos peccare sentimus.  Quam 
proprie aquilae deputant, non se miscentem tribus, ded tria errantia corrigentem, quam in Scripturis interdum vocari 
legimus spiritum ‘qui interpellet pro nobis gemitibus inerrabilibus’ (Romans 8: 26). 
Jerome, Commentary on the Prophet Ezekiel in Fourteen Books. Book I, cap. I, 10D. Obtained from 
http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/02m/0347-0420,_Hieronymus,_Commentariorum_In_Ezechielem_ 
Prophetam_Libri_Quatuordecim,_MLT.pdf 
102 Kries, Douglas.  The Problem of Natural Law, 11. 
103 Cf. Kries, Douglas.  “Origen, Plato, and Conscience (‘Synderesis’) in Jerome’s Ezekiel’s Commentary.” 
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 earth.  And in the fourth part, which the Greeks call syneidesis, above and beyond these 
 three.  This is the spark of conscience, which is not extinguished even in the breast of 
 Cain after he was ejected from paradise.  It is through this that, occasionally having been 
 deceived by an imitation of reason itself when overcome by the pleasures or by fury, we 
 realize that we ourselves sin.  This fourth part they refer especially to the eagle, which 
 does not mix with the other three but corrects them when they err…104 
 
Jerome never names Origen in this passage, nor refers to any specific passage from his work, and 
his reasons for including this interpretation seem unclear, since earlier in the passage he seems to 
endorse the interpretation of the four creatures representing the four evangelists.   
 Whether Jerome cites this interpretation approvingly or disapprovingly is unclear from 
the text.  Whatever his intentions were, Jerome preserves a very influential philosophical and 
theological anthropology, and he particularly preserves an important element of Origen’s 
anthropology that tremendously influences the Scholastic ideas about conscience.  The Platonic 
division of the three parts of the soul Jerome explains as corresponding to three symbolic 
creatures: reason with the man; the ‘spirited part’ with the lion; and the passions with an ox or a 
calf.  But above and beyond all of these is the eagle, the ‘spark of conscience’ that does not mix 
with reason, the ‘spirited part,’ or the passions, but rather corrects them when they are in error.  
In a homily on this passage of Ezekiel, Origen makes this same argument, although he does not 
here mention syneidesis, “By ‘man’ its rational part is being indicated; by ‘lion’ its irascible part; 
by ‘calf’ its desirous part.  But the ‘spirit’ who presides to help…is over all three faces.  For in 
another passage the eagle is declared, so that through the eagle he signifies the presiding spirit of 
the soul.”105  The eagle that presides over the soul appears to have pride of place, even over and 
above human reason.  Conscience is thus elevated as an important component part of the human 
                                                 
104 Kries, Douglas.  The Problem of Natural Law, 7, 9.  Translation is Kries’s.   
105 Origen.  Origen: Homilies 1-14 on Ezekiel.  Trans. Thomas P. Scheck.  Homily 1, p. 45.  Ancient Christian 
Writers.  Ed. Dennis D. McManus.  No. 62.  (New York: Newman Press, 2010).   Origen here does not go into detail 
about conscience, but gives an explanation in his Commentary on the Epistle of to the Romans.  Cf. Kries, Douglas, 
“Origen, Plato, and Conscience,” 78. 
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person—of the human soul, and much of the Scholastic debate centers upon how it relates to the 
other parts of the soul.   
 The Scholastics examine conscience while grappling with the problem of human 
fallibility and the problem of evil.  They sought to understand how human beings could live 
moral lives and how those lives were to be constituted.  According to D.O. Lottin, the first of the 
medieval Scholastic scholars to refer back to this passage of Jerome is in 1152 AD by Peter 
Lombard, although he never used the term synderesis.  Peter Lombard instead refers to 
conscience as the “scintilla rationis” or the ‘spark of reason’ that was not eradicated even in Cain 
after he slaughtered his brother.106  Thus, even in Cain, the first murderer and fratricide, this 
‘spark of reason’ that is that which makes him aware of the evil he has done.  Conscience, then, 
becomes connected with human reason.  While Jerome (and perhaps Origen) refers to the 
scintilla conscientia, conscience is transformed by the Scholastics into the scintilla rationis or 
the ‘spark of reason’.  This change should be noted, especially when we consider that according 
to Jerome, conscience rules over and above human reason.  What conscience becomes for the 
medieval Scholastic has thus shifted from what Jerome has described.  About a decade after 
Peter Lombard, a certain Magister Udo returns to this passage in Jerome and uses the word 
synderesis to name that ‘higher reason’ that even in Cain could not be extinguished.107  In Udo, 
as in Peter Lombard, synderesis is a kind of higher reason, differing slightly from the Origen-
Jerome characterization of it as something separate from reason.  This shift is also worth noting, 
as Augustine attributes the knowledge of our conscience to a higher reason.  I have argued above 
that Aristotle contributes a rational basis to morality, and although he makes no explicit mention 
of conscience.  In this next section, I will show how it is St. Augustine who connects conscience 
                                                 
106Lottin, D. Odon.  Psychologie et Morale Aux XIIe et XIIIe Siècles.  (Louvain, Belgium: Abbaye du Mont César. 
Vol. II, 1948), 103-104.   
107Lottin, D. Odon.  Psychologie et Morale Aux XIIe et XIIIe Siècles, 106-107.   
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with human reason and how Augustine another critical component part to conscience, viz. a 
theory of free will.  
B. Augustine’s Contribution to Conscience 
 Of the Patristic scholars who contributed to Aquinas’s theory of conscience, Augustine is 
perhaps the most significant.  Aquinas quotes Augustine (among others) work in his treatment of 
synderesis and conscientia in De Veritate and in the Summa Theologiae, and Augustine had 
exceptional authority among the Scholastics, much of which was transmitted through Peter 
Lombard’s theology textbook the Book of Sentences.  The content of Lombards’s text was 
heavily drawn from St. Augustine’s work, and Aquinas had to teach and write a commentary on 
Lombard’s Book of Sentences as a prerequisite for attaining the equivalent of his doctorate in 
theology between 1254 and1256.108  However, Augustine himself wrote no treatise on 
conscience and never addressed it systematically—although the theme of conscience can be 
found throughout his scholarly work, his pastoral homilies and Scriptural commentaries, and 
even in his personal correspondence.  
 According to Augustine, conscience can either be good or bad, that is to say, it can 
approve or disprove of a person’s moral actions and choices.  In a letter to Caecilian, in which 
Augustine chastises him for a friendship with a corrupt and murderous wealthy count, Augustine 
strongly admonishes him that the “conscience of a wicked man, with its dread and penal 
shadows, outweighs not only all prisons, but even all hell.”109  In contrast, a person with a good 
                                                 
108 Cf. Vernon J. Bourke Aquinas’ Search for Wisdom, 68-69: “Originally from North Italy, Peter [Lombard] taught 
theology in the Paris School of Notre Dame from about 1135-1150. He produced a textbook in theology which was 
a digest of the ‘views’ (sententiae) of earlier Christian writers. . . but in which 80 percent of the material was 
directly quoted from St. Augustine.”  Cf. Also M.D. Chenu Toward Understanding St. Thomas.  Trans. A.M. 
Landry and D. Hughes.  (Chicago, Regnery: 1964), Chapter VIII. 
109 Augustine.  Letter 151 in Fathers of the Church: St. Augustine: Letters.  Volume III.  Trans. Sister Wilfrid 
Parsons, SND.  (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1953), 276.Volume 20. 
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conscience remains luminous and pure, even in the face of grave evil perpetrated against him.110  
A good conscience is reward enough to a person of good moral character.111  Thus far, we see no 
explicitly remarkable development of conscience in Augustine.  However, let us examine further 
how Augustine treats conscience in Book I of the City of God.  The first ten books of this work 
are a scathing critique on the Roman way of life and of the pagan notions of religion, virtues, and 
philosophy.  To this effect, Augustine makes a radical critique of the revered virtue of Lucretia, 
the great Roman heroine who committed suicide when she was violated by the son of King 
Tarquin. Rather than suffer the public shame of rape, Lucretia commits suicide. Augustine 
rebukes this action arguing that such a punishment for evil acted against her and without her 
consent does not serve justice.  Perhaps, he says, she was not innocent and actually consented to 
the violation.  Thus, Augustine argues, “If she was adulterous, why praise her?  If chaste, why 
slay her?”112 Augustine turns the discussion to her own interior conscience to reveal her motives 
for suicide: “She killed herself for being subjected to an outrage in which she had no guilty part, 
it is obvious that this act of hers was prompted…by the overwhelming burden of her shame.”113  
This shame Augustine attributes to her pride, which made her refuse to “exhibit to men her 
conscience.”114  Augustine speculates that because of her pride, Lucretia commits yet another 
more grievous crime in her suicide, and he contrasts Lucretia’s prideful disposition and faulty 
judgment of conscience with those of Christian women who suffered similar violations and who 
“declined to avenge upon themselves the guilt of others, and so add crimes of their own to those 
crimes in which they had no share.”115  These women, argues Augustine, rather than commit the 
                                                 
110 Cf. Augustine, The City of God.  Book I, chapters 19 and 22.  
111 Cf. Augustine.  On the Sermon on the Mount.  Book II, ch. 2 §9.  http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/16012.htm 
112 Augustine.  The City of God.  Trans. Marcus Dods, DD.  (Modern Library: New York, 2000), Book I, chapter 19.   
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crime of suicide, are consoled by the peace “within their own souls, in the witness of their own 
conscience.”116 
 The preceding example illustrates that Augustine turns pagan virtue ‘on its head’ and 
makes the case that it is not virtue at all—a theme he continues to expound at length in the City 
of God.  He argues that a good conscience is enough to give one peace in her own soul, so long 
as she is not complicit with evil, even an evil as horrific as rape, which often carried with the 
added violation of public shame.  Ernest Fortin explains that Augustine’s radically shifts the 
meaning of conscience to something which,  
 Rules all man’s life, [and] it represents a higher form of justice and makes demands that 
 are both extensively and intensively more stringent than those of ordinary human justice.  
 It applies not only to such actions as the law may prescribe or forbid but to the totality of 
 man’s external actions and encompasses even his secret thoughts and desires.  For, in 
 order to be truly virtuous, it is not enough to perform that one perform the right deeds; he 
 must also perform them for the right motives, and over these the human law has no 
 power. 117 
 
The central political insight is that human law becomes limited in a way that Augustine’s pagan 
predecessors could not have comprehended or anticipated; “civil society is displaced as the locus 
of virtue and the object of man’s deepest and most noble attachments…. It ceases to, as it had in 
the pagan scheme, the sole horizon lending meaning and substance to the highest activities 
undertaken by its citizens.”118  By this account, Augustine’s contribution to conscience has a 
revolutionary political impact.  Let us consider in more detail how Augustine achieves it.    
Augustine maintains that conscience exists in all human beings, and Augustine connects 
conscience both to human reason and to the desires of the human heart.  Augustine believes that 
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the promptings of conscience cannot be eradicated from the souls of human beings, a view that 
his contemporary Jerome shared, and Aquinas adopts: 
 [T]here is no soul, however wicked, which can yet reason in any way, in whose  
 conscience God does not speak… For who but God has written the law of nature in the 
 hearts of men?— that law concerning which the apostle says: “For when the Gentiles, 
 which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not 
 the law, are a law unto themselves: which show the work of the law written in their 
 hearts, their conscience also bearing them witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile 
 accusing or else excusing one another, in the day when the Lord shall judge the secrets 
 of men.” And therefore, as in the case of every rational soul, which thinks and reasons, 
 even though blinded by passion, we attribute whatever in its reasoning is true, not to itself 
 but to the very light of truth by which, however faintly, it is according to its capacity 
 illuminated, so as to perceive some measure of truth by its reasoning…119 
 
Augustine offers evidence from St. Paul’s letter to Romans 2:14-15, a verse repeated throughout 
the work of the Scholastics to explain the natural law.  In a lengthy letter written to his friend 
Hilarius in 414 AD, Augustine expounds the connection of the natural law to reason: 
Since there is a law in man’s reason, written by nature in the heart of everyone [i.e. each 
person] who enjoys the use of free will, and this law suggests that a man do no evil to 
another which  he would not wish to suffer himself, therefore according to this law all are 
transgressors,  even those who have not received the law of Law given by Moses, of 
whom the Psalmist says: ‘I have accounted all the sinners of the earth prevaricators’ (Ps. 
118.119)….  But, all the sinners of the earth become prevaricators by transgressing 
against the [natural] law which is found in the faculty of reason of the rational soul in all 
who have attained the age of reason.120 
 
In order to ascertain Augustine’s meaning in this passage, let us consider briefly his 
philosophical anthropology.   
 Augustine divides the human person into the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ man. The outer man 
refers to “anything in our consciousness that we have in common with animals,” i.e. sensation, 
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bodily growth, movement etc.121  The inner man contains the mind or reason, man’s differentia 
specifica, and through which he contemplates the Divine.  Augustine divides the functions of the 
mind into higher and lower reason, sapientia and scientia.  Scientia is knowledge pertaining to 
temporal matters, and sapientia is “the loftier reason” or ‘higher reason’ that makes “judgments 
on these bodily things according to non-bodily and everlasting meanings.”122  The loftier reason 
is able to contemplate “intelligible and unchanging truth” and can apply that truth to temporal 
matters.123  Augustine describes this process as partnership that parallels the Christian doctrine of 
the Trinitarian nature of God.   
Just as among all the beasts there was not found for man an assistant like himself, and 
only something taken from himself and formed into a consort could fill the bill, so too 
our mind, with which we consult the highest and innermost truth, has no assistant like it 
in the part of the soul we have in common with the beasts, for making use of bodily 
things in a way to satisfy the nature of man.  And therefore something rational of ours is 
assigned the duty of this work, not in the sense of being divorced from the mind in break 
of unity, but as derived from a helpful partnership.124 
 
The ‘helpful partnership’ according to Augustine is between the memory, the intellect 
(understanding), and the will.125  Augustine adds two new elements to conscience, viz. memory 
and will.  Memory and conscience will be discussed in the last chapter, so let us consider for the 
present conscience and will, and specifically for Augustine, free will.   
 In his treatise On the Free Choice of the Will, Augustine begins his Socratic-styled 
dialogue with his interlocutor Evodius asking whether God causes evil in the world.  Augustine 
argues that human beings are able to choose freely whether to direct themselves toward eternal 
truths or temporal goods, and “the eternal law demands that we purify our love by turning it 
                                                 
121 Augustine.  The Trinity.  Trans. Edmund Hill, O.P.  Ed. John E. Rotelle, O.S.A.  (Hyde Park, NY: New York City 
Press, 2010), Book XII, §1.  Cf. Augustine, City of God, Book XI, chapter 26.   
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away from the temporal things and toward what is eternal.”126  Again we see the division 
between that which eternal and unchanging and that which is temporal and changeable.  For 
Augustine, willfully pursuing misdirected desires constitutes evil doing, but this is not God’s 
doing.  In a later addendum to this work, Augustine writes, “it is indeed by the will that we sin or 
live rightly.”127  However, Augustine contends that no efficient cause for evil can be found in the 
will.  Evil deeds are committed by an act of will, but “it is not efficient but deficient, as the will 
itself is not an effecting of something, but a defect.  For defection from that which supremely is, 
that which has less being—this is to begin to have an evil will.”128  Turning from a higher good 
(for Augustine, that which is eternal) toward a lesser good (that which is temporal) constitutes 
evil.  Aquinas picks up Augustine’s deficient understanding of evil.  According to Aquinas, all 
beings by nature seek that which is good for them.  Underlying Aquinas’ assertion that all beings 
tend toward some good is the first premise of the natural law known by the habit of synderesis 
that “good is to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided.”129  He states: 
 But all things are known to flee from evil; in fact, intelligent agents avoid a thing for this 
 reason: they recognize it as an evil thing.  Now, all natural agents resist corruption, which 
 is an evil for each individual, to the full extent of their power.  Therefore, all things act 
 for the sake of a good.130 
                                                 
126 Augustine.  On the Free Choice of the Will.  Trans. Thomas Williams.  (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1993), Book I, Chapter 15.  
127 Augustine.  “Reconsiderations of On the Free Choice of the Will” in On the Free Choice of the Will.  Trans. 
Thomas Williams.(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 127.  Augustine is careful to argue that it is 
not will alone  by which we are able to make moral choices for the good.  At the end of his career, Augustine re-
examined his written works, and in the case of this treatise, he particularly wanted to distinguish his work from the 
Pelagian heresy, which argued that grace was not necessary for salvation.  Thus, according to Augustine, the will is 
only free because of the freely given gift of God’s grace.  Augustine writes just after the above quoted passage: “But 
unless the will is liberated by grace from its bondage to sin and is helped to overcome its vices, mortal cannot lead 
pious and righteous lives.  And unless the divine grace by which the will is freed preceded the act of the will, it 
would not be grace at all.”   
128 Augustine.  The City of God,  Book XII, 7.  Cf. also Book XIV, 28 where Augustine puts his analysis into a 
political context.   
129 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 94, art. 2  
130 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, 3, §8.    
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According to Aquinas, that which is good is the same as that which exists.  Thus, goodness and 
being are convertible terms.  Something exists insofar as it tends toward that which is good as 
“every action and movement are seen to be ordered in some way toward being, either that it may 
be preserved in the species or in the individual, or that it may be newly acquired.  Now, the very 
fact that of being is a good, and so all things desire to be.”131  Aquinas’ understanding of being 
and goodness as convertible terms leaves the problem of evil with only one solution, viz. that 
evil has no existence in and of itself, a view he shares with Augustine.  Like Augustine, he 
contends that moral evil occurs in an act of the human will.   
 The will, according to Aquinas is man’s free elective power, whereby he “desire[s] 
something for the sake of obtaining something else.”132  In order to freely choose to pursue good, 
the will must be informed by right reason.  Right reason is habituated through the exercise of 
virtue, “the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determined to one particular action, 
but are inclined differently to many; but they are determined to acts by means of habits. . . .  
Therefore, human virtues are habits.”133  Just as virtue habituates right reason, so vice habituates 
faulty reason.  Thus, moral evil is a defection of the will, and it is the result of an improperly 
formed rational capacity, which informs the will and presents to the will something considered 
good, for “evil does not result from an agent cause, unless because it is deficient in power, and to 
that extent it is not efficient.”134  However, this defect in the will “is voluntary, for to will and 
not to will lie within the power of the will itself. . . .  Yet, such a defect of ordering is not a moral 
evil, for, if reason considers nothing, or considers any good whatever, that is still not sin until the 
                                                 
131 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, 3, §4.  
132 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae. I,Q. 83, art. 4, corpus. 
133 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae. I-II, Q. 55, art.1, corpus. 
134 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, 10, §7.  
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will inclines to an unsuitable end.”135  One way to prevent defection of the will is a proper 
education that is aimed at formation of character, and particularly of their moral conscience.  In 
De Veritate, Aquinas distinguishes between a false conscience and a correct conscience 
(conscientia, not synderesis).  He writes that, “A correct conscience binds absolutely and 
perfectly….  But a false conscience…binds with some qualification and imperfectly…. For one 
can and should change such a [false] conscience.”136  This distinction will be examined in the 
following chapter.   
 One final point on Augustine’s contribution to conscience: he does not give a systematic 
explanation about the relationship between reason, will, memory, and conscience, but he does 
give us a vision of man’s moral life in very political terms.  Perhaps Augustine most famously 
declares this in his City of God: 
Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, 
even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of 
self.  The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the Lord.  For the one seeks 
glory from men; but the greatest glory of the other is God, the witness of conscience.137 
 
It is noteworthy that Augustine mentions conscience in this passage.  Citizenship in the city of 
God glories in the one who is the witness of human conscience, and conscience is hegemonic in 
the city of God.  Augustine describes human existence and salvation in political terms—
specifically as a kind of citizenship.  Yet, because of human sinfulness, made possible because of 
free will, the political realm will always be imperfect and laden with evil.  Augustine goes to 
great lengths to discuss the evils of political life – even family life and friendships suffer because 
of sin.  Wars, famines, disasters, all are a result of sin and characteristic of the city of Man.  The 
                                                 
135 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, 10, §17.  
136 Aquinas.  De Veritate.  Trans. James V. McGlynn, S.J.  Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953. Vol. II, Q. 17, Art. 5. 
Reply.   
137 Augustine.  City of God.  Book XIV, 28.   
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earthly city is by its nature limited in its scope and accomplishments.  Yet, Augustine does not 
leave man destitute with no hope.  The city of God is not of the world, but the Incarnation has 
brought its order (the order of grace and redemption) to the world.  The city of God is in fact the 
best regime, although it is not achievable through any earthly politics.  Only the city of God 
offers true peace, true justice, and true virtue.138  Further, the city of God is open to all men on 
account of their free will, their properly ordered love, and their fundamental nature as imago Dei.   
Each person, according to Augustine, is made in the Trinitarian image of God and is 
capable of choosing to do good or evil—because of the freedom of will that was given to each 
person as part of his nature.139  For Augustine, as well for Aquinas, human beings are ordered to 
a specific end—the happiness that is only found in the city of God. In the world, this city is not 
to be found in its perfection.  Human beings are endowed with tools—among them are free will, 
reason, memory, and conscience—to help them choose what will enable them to become citizens 
in the city of God; all of these tools are themselves free gifts of grace, according to Augustine.  
Thus, human happiness and the highest end exist in their fullness only outside the earthly city.  
Augustine locates the best regime outside the earthly city, which necessarily limits what the 
earthly city can accomplish.  In doing so, he leaves the individual free to pursue that which will 
make him truly happy, viz. love of God, and he therefore leaves the state free from having to 
provide every human good.  Drawing from Christian revelation, Augustine builds an important 
part of the foundational framework from which Aquinas draws to explain the relationship 
between human reason, natural law, and conscience.  In the next chapter, we will examine the 
texts in which Aquinas develops his own theory of conscience, drawing from and incorporating 
these Classical and Christian elements that have been outlined.
                                                 
138 Cf. Augustine.  City of God.  Book XIX, especially chapters 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, and 12. 
139 Cf. Augustine.  The Trinity.  Book X, 17-19.  Here Augustine connects three mental acts: memory, 
understanding, and will with the image of the divine in the human person.   
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Chapter III: Conscience in the Early Work of Aquinas: Scriptum Super Libros 
Sententiarum and De Veritate1 
“St. Thomas’ doctrine of conscience indicates the road we must take to avoid the pitfalls of both 
subjectivism and a rigorous legalism.  It gives unity to man’s intellectual and moral life.”2 
“From all eternity the world has lain in God’s hand.  From eternity He ordains the whole and the 
individual—the individual, that in conjunction with all other individuals it may build up the 
whole; the whole, that it may become the foundation, content, and task of the individual.”3 
I. Introduction: Aquinas on Man and Politics 
 Now that we have examined some of the sources from which Aquinas constructs his 
theory of the human person, and specifically of conscience, we turn to the works in his corpus 
where he explicates his understanding of conscience.  Thomas Aquinas outlines his most mature 
account of conscience in the Summa Theologiae in two significant places.4  First, he discusses 
conscience in the Treatise on Man (I, Questions 75-102) and secondly in his discussion of human 
action in the Prima Secundae. The placement of both these treatments of conscience is 
significant for our inquiry, as it situates the importance of conscience in illuminating Aquinas’ 
philosophical anthropology.5  While Aquinas in these instances is investigating the interiority of 
the individual human person, we will also examine more particularly how his theory points 
toward the necessity of human relationships for individual conscience.  Aquinas discusses the 
function of synderesis again in the Treatise on Law (I-II, Questions 90-108), which also places 
his theory in the context of his understanding of law.  The context of conscience in the Treatise 
                                                 
1 Thomas Aquinas’s Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum or his commentary on the “Sentences’ of Peter Lombard 
has not been translated into English.  For that reason, I have included the Latin text in my footnotes.  All translations 
were done with the aid of Peter Koritansky, Ph.D. and Alan N. Stout.  Any mistakes in the translation are my own.   
2 Elders, L. J.  “Aquinas on Conscience.”Lex et Libertas: Freedom and Law according to St. Thomas Aquinas. Studi 
Tomistici .Volume 30.Studi Tomistici.  Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium on St. Thomas’s Philosophy.Pontificia 
Accademia de S. Tomasso e di Religione Cattolica.  Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1987, 134  
3 Guardini, Romano.  Conscience, 73. 
4 Cf. D’Arcy, Eric.  Conscience and its Right to Freedom, 34. 
5 The first place where he discusses this topic is in the Prima Pars, Q. 79, articles 12 and 13.  The second place is in 
the Prima Secundae Pars in the Treatise on Law, Qu. 94, article 1. Also important for his definition of conscientia is 
in the Prima Secundae Q. 19. 
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on Law is in the discussion of the natural law, which continues to be debated within our political 
discourse, especially regarding the social and moral issues and the role of law in defining or 
promoting them.  The place of his theory of conscience within the context of natural law will 
also be critical to our examination.  To get a better sense of Aquinas’s understanding of law, let 
us first consider his brief but substantive account of human nature at the beginning of his 
political treatise De Regno.  This consideration will give an overall context to help conceptualize 
Aquinas’s contribution to politics and to highlight the significance of his theory of conscience.   
 Aquinas wrote De Regno to the King of Cyprus likely around 1267.6  The work was not 
completed by Aquinas, and it does not contain the typical Thomistic academic disputations.  
Rather, it “pays more attention to the particularities of actual life than to abstract, universal 
political formulas.”7  Aquinas wrote this little treatise around the same time as he began his 
Aristotelian commentaries, and he draws heavily from Aristotle’s understanding of human 
nature.8  Aquinas begins the treatise with the Aristotelian assertion that all things are ordered 
toward an end, as he views all nature, including human nature, as teleological.  Further, Aquinas 
argues that, “some directive principle is needed through which the due end may be reached by 
the most direct route.”9  It is the light of reason (lumen rationis) that acts as man’s directive.  
(Aquinas also uses the image ‘light of reason’ to describe synderesis, the primary level of 
                                                 
6Torrell, Jean-Pierre, O.P.  Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work.  Volume I.  Trans. Robert 
Royal.(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 169.  The date is somewhat unsure, 
although Torrell states that it is most like 1267 to Hugh II of Lusignan.  Although the text had been thought not 
authentically written by Thomas, Torrell states that up to Chapter II, book 8 has been confirmed as authored by him.  
Although Torrell recommends that the text not be considered a full exposition of Thomistic political theory, my 
analysis only looks to the first book, authored by Thomas, a concise summation of his philosophical anthropology.   
7 Guerra, Marc D.  “Beyond Natural Law Talk: Politics and Prudence in St. Thomas Aquinas’s On Kingship.”  
Perspectives on Political Science.  (2002): 31: 1, 10.   
8 Guerra, Marc D.  “Beyond Natural Law Talk: Politics and Prudence in St. Thomas Aquinas’s On Kingship,” 9.   
9 Aquinas, Thomas.  De Regno ad Regem Cypri.  Trans. Gerald B. Phelan.  (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of 
Medieval Studies, 1949), Book I, Chapter I, §3.   
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conscience).  However, it is not by the light of reason alone that human beings attain their final 
end:  
Wherefore, if man were intended to live alone…he would require no other guide to his 
end.  Each man would be a king unto himself under God, the highest King, inasmuch as 
he would direct himself in his acts by the light of reason given him from on high.  Yet it 
is natural for man…to be a social and political animal, to live in a group.10 
 
Aquinas maintains that human beings have some knowledge of what is good by means of reason 
(although not by reason alone); man is uniquely a rational animal.  But as a rational animal, man 
has not been endowed with all that he needs for survival.  Instead, he has been given reason, by 
means of which he is able to learn how to provide for himself.  Yet, “one man alone could not 
sufficiently provide for life, unassisted.”11 
 According to Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology, each human person is in need of 
others, at least at a very basic level, i.e. human beings need each other for the bare necessities of 
life.  But Aquinas goes further: man qua rational animal needs relationship with other human 
beings:  
Man…has natural knowledge of the things which are essential for his life only in a 
general fashion, inasmuch as he is able to attain knowledge of the particular things 
necessary for human life by reasoning from natural principles.  But it is not possible for 
one man to arrive at a knowledge of these things by his own individual reason [emphasis 
mine].  It is therefore necessary for man to live in a multitude so that each one may assist 
his fellows.12 
 
Aquinas gives two significant points: first, human beings attain knowledge by means of 
reasoning about natural principles.  This assertion is the conceptual foundation for Aquinas’s 
understanding of the natural law.  Second, the reason of any one person alone is insufficient – he 
needs other human beings, that is to say, he needs other rational beings.  Alasdair MacIntyre has 
                                                 
10 Aquinas, Thomas.  De Regno ad Regem Cypri.  Book I, Chapter I, §4.   
11 Aquinas, Thomas.  De Regno ad Regem Cypri. Book I, Chapter I, §5.   
12 Aquinas, Thomas.  De Regno ad Regem Cypri. Book I, Chapter I, §6.   
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called this philosophical anthropology one that views human persons as ‘dependent rational 
animals.’13  We shall further explore MacIntyre’s idea toward the end of the chapter.  
Additionally, this necessity for human beings to live in community with others is linked to the 
common good and political governance, “For where men are together and each one is looking 
after his own interest, the multitude would be broken up and scattered unless there were also an 
agency to take care of what pertains to the commonweal.”14  Aquinas further asserts that political 
society is most fitting to the proper end human beings when it is “a multitude of free men,” 
oriented together toward the common good.15  Aquinas emphasizes the multitude of free men 
and the common good, thereby creating a critical linkage between a political society oriented to 
the common good, human freedom, and law.  The question for us to consider is how Aquinas’s 
understanding of conscience might illumine this linkage without subordinating the common good 
to the freedom of the individual person or vice versa.   
To consider briefly Aquinas’s political ideas in our own context, many argue that 
American constitutionalism was established upon the tenets of the natural law is the foundation 
for both the common good and the protection of individual freedom.  For example, the 
Honorable Thomas J. Brogan, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey from 1933 to 
1946 wrote that: 
 The basis of our democracy is the dignity of the person and his inalienable right to 
 liberty. Our government was established for the express purpose of protecting these 
                                                 
13 MacIntyre, Alasdair. Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues.  (Chicago: Open Court, 
1999).  MacIntyre writes, “I remain in general convinced by those commentators who stressed the extent to which 
Aquinas in his philosophical enquiries was not just an Aristotelian, but often a keenly perceptive interpreter as well 
as adapter of Aristotle.  But I had been misled, in part by Aquinas’s use of something like Davidson’s principle of 
charity in his interpretation of Aristotle, into underestimating the degree and importance of the differences in their 
attitudes to the acknowledgment of dependence.  I was first struck by this when reading a prayer composed by 
Aquinas in which he asks God to grant that he may happily share with those in need what he has, while humbly 
asking for what he needs from those who have, a prayer, that in effect, although not by Aquinas’s own intention, 
asks that we may not share some of the attitudes of Aristotle’s megalopsychos.” P. xi. 
14 Aquinas, Thomas.  De Regno ad Regem Cypri.  Book I, Chapter I, §8.  
15 Aquinas, Thomas.  De Regno ad Regem Cypri.  Book I, Chapter I, §10.   
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 rights, and our Constitution and Bill of Rights give eloquent demonstration of that fact. In 
 a word, the Declaration of the Founding Fathers and our Constitution and Bill of Rights 
 established a jurisprudence in this Country based on Natural Law.16 
 
Ellis Sandoz concludes similarly:  
 
 It should be said that the Bill of Rights to the Constitution as conceived and adopted 
 illustrates some higher law perspectives. It is substantively part and parcel of a tradition 
 of common law liberty and natural law productive of what we refer to as 
 constitutionalism or rule of law.17 
 
It is the stance of the natural law tradition, the tradition of the lex-ratio, that human beings by 
their nature, that is, by their common rational and political nature, share knowledge and 
universal inclinations that guide their moral actions.  For Aquinas, that by which human beings 
both know and subsequently act upon these inclinations is what we call conscience.  However, 
for Aquinas, conscience does not mean either the universal knowledge of all objective good or 
the “sweeping annulment of norms and the constant extension of individual liberties to the point 
of complete emancipation from all order.”18  Rather, his theory of conscience, and especially his 
understanding of the freedom of conscience necessitates both individual and collective 
responsibility which makes “possible the human coexistence of freedoms.”19  This is the critical 
linkage between common good and human freedom that we seek to illumine in Aquinas’s work.  
 In each of these places where Aquinas discusses conscience, he engages the difficult 
questions of man’s knowledge of moral truths that are meant to guide his choices and actions.  In 
the natural law tradition, it is the conscience that is considered the means by which a person 
                                                 
16 Brogan, Thomas J.  “The Natural Law and the Right to Liberty.”  University of Notre Dame Natural Law Institute 
Proceedings, Volume IV.  Ed. Edward F. Barrett.(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1951), 36. 
17 Sandoz, Ellis.  “American Religion and Higher Law.”  The Politics of Truth and Other Untimely Essays: The 
Crisis of Civic Consciousness.  (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1999), 106. 
18Ratzinger, Joseph.  “Truth and Freedom,” Communio International Catholic Review, 23 (1996): www.ewtn.com/ 
library/theology/truefree.htm 
19Ratzinger, Joseph.  “Truth and Freedom.” 
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“comes to know the basic principles of right and wrong.”20  Thus, for the student of political 
science, these questions pertaining to conscience are especially salient for understanding 
Thomas’ treatment of the natural law, of law more generally, and of the common good, which 
according to Aquinas is the proper end of a political society.  Aquinas offers the natural law 
teaching not for providing an account of the best political regime, but rather “to give an account 
of the principles that should inform the moral actions of individuals.”21  His starting point for 
political theory is not with the regime type, but rather with the interiority of the human person, 
particularly of synderesis, the habit by which human beings know the first principles of the 
natural law.  Thus, it will be particularly significant for us to investigate Thomas’ treatment of 
conscience as it is situated in the Treatise on Law in the Summa Theologiae. 
However, the Summa Theologiae is not the first place Aquinas introduces conscience, nor 
is it the text wherein he gives the most comprehensive discussion.  The first significant 
discussion of conscience is in his commentary Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, or the 
Commentary on the Book of Sentences, which was equivalent to Aquinas’s doctoral dissertation. 
TheBook of Sentences by Peter Lombard was used in the medieval universities and particularly at 
the University of Paris as the textbook for advanced theology students. In this early work, 
Thomas begins to develop his ideas more in line with those of the then emergent Aristotelianism 
and less in the medieval university’s traditional thought of Neo-Platonism and Augustinianism.22  
This work, according to M.D. Chenu, provides the student of Aquinas with an “internal 
                                                 
20 Kries, Douglas.  The Problem of Natural Law, 3. 
21 Guerra, Marc D.  “Beyond Natural Law Talk: Politics and Prudence in St. Thomas Aquinas’s On Kingship,” 10.   
22 Cf. Bourke, Vernon J. Aquinas’ Search for Wisdom, 72-73.  Cf. also M.D. Chenu, Toward Understanding St. 
Thomas, Chapter VIII.  It is important for us to note that Aquinas does not reject what was then the dominant 
tradition of Augustinianism.  Cf. O’Rourke, Fran.  Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas.  Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1992.  In fact, Aquinas’s description of conscience in this early work is less clear precisely because he was still 
working through the different traditions of Neo-Platonism/Augustinian and the emerging Aristotelian.   
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[elaboration] of his thought at work,” especially as it develops in the Disputed Questions 
(Quaestiones disputatae) and in his commentaries on Aristotle.23 
It is in one of his ‘disputed questions’ where we find the next treatment on conscience by 
Aquinas, viz. the Disputed Questions on Truth (De Veritate), written from 1257-1259 when 
Thomas was a Master of Theology.  De Veritate, according to Vernon Bourke, illustrates the 
breadth of knowledge that Aquinas had assimilated as a young professor:  
 The Bible, ancient classical writers, many Patristics and early medieval authors, 
 contemporary theologians and chroniclers are perhaps to be expected. But Aristotle, 
 Porphyry, Boethius, and a dozen other philosophers now fill his pages. Nor does he 
 neglect the Jewish and Mohammedan writers: Maimonides, Avicebron, Isaac of Israel, 
 Algazel, Avicenna, and Averroës.24 
 
In De Veritate, Thomas “is developing his own explanations of reality, knowing, willing, and of 
truth and goodness,” and he dedicates two rather extensive questions to conscience.25  There is 
another, less studied place where Aquinas treats the topic of conscience, viz. in his commentary 
on St. Paul’s letter to the Romans.  According to Thomist scholar Jean-Pierre Torrell, Aquinas’s 
commentary on the scriptural letter to the Romans contains perhaps his most important teachings 
on conscience, although there is no scholarly consensus on the time period when this particular 
commentary was written.26  His scriptural commentaries on St. Paul’s writings were written in 
two periods of Aquinas’s life: between 1259 and 1268 and then again toward the very end of his 
life, between the years of 1272 and 1273.27  Jean-Pierre Torrell argues that Thomas probably 
composed this commentary on Romans in the latter period toward the end of his life, and James 
                                                 
23 Cf. Chenu, M.D. Toward Understanding St. Thomas, 272 
24Bourke, Vernon J.  Aquinas’ Search for Wisdom, 95. 
25Bourke, Vernon J.  Aquinas’ Search for Wisdom, 96. 
26 Cf. Jean-Pierre Torrell’s Saint Thomas Aquinas: Spiritual Master, Volume 2. Trans. Robert Royal.  (Washington, 
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 317, footnote 25.  See also Torrell, Jean-Pierre.  Initiation à 
Saint Thomas d’Aquin: Sa Personne et Son Oeuvre.  Éditions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse: Éditions Du Cerf 
Paris, 1993.  Pp. 496-497.   
27Torrell, Jean-Pierre.  Initiation à Saint Thomas d’Aquin: Sa Personne et Son Oeuvre.  (Éditions Universitaires 
Fribourg Suisse: Éditions Du Cerf Paris, 1993), 496-497 
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Weisheipl concurs that it was likely written between 1270 and 1272.28  The commentary on 
Romans is an important text to examine not only because Aquinas discusses conscience, but also 
because he discusses the natural law and its theological grounding in St. Paul’s letter to Romans.   
 In each of his discussions of conscience, Aquinas categorizes it as constituted by two 
distinct ‘levels,’ synderesis and conscientia.  The Greek term synderesis, as previously 
explained, remains untranslated in English and is found primarily in the New Testament writings 
of St. Paul as syneidesis, although it also appears in Classical Greek philosophy and in the Greek 
Patristic Church fathers.29  To summarize the previous chapter, the use of synderesis and its 
grammatical variations by the Classic philosophers confers an awareness (consciousness) and a 
sense of remorse or approval for a past action called ‘judicial conscience,’ that is to say; it is 
what judges an individual’s past actions, but does not necessarily have the connotation of a guide 
to choosing right action. The corresponding Latin term used by the pre-Christian Romans, 
conscientia, is used more frequently and is used especially by Cicero and by the Epicureans.30  It 
is not until St. Paul uses the Greek term in his writings that it takes on a much more politically 
significant meaning: 
 In eight places [in St. Paul’s writings], however, we encounter something quite new. In 
 the First Epistle to the Corinthians, the problems of certain individuals’ scruples 
 concerning the right course of action leads St. Paul to use the phrase, ‘Their conscience is 
 uneasy, doubtful;’ the context shows that this defective condition is the product, not of 
 timidity, but of ignorance too. Being a conscience, it imposes a rule of conduct; yet for all 
 that it may be mistaken.  Here then are two new features in the use of the word 
                                                 
28Torrell, Jean-Pierre.  Initiation à Saint Thomas d’Aquin: Sa Personne et Son Oeuvre.  (Éditions Universitaires 
Fribourg Suisse: Éditions Du Cerf Paris, 1993), 365.  Cf. Weisheipl, James. A., O.P.  Friar Thomas D’Aquino: His 
Life, Thought, and Work.  (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1974), 372-373.   
29 According to Kries, the term synderesis is found 30 times in the New Testament and 27 of those usages are found 
in St. Paul’s writings or are associated with his life and work (three in Romans; eleven in Corinthians; five in letters 
to Timothy; one in letter to Titus; five are found Hebrews.)  Two are also found in a text associated with St. Paul, 
viz. Acts of the Apostles.  The remaining three instances are found in 1 Peter).  Cf. Kries, The Problem of Natural 
Law, Chapter 1, ff. 1. 
30 D’Arcy, Eric.  Conscience and its Right to Freedom New York, 8.  Cf. Also Philippe Delhaye.  The Christian 
Conscience, Introduction.  
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 ‘conscience’: that of having authority to legislate; and that of being subject to error. . . .  
 St. Paul, then introduces an entirely new phase in the history of the term ‘conscience’ in 
 moral theory, and two new features characterize his use of it. First, it is to play a directive 
 role before an action takes place.  In the pagan writers conscience did not appear on the 
 scene until after the action was performed, and its role was purely judicial; but in St. 
 Paul, conscience is credited with a legislative function, and it induces and obligation in  
 the proper sense. Second, conscience is fallible: the directions it issues may be 
 mistaken.31 
 
According to D’Arcy, St. Paul’s usage revolutionizes the meaning of conscience that was handed 
down to the Scholastics.  Instead of a purely judicial or past-oriented function, conscience 
becomes a guide, a consultant for future action.  This change in meaning and usage of the term 
was then further developed by the early Patristic scholars such as Jerome and Augustine.  The 
directive role of conscience is based upon a philosophical anthropology that views the human 
person as free to pursue his own ends by virtue of his reason and free will.   
 This chapter will consider Aquinas’s two earlier discussions of conscience.  First, I will 
examine the early development in Thomas’s earliest major work, viz. Scriptum super Libros 
Sententiarum written from 1254-1256.  Second, I will analyze how his thought develops in his 
significant and very extensive treatment of conscience in De Veritate, composed from 1256-
1259.  This work is a set of academic disputations wherein Aquinas formally answers questions 
put forth by students and colleagues in the university.  Through the examination of Aquinas’s 
theory of conscience, we will identify how the foundation of the idea of “freedom of conscience” 
is established in Aquinas’s work, as rooted in his understanding of the human person.  For 
Aquinas, this freedom stems from a common, shared rational nature that not only enables human 
beings to discern together the common good, but also requires mutual respect for the judgments 
of individual consciences.  His view, as we shall see, differs greatly from current connotation of 
                                                 
31 D’Arcy, Eric.  Conscience and its Right to Freedom, 9, 11. 
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‘conscience’ in political discourse.  Much of contemporary public discourse views the individual 
conscience as comprised of “emotional tendencies and spontaneous or environment-induced 
feelings which often escape rational control.”32  Under this definition, the claim of freedom for 
conscientious choice or objection diminishes, as to allow such freedom would be seen as an 
irrational imposition of one person’s choices onto someone else’s.  And in contemporary 
American political discourse, this logic is increasingly cited as justification for the legislative and 
judicial decisions on the more contentious ‘moral’ issues such as abortion, the definition of 
marriage, depictions of violence in the media, etc.  Further, as Roger Trigg points out, the 
“inherently subjective associations of ‘conscience’… cannot be allowed to get in the way of the 
alleged objective status of the rights and dignity of humans.”33  However, ‘irrational’ or 
‘inherently subjective’ is far from Aquinas’s description of conscience, and more importantly, it 
is far from his understanding of why conscience is free.  In fact, as we shall see in the following 
sections, in each of St. Thomas’s works where he addresses the topic of conscience, what is 
emphasized is the role of reason for the proper functioning of conscience, “’in pura ratione 
consistit.’”34  Thus, this analysis of these two earlier texts wherein Aquinas develops his own 
theory of conscience, viz. the Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum and De Veritate, will seek to 
clarify the role of reason in the function of conscience and how ‘freedom of conscience’ is 
understood by Aquinas’s rendering.   
II. The Structure of the Soul and of Moral Thinking for Aquinas 
In each of Aquinas’s major discussions of conscience, we see the classification of conscience 
as two-fold, constituted as synderesis and conscientia.  Although this classification did not 
originate with Aquinas, his development of the two constituents of conscience was quite radical; 
                                                 
32 Elders, L. J.  “Aquinas on Conscience,” 125. 
33 Trigg, Roger.  Equality, Freedom, and Religion, 134. 
34 Elders, L. J.  “Aquinas on Conscience,” 126. 
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“We shall find that, by espousing the cause of conscience, [Aquinas] broke with the common 
opinion of his immediate predecessors.”35  To better understand how Aquinas espouses the cause 
of conscience and development of conscience, let us first consider the medieval framework 
within which he approaches the topic of conscience.36  According to Eric D’Arcy, the debate 
about the nature and function of conscience before Aquinas’s contribution on the topic hinged on 
the interpretation of two texts, one from St. Paul and one from St. Augustine.  The question that 
these medieval scholars explored was the extent of conscience’s freedom and authority.  The text 
from Paul is from Romans 14: 23, “All that is not of faith is sin,” which was interpreted by the 
13th century Scholastics to mean that anything that is not in accordance with the faith is against 
conscience and therefore sinful.37  The other text was from one of St. Augustine’s sermons, 
which reads: “The command of a subordinate authority does not bind if it runs counter to the 
command of a superior in authority; as for instance, if the proconsul were to enjoin what the 
Emperor forbade.”38  The dominant interpretation of this passage was that conscience has no 
authority when a superior authority would contradict its promptings.  For the medieval 
theologian, this passage was taken to illustrate that the commandments of God supersede those 
of individual conscience.  The debate thus turned on the questions: To what degree does 
conscience bind?  What is the authority of conscience especially in relation to the law of God?  
Of Aquinas’s immediate predecessors and colleagues, some argued that conscience never binds 
and some that binds only provisionally.39 
                                                 
35 D’Arcy, Eric.  Conscience and Its Right to Freedom, 76. 
36Cf. Chapter 2 of this dissertation for the pre-Christian and early Christian contributions to conscience.   
37 Cf. D’Arcy, Eric.  Conscience and Its Right to Freedom, 76-77.   
38 St. Augustine Sermon VI De Verbis Domini, cap. 8.  Quoted in Eric D’Arcy Conscience and Its Right to Freedom, 
77.   
39 Cf. Eric D’Arcy.  Conscience and Its Right to Freedom, Part II, Chapter 1 and Dom O. Lottin Psychologie et 
Morale aux 12e et 13e Siècles.  Louvain, 1948, Vol. 2.  Pp. 379-385.   
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Of those who believed conscience never binds, the common opinion was that it does not 
bind in so far as it erroneous, nor in so far as it is a conscience.  “In so far as it is erroneous, there 
is no obligation to follow it….  In so far as it is a conscience, there is no obligation to follow it, 
for conscience as conscience induces no obligation.”40  For those who asserted that conscience 
only binds provisionally, they argue that conscience only binds in morally neutral acts.  
According to St. Bonaventure, one of Aquinas’s contemporaries, the obligation of conscience 
only binds when its dictates follow the will of God.41  Thus far, it would seem that the dictates of 
conscience ought to make no difference since the will of God always determines how human 
beings ought to act.  Albert the Great, Aquinas’s mentor and teacher, made one important 
contribution to the conscience debate, viz. that: 
 [A]ny account of conscience must study the subjective factor…. Albert sees that any 
 question of conscience turns attention to subjective states as well as objective matters; he 
 breaks very new ground by claiming that the answer to the question is to be given, not in 
 terms of true or false, but in terms of the subjective firmness with which the judgement 
 of conscience is held.42 
 
Albert the Great, Aquinas’s teacher and mentor, for the first time in the debate about conscience, 
emphasizes the interiority of the individual person in order to judge the moral gravity and the 
authority of the dictates of conscience.43  However, it seems by the description above, one that 
emphasizes on the subjective state of a person’s conscience, might seem to imply that conscience 
is simply arbitrary subjectivism.  How ought we to interpret this development in the debate?   
                                                 
40 D’Arcy, Eric.  Conscience and Its Right to Freedom, 81.  This particular opinion is that of Walter de Château 
Thierry who wrote his opinion between 1246-1249.   
41 D’Arcy, Eric.  Conscience and Its Right to Freedom, 84. 
42 D’Arcy, Eric.  Conscience and Its Right to Freedom, 84-85.   
43 D’Arcy, Eric.  Conscience and Its Right to Freedom, 85. 
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 It will help clarify the significance of this development first to explain how Aquinas 
outlined the different component parts of the human person, particularly those of the soul and its 
different functions, and then to explain his understanding of the structure of moral choice.   
First, Aquinas views the human person as consisting of a unity of body and soul.  The body and 
soul are not two separate entities, but rather a “substantial unity” that comprises human nature.  
The human soul is particular – a rational soul – and as the form of the body it gives the human 
person his uniqueness qua man.44  Aquinas makes a distinction between the body and soul, for 
example, “Although it is a form united to the body, the human soul nevertheless transcends all of 
corporeal matter, and consequently the soul cannot be brought to actual existence from the 
potency of matter by motion as are other forms that are immersed in matter.”45  Following the 
new Aristotelian schema, the different elements of the soul would be classified either as a power, 
a habit, a law, or an action.46  Aquinas, following Aristotle closely, conceptualizes different 
faculties or powers (potentia) of the soul based upon the operation of each part, viz. vegetative, 
sensitive (i.e. related to the senses), appetitive, locomotive, and intellectual.47 
The soul contains certain natural powers or capacities (potentia) that are distinguished by 
the function they carry out.48  In the human person, Aquinas explains, “there exists…an 
operation of the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that it is not even performed by a 
corporeal organ; and such is the operation of the rational soul.”49  According to Aquinas, there 
exists a hierarchy of these powers of the soul.  He explains:  
                                                 
44 Cf. Aquinas, Thomas.  Questions on the Soul.  Trans. James H. Robb.(Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University 
Press, 1984), Q. 2.  F.C. Copleston’s volume Aquinas also gives a very helpful explanation of the Thomistic account 
of the soul.   
45 Cf. Aquinas, Thomas.  Questions on the Soul.  Q. 2., ad 12. P. 62 
46 Hittinger, Russell.  “Examination of Conscience.”  First Things, January 2009.  Obtained from 
http://www.firsthings/article/2008/12/004-examination-of-conscience-5.P. 3. 
47 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I, Q. 78, art. I   
48 Cf. Summa Theologiae.  I, Q. 77, art. VIII, Corpus.   
49 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I, Q. 78, art.1, Corpus. 
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Now it has been shown above that among the powers of the soul there are several kinds 
of order.  Therefore one power of the soul proceeds from the essence of the soul by the 
medium of another. But since the essence of the soul is compared to the powers as active 
principle and as final, and as a receptive principle, either separately by itself, or together 
with a body; and since the agent and the end are more perfect while the receptive 
principle, as such, is less perfect; it follows that those powers of the soul which precede 
the others in the order of perfection and nature, are the principles of the others….  For we 
see the senses for the sake of the intelligence, and not the other way around.50 
 
It is important to note that the powers of the soul are natural, i.e., that they exist as a constitutive 
element of our human nature.  Further, nature ordains a hierarchy with the rational or intellectual 
power as the highest power of the soul.  There are natural and innate, and Aquinas makes a 
distinction between these powers (potentia) and learned capacities, which he calls habits 
(habitus).51  Aquinas defines a habit as a quality or “a disposition whereby that which is 
disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another.”52  
Habits are deemed good or bad depending upon whether it is suited to the nature of a thing; “if 
we add well or ill, which belongs to the essential notion of habit, we must consider the qualities 
relation to the nature, which is the end.”53 
 However, Aquinas is careful to add an essential point, viz. that habits, though usually 
learned or acquired qualities or dispositions, can also be natural.  He explains:  
One thing can be natural to another in two ways.  First in respect of the specific nature, as 
the faculty of laughing is the natural to man, and it is natural for fire to have an upward 
tendency. Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural to Socrates or Plato 
to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in accordance with their respective 
temperaments.  Again, in respect of both natures, something may be called natural in two 
ways: first because it entirely is from the nature; secondly because it is partly from the 
nature and partly from an extrinsic principle….  Thus, then, if we speak of habit as 
                                                 
50 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I, Q. 77, art.7, Corpus. 
51 Pasnau, Robert.  Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae Ia 75-
89.(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 150. 
52 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 49, art 2, Corpus. 
53 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 49, art 2, Corpus 
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disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the 
foregoing ways.54 
 
The natural habit of the intellectual power, according to Aquinas, is the understanding of first 
principles.55  This assertion is an important component of Aquinas’s theory of conscience, as 
shall be shown—especially in his explanation of synderesis for he proves that it is a habit of 
practical reason by drawing a parallel to the habit of speculative reason (i.e. understanding).  
Another important element of Aquinas’s discussion of habit is his understanding that when it is 
“directed to operation…[it] is a perfection of a power.”56  For Aquinas, synderesis is a natural 
habit and conscientia is an act following from a judgment of reason.  Thus, Aquinas describes 
human nature—and more particularly moral choice and action within the context of the 
perfection of a power of the soul, viz. human reason.  Robert Pasnau explains:  
Aquinas conceives of…our ethical development as having two parts: a study of our 
innate capacities [potentia] and a study of our [natural] and acquired dispositions 
[habitus] for various actions….  Aquinas views the study of human nature as primarily a 
study of moral psychology.  The nature of human beings is determined by our ultimate 
end, a beatific vision that requires the perfection of our intellectual and appetitive 
faculties.57 
 
Understanding these terms help to clarify the significance of Aquinas’s contribution to the 
definition of conscience, for in most of the works where he discusses conscience, he usually 
begins by engaging in the debate about how to classify its component parts.   
 For Aquinas both the appetitive and intellectual powers are directed in their operation 
toward perfection.  Aquinas does not make a distinction between reason (ratio) or the intellectual 
powers, i.e. the power of understanding—the intellect (intellectus): 
                                                 
54Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 51, art 1, Corpus.  According to Aquinas, habits may also be 
natural, caused by our actions, or infused by God.  Cf. I-II Q. 51.   
55Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 51, art 1, Corpus. 
56Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 54, art 4, Corpus. 
57 Pasnau, Robert.  Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 162-163.   
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Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers.  We shall understand this clearly if 
we consider their respective actions.  For to understand (intelligere) is simply to 
apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to advance from one thing to another, so as 
to know intelligible truth….  Man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by 
advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational.  Reasoning, 
therefore, is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition to 
possession…. [H]uman reasoning (ratiocinatio), by way of inquiry and discovery, 
advances from certain things simply understood (intellectis)—namely, the first principles; 
and again by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in light of which it 
examines what it has found.58 
 
Conscience (synderesis and conscientia) is rooted in the intellectual powers—thus they are 
connected to reason.  In particular, Aquinas contends that the “first principle in the practical 
reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that good is that which all things seek after.”59  
The natural habit by which human beings know the first principle of practical reason is 
synderesis.  The judgment of practical reason take place according to “what immediately 
precedes and generates action…[namely] that form of deductive reasoning which commentators 
[of Aristotle] have called ‘the practical syllogism.’”60  While Aristotle himself does not use this 
expression, the use of the syllogism to explain moral action, the medieval schoolmen drew drawn 
from his work.  For example, in Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes what is 
called the syllogism in the following terms: 
 There is one judgment that is universal; and another concerned with particulars that are 
 properly the objects of sense.  However, since one formal reason is present in such 
 judgments, the mind necessarily comes to a conclusion, while in the practical order it 
 must immediately be directed to operation.”61 
 
In the matter of a practical reason—a decision that may involve the use of conscience, the major 
premise of a syllogism is a ‘first principle,’ or something that is ‘simply understood’ by a person 
                                                 
58 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I, Q. 79, art 8, Corpus. 
59Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 94, art.2, Corpus. 
60 MacIntyre, Alasdair.  Whose Justice? Which Rationality?,129.   
61 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1147a. 
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as self-evident.  A particular experience or situation is included in the minor premise of 
syllogism.  There are those who find this structure of practical reason objectionable, stating that 
the “practical principles form a closed, consistent deductive system, beginning with a priori first 
principles concerning the essence or nature of man.  These principles are objectively valid, 
independently of the desires and judgments of human agents.”62  However Aquinas, as a student 
of Albert the Great, turns the study of ethical action toward the interior movement of the 
individual person—particularly to the freedom of the individual person.  It would be unjust to 
charge him with such an accusation that his understanding of moral action entails a ‘closed, 
consistent deductive system’ imposed on human beings.   
 Rather than a closed system of objective principles imposed on human beings, Aquinas 
sees moral choice as a process of reasoning that must take into account the particulars of a given 
situation.  Yet, human beings are not left without any means to evaluate the particulars of a 
situation.  The structure of moral choice in the form of a syllogism helps to illumine Aquinas’s 
own understanding of conscience and its relation to practical wisdom and prudential judgment. 
According to Aquinas, through a process of reasoning that includes a “way of judgment [that] 
returns by analysis to the first principles in light of which it examines what it has found,” a 
conclusion is reached as to a course of action.63  Kevin Flannery describes the practical 
syllogism as “reasoning about goods” that has a particular logic and structure to order those 
goods and produce a conclusion as to how we act with respect to those goods.64  He gives the 
following example of a practical syllogism: Premise 1: Covering leads to need-satisfaction.  
                                                 
62 Flannery, Kevin.  Acts Amid Precepts: The Aristotelian Logical Structure of Thomas Aquinas’s Moral Theory.  
(Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 2001), 3.  Flannery is citing Martha Nussbaum’s critique in her 
Aristotle’s ‘De Motu Animalium.’   
63 Cf. Summa Theologiae I: Q. 79 Art. 8, Corpus. 
64 Flannery, Kevin.  Acts Amid Precepts, 8-9.   
109 
 
Premise 2: Cloak leads to covering.  Conclusion: Thus, cloak leads to need-satisfaction.65  In this 
particular example, the movement is toward the first premise, that is, to satisfy a need.  It is a 
bottom-up movement, rather than a top-down movement wherein ‘a priori first principles 
concerning the essence or nature of man’ determine the outcome.  The practical syllogism is also 
‘defeatable’ by extraneous factors, for if “all the cloaks are contaminated with poisonous insects 
[then] practically speaking, one in not bound to get a cloak.”66  The structure of practical reason 
is more closely connected to human experience and is good-preserving rather than necessarily 
truth-preserving (as is the goal of theoretical reason).67  But this does not mean that practical 
reason has no concern with truth seeking.  It is critical to understand that practical reason still 
does “depend upon the first principles—which are the ends, i.e. the goods that humans seek.”68  
The goods that humans seek are not unconnected to the truth about their nature and essence, and 
prudential judgment and the careful considerations of conscience aid the individual human 
person in discerning what goods ought to be pursued or avoided.  Indeed for Aquinas, practical 
knowledge seeks truth as it relates to action.69  Let us then turn to Aquinas’s particular 
discussions of conscience for Aquinas’s argument on this connection.   
III. Thomas’s Early Development of Conscience: Conscience in the Scriptum Super 
 Libros Sententiarum 
 In his first major scholarly endeavor, Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, Aquinas 
considers the nature and function of conscience in two places: the first in a discussion of free will 
and the second in a question regarding willing good or evil.  Both of these treatments of 
conscience appear in the second book of his commentary, which treats human nature, and 
                                                 
65 Cf. Flannery, Kevin.  Acts Amid Precepts, 9.   
66 Flannery, Kevin.  Acts Amid Precepts, 10.   
67 Cf. Flannery, Kevin. Acts Amid Precepts, 12-15. 
68 Flannery, Kevin.  Acts Amid Precepts, 17.   
69 Aquinas, Thomas.  De Veritate.  Q. 22, art 10, ad 4.   
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specifically ‘corporeal nature.’70  The placement of his argument within a context of free will is a 
significant detail, as in later work, Aquinas places his discussion of synderesis and conscientia in 
a broader discussion about human reason.  However, reason and will are intimately related for 
Aquinas, as the will chooses what reason proposes to it as a good to be pursued.  Aquinas’s 
initial focus in this text is to determine whether synderesis and conscientia are to be classified as 
a power, a habit, or an act, classifications of the functions of parts of the soul that were drawn 
from the newly translated Aristotelian texts.  How both synderesis and conscientia were 
classified mattered significantly in the medieval debate, as the classification of conscience stood 
at the center of man’s moral knowledge, choice, and responsibility.  In this early work Aquinas 
embeds his treatment of synderesis into the framework of higher and lower reason and of free 
choice of the will, emphasizing contribution of Augustine’s work.71 
Yet, according to scholars, this work already deviates from the dominant Augustinian 
hermeneutic of theology that was the norm in the medieval universities.72  We will examine 
several ways in which Aquinas deviates from the Augustinian tradition by emphasizing 
Aristotelian insights, particularly insights about the nature and function of reason.  His Scriptum 
Super Libros Sententiarum is one of the first works wherein he begins to bring the Augustinian 
tradition into conversation with Aristotelian principles on the topic of conscience; “the young 
Aquinas…feels that he has to present and somehow defend St. Augustine’s views, but he also 
takes care to introduce various explanations from the Aristotelian tradition.”73  However, the 
concept of synderesis was not explicitly present in Aristotle’s work, making Aquinas’s task of 
                                                 
70 Cf. Aquinas, Thomas.  Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum.  Book II, Distinction 12, Prooemium.  
http://josephkenny.joyeurs.com/CDtexts/Sentences2.htm#12-02.  Trans. Joseph Kenny, O.P.   
71 Cf. Chapter 2 of this dissertation.  Aquinas’s discussion of synderesis in can be found in Scriptum Super Libros 
Sententiarum, Book II, Dist. XXIV, Qu. II, Art. III 
72 Cf. Torrell, Jean-Pierre, O.P. Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work, Volume I, 39-45; Bourke, 
Vernon.  Aquinas’ Search for Wisdom, Chapter 8. 
73 Bourke, Vernon.  Aquinas’ Search for Wisdom, 71.  This often makes Aquinas’s discussion of conscience a little 
bit less clear than when it appears in later work.   
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classifying it according to the Aristotelian typology (i.e. power, act, or habit) a difficult one.  
Aquinas ultimately concludes that it must be a habit, but he remains timid about proclaiming so 
in this work.  Russell Hittinger explains: “For his part, Thomas concluded that synderesis is not a 
power (intellect) or an act of the power (conscience) or the norm of action (natural law) but 
rather an innate, habitual disposition to grasp the first principles of the natural law.”74  And this 
classification has important implications: 
This was a deft interpretation, allowing to Thomas to avoid conflating innate habits with 
innate knowledge.  Like other medieval masters, Thomas knew that, for Aristotle, the 
intellect does not naturally know anything without experience of extramental reality, 
beginning in the senses.  Seeing that he couldn’t front-load knowledge of moral 
principles ahead of experience, he hit on the solution of positing [synderesis as] a habit.75 
 
While Aquinas’s ultimate conclusion that synderesis is a habit is clearly stated in his later works, 
his argument here is unsure, stating that it is either a habit or a faculty endowed with a habit.76  
He makes a similar comment in the following article where he argues that conscientia is an act, 
and explains the relationship between the natural law, synderesis, and conscientia: “And 
according to this way it is clear, just as they differentiate synderesis, natural law and conscience, 
because natural law names the very universal principles of justice, but synderesis, indeed, names 
the habit of the principles or the power with the habit; but conscience, in fact, names a certain 
application of the natural law to something needing to be done through the method of a certain 
conclusion.”77  Although he seems to waver on the precise nature of synderesis (i.e. whether it is 
                                                 
74 Hittinger, Russell.  “Examination of Conscience.”First Things, January 2009.  Obtained from 
http://www.firsthings/article/2008/12/004-examination-of-conscience-5.P. 3. 
75 Hittinger, Russell.  “Examination of Conscience.”First Things, January 2009.  Obtained from 
http://www.firsthings/article/2008/12/004-examination-of-conscience-5.P. 3. 
76Aquinas, Thomas.  Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum.  Book II, Dist. XXIV, Q. 2, art. 3: “Et ideo dico quod 
synderesis vel habitum tantum nominat, vel potentiam saltem substitutam habitui sicut nobis innato.”   
77Aquinas, Thomas.  Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum.  Book II, Dist. XXIV, Q. 2, art. 4, Corpus: “Et secundum 
hunc modum patet, qualiter differant synderesis, lex naturalis, et conscientia: quia lex naturalis nominat ipsa 
universalia principia juris, synderesis vero nominat habitum eorum, seu potentiam cum habitu; conscientia vero 
nominat applicationem quamdam legis naturalis ad aliquid faciendum per modum conclusionis cujusdam.”  Here, 
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a power or habit), Aquinas makes two significant shifts in the medieval debate about conscience.  
First, he emphasizes that synderesis is connected to the reason, and not to the will.  Reason 
judges whether a good should be pursued and then presents this good to the will, “the will is not 
moved to something desired without something being set forth by the apprehension….  But 
reason demonstrates the intention of good or evil.  Whence, since the act of the will is specified 
by its object, it is fitting that the act of the will proceeds according to the judgment of reason and 
conscience.”78  This shift allows him to make this link between natural law and conscience, 
which Aquinas fortifies in the Summa Theologiae.   
 With respect to the second aspect of conscience, viz. conscientia, we see that Aquinas 
states clearly in this early work what he maintained throughout his later ones: conscientia is an 
act.  Drawing from Book VI of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Aquinas describes the structure 
of moral reasoning as syllogistic.  Synderesis provides the major premise; the minor premise is 
supplied by what he calls ‘superior or inferior’ reason; and the conclusion of the syllogism is ‘the 
consideration of conscience.’79  This consideration of conscience is an act that applies what 
Aquinas calls ‘universal knowledge” to a particular situation.80  According to L.J. Elders, the 
major innovation that Aquinas makes in this work is his insistence that conscience is dependent 
                                                                                                                                                             
Aquinas was drawing on the authority of Philip the Chancellor who argued that synderesis was a faculty endowed 
with a habit. He later develops the teaching of his own teacher Albert the Great who insists that synderesis is a habit 
by which we know the first principles of practical reason, parallel to the habit of understanding, by which we know 
the first principles of speculative reason.  Cf. Philippe Delhaye The Christian Conscience.  Trans. Charles Underhill 
Quinn.  New York: Desclee, 1968.  Part II, Chapter 1.  
78 Aquinas, Thomas.  Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum.  Book II, Dist. XXXIX, Q. 3, Art. 3, Corpus.  “Voluntas 
autem non movetur in aliquid appetendum, nisi praesupposita aliqua apprehension….Intentionem autem boni vel 
mali ratio ipsa demonstrate.  Unde cum actus voluntatis ex objecto specificetur, oportet quod secundum rationis 
judicium et conscientiae.” 
79Aquinas, Thomas.  Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum.  Book II, Dist. XXIV, Q. 2, Art. 4.  “Synderesis in hoc 
syllogismo quasi majorem ministrat, cujus consideratio est actua synderesis; sed minorem ministrat ratio superior 
vel inferior, et ejus consideratio est ipsius actus; sed consideratio conclusionis elicitae, est consideratio 
conscientiae.”  Aquinas uses this same language of ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ (superior and inferior, respectively) in his dic 
80Aquinas, Thomas.  Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum.  Book II, Dist. XXIV, Q. 2, Art. 4. “et inde dicitur 
conscientia, quasi cum alio scientia, quia scientia universalis ad actum particularem applicatur.” 
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upon reason.81  Aquinas treats this issue when he asks whether an erroneous conscience is 
binding; in other words, if our conscience judges incorrectly, are we morally bound to act 
accordingly?  Aquinas’s starting point is that our will orients us toward the good—but the good 
as it is presented by reason.  Conscientia, according to Aquinas, is a dictate of reason that moves 
the will toward what has been apprehended as a good to be pursued.82  Thus, when conscience 
has judged that an act is morally good, the judgment is binding because to act against it is to act 
against what has been judged as good.  Aquinas places tremendous gravitas upon the judgment 
of the individual human person.  However, his conclusion about whether an erring conscience is 
binding is somewhat unsatisfactory.  He contends that if someone has judged in their conscience 
that something ought to be done (even if it is wrong), he must do it or else he sins.  He writes,  
And, therefore, if someone does something which is evil in itself, and which erring 
reason judges good, he does not evade sin.  But if he does not do it, he also falls into sin 
because one defect of goodness suffices for that by which one is called evil, he will either 
choose against a goodness that is good in a certain sense inasmuch as it is apprehended as 
good by the reason, or he will choose against a goodness that is good in itself.83   
 
His solution to this moral dilemma is unsatisfactory; the man with an erring conscience should 
simply put aside the error.  How this putting aside the error is to come about, Aquinas does not 
elaborate.  However, despite these less than satisfactory conclusions, we should not “overlook 
the striking points in the treatment of…conscience” that Aquinas does put forth this work.84  
Aquinas posits an important new principle, viz. “the will is to be judged by the standard of the 
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good as subjectively apprehended, not as it is objectively in itself.”85  Let us turn to consider how 
Aquinas develops this new understanding of conscience in De Veritate.   
IV. De Veritate: Conscience, Reason, and the Supremacy of Conscience 
 In his series of academic disputations on ‘truth,’ Disputed Questions on Truth (De 
Veritate,), Aquinas gives his most extensive treatment of conscience and makes some significant 
shifts in his theorization.  First, unlike in his Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, Aquinas 
places his discussion of synderesis and conscientia immediately following his discussion on 
reason rather than as connected to free choice.  It is the emphasis on reason that makes Aquinas’s 
theory truly a novel approach—a point we will consider in light of Aquinas’s understanding of 
the human person.86  Aquinas begins by again addressing the topic of whether synderesis ought 
to be considered a power or a habit.  He is more conclusive in De Veritate than he was in 
Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum: synderesis is a habit and not a power:  
 If synderesis is a power, it is either cognitive or tends to action.  But it is clear that it is 
 not simply cognitive from the fact that its act is to incline us to good and warn us against 
 evil.  Therefore, if it is a power it will tend to action.  But this is obviously false, for the 
 powers which tend to action are adequately divided into the irascible, the concupiscent, 
 and the rational.  And synderesis is distinguished from these.87 
 
The distinction is an essential one.  A habit, while it can be natural, still requires development, 
experience, and learning.  Aquinas’s understanding of conscience as pertaining both to the 
dignity of the individual person and to the relational element of human nature hinges on whether 
synderesis is a habit or a power.  Let us first consider how Aquinas makes his case.  It is the role 
of synderesis to murmur against evil and to urge toward good.  It is not a power, Aquinas argues, 
but it is associated with human reason, “for reason itself urges to good and speaks out against 
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evil.  Therefore, synderesis is in no way a power.”88  Drawing from Aristotle, Aquinas argues 
that “just as in the operative part of the soul synderesis never errs, so in the speculative part 
understanding never errs.”  Put differently, Aquinas argues here a parallel between practical and 
speculative reason, “Now the speculative and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative 
merely apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only apprehends but causes.”89 
So far, Aquinas’s theorization remains in the realm of analyzing the individual human 
soul, particularly human reason.  But Aquinas then makes an interesting turn his argument, a turn 
that points to an important relational aspect of conscience.  He draws upon Dionysius’s account 
of participation.  Dionysius says that “divine wisdom ‘joins the ends of nobler things with the 
beginnings of lesser things.’  For natures which are ordained to one another are related to each 
other as contiguous bodies, the upper limits of the lower body being in contact with the lower 
limit of the higher one.  Hence, at its highest point a lower nature attains to something which is 
proper to the higher nature and shares in it imperfectly.”90  Aquinas then uses this theory to relate 
human nature to angelic nature.  Angelic nature knows immediately without any need for “the 
movement of reason;” but human nature needs attains knowledge of truth through investigation 
of reason.91  However, Aquinas argues that human beings share some participation in this angelic 
or intuitive and self-evident way of knowing “according to what is highest” in human nature and 
by means of which human beings “[know] some things at once and without investigation,” even 
while still needing to receive some things from sense experience.92  Angelic nature contains both 
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speculative and practical reason, as since human beings come into contact with this angelic 
nature, it too must have both a speculative and a practical component.  Aquinas explains: 
 Hence it is that human nature, in so far as it comes into contact with the angelic nature,  
 must both in speculative and practical matters know truth without investigation.  And this 
 knowledge must be the principle of all the knowledge which follows, whether speculative 
 or practical, since principles must be more stable and certain…. This knowledge must be 
 habitual so that it will be ready when needed….  Thus, just as there is a natural habit of  
 the human soul though which it knows principles of the speculative sciences, which we  
 call understanding of principles, so, too, there is in the soul a natural habit of the first  
 principles of action, which are the universal principles of the natural law. This habit  
 pertains to synderesis.  This habit exists in no other power than reason.93 
 
This passage points to several important components of Aquinas’s theory of conscience.  First, 
significantly, he makes the case for its being a habit based on the participation of human nature 
in something other than itself, thereby connecting synderesis to something outside the individual 
human person (thus addressing the problem of conscience as radical autonomy).   
 Again, we see Aquinas’s emphasis on synderesis being a natural habit of reason.  But we 
see even more clearly the implications of this emphasis.  Aquinas argues for the existence of 
synderesis as a habit of practical reason by drawing from the Aristotelian assertion that there 
exists a habit of speculative reason, viz. understanding, by which we know the first principle of 
non contradiction.  Further, this habit of practical reason enables us to know the universal 
principles of the natural law, which include “the eternal norms of conduct.”94  Is Aquinas 
arguing for a universal knowledge of all moral truth that is to regulate human conduct?  Aquinas 
argues that synderesis is an infallible habit: 
 In all activities nature intends what is good and the conservation of the things which are 
 produced through the activity of nature.  Therefore, in all the works of nature, the 
 principles are always permanent and unchangeable and preservative of right order.  For, 
 as it is said in the Physics: ‘Principles should be permanent.’  For it would not be possible 
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 to have any stability or certainty in things which flow from principles if the principles 
 themselves were not firmly established….  This is the knowledge of first general 
 principles, in reference to which everything else which is known is examined and by 
 reason of which every truth is approved and every falsehood rejected.  If any error could 
 take place in these, there would be no certainty in the whole of the knowledge which 
 follows.95 
 
If synderesis is a natural habit that guides human action by urging it toward good that can never 
err, is Aquinas naïve enough to believe that human beings agree on moral issues at all times?  
How would he account for the many disagreements and rival conceptions of what is good in 
contemporary society?  Does an habitual grasp of first principles translate into a universal code 
of moral principles?  This critique is frequently leveled at Aquinas’s natural law theory, as 
history and experience prove otherwise.  Twentieth century Thomist and natural law proponent 
Yves Simon was concerned that, especially after the Second World War, the revival in natural 
law theory could easily become ideological; “Against such powers of destruction we feel the 
need for an ideology of natural law….  There is a tendency to treat in terms of natural law 
questions which call for treatment in terms of prudence.”96  Simon’s words are as true today as 
when he wrote them in the late 1950’s.  He stresses the importance of prudence, another critical 
component of Aquinas’s theory of conscience that Aquinas, a component that Aquinas 
emphasizes in the Summa Theologiae.  Yet, Aquinas does not argue that the natural habit of 
synderesis necessarily yields a universal morality or even a shared sense of the common good; 
“the agent needs the facts drawn from experience and inquiry; conclusions need to be framed in 
the manner of adequate propositions; and conclusions need to be applied to facts.  Moreover, all 
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of these need the institutions of moral training.”97  These institutions of moral training point the 
individual human person beyond himself toward the family, friendships, civil society, and 
community toward a relational aspect to conscience that informs the individual human person 
about the norms of moral conduct.   
 While Aquinas contends that synderesis can neither err nor be extinguished in a person, 
persons are still capable of differing about concepts of the good and can be mistaken in 
judgment.  Aquinas reiterates this parallel between speculative and practical matters, “Just as in 
speculative matters, although a mistaken reason starts from principles, it does not derive its 
falsity from first principles, but the wrong use of the principles, so the same thing also happens 
in practical matters.”98  For an error to occur or for a wrong moral choice to be made, synderesis 
itself does not fail, but rather the principles provided by synderesis are wrongly applied in a 
particular situation.  This application of the principles of synderesis is the act of conscientia.  
Aquinas first characterizes the relational aspect of conscience, explaining that, “Knowledge 
which consists in comparison is actual knowledge.  But conscience denotes knowledge with 
comparison. For one is said to be conscious (conscire), that is, to know together (simul scire).”99 
In his brief etymological discussion, Aquinas comes closer to pointing toward a relational aspect 
to conscience.  Aquinas then explains that there are several ways in which conscientia is 
commonly conceptualized.  That conscientia is considered ‘knowledge together with’ points 
beyond the individual human person.   
 Yet, conscientia is said to be the consciousness or awareness of an act that was done, and 
it is also considered to be that which judges whether an action is right or wrong.  When we speak 
                                                 
97 Hittinger, Russell.  “Examination of Conscience.”First Things, January 2009.  Obtained from 
http://www.firsthings/article/2008/12/004-examination-of-conscience-5.P. 5. 
98 Aquinas, Thomas.  De Veritate.  Q. 16, art. 3, ad 6. 
99 Aquinas, Thomas.  De Veritate.  Q. 17, art. 1, sed contra. 
119 
 
of conscientia in this latter sense, Aquinas states that it functions in two ways.  First, it is that by 
“which we are directed through the habit of scientific knowledge to do or not to do 
something.”100  It also functions as a judge of past action, again “with reference to the habit of 
knowledge” that is supplied by synderesis.101  Aquinas thus acknowledges both the judicial and 
legislative functions of conscience:  
 But we must bear in mind that in the first application, in which scientific knowledge is 
 applied to an act to know whether it has taken place, it is application to a particular act of 
 sensitive knowledge, as of memory, though which we recall what is done, or of sense, 
 through which we perceive the particular act in which we are now engaged.  But in the 
 second and third applications, by which we deliberate about what should be done, or 
 examine what has already been done, that operative habits of reason are applied to the 
 act.  These are the habit of synderesis and the habit of wisdom, which perfects higher  
 reason, and the habit of scientific knowledge, which perfects lower reason.  Of these,  
 either all are applied at the same time, or only one of them is applied.102 
 
Aquinas identifies conscience with reason, but he uses the terminology ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ 
reason, following the distinction made by Augustine.  Aquinas distinguishes between higher and 
lower reason according to whether a particular nature is higher or lower than the rational soul: 
“There are certain natures higher than the rational soul, and certain natures lower.”103  While 
reason is one unified power (not several): 
 The soul has a different relation to both types of things, and from this the different 
 functions are derived.  For it is called higher reason in its reference to higher natures, 
 either as contemplating their nature and truth in themselves, or as receiving from them 
 intelligible character and a kind of model for activity.  It is called lower reason in so far 
 as it is directed to lower things either to perceive them through contemplation or to 
 manage them through activity.  Both types of nature, however, the higher and the lower, 
 are perceived by the human soul in their common character of intelligible, the higher in 
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 so far as it is immaterial in itself, and the lower in so far as it is divested of matter 
 through the activity of the soul.104 
 
The exercise of conscience can apply to matters either of higher or lower reason, and it is 
through conscience (conscientia) that “the knowledge of synderesis and of higher and lower 
reason are applied to the examination of a particular act.”105 
 If synderesis cannot lead a person astray, how does Aquinas reconcile that human beings 
certainly do not agree about certain moral goods, and can themselves err in their moral 
judgment?  It is through this very application of the knowledge that synderesis supplies for a 
particular circumstance that conscientia is liable to err.  Attachment to certain bad habits or 
passions can cause an error in judgment.  For example, an intemperate desire for food can cause 
one to eat more than he should, even if he knows it is bad for his health.  Aquinas explains, 
“Error, however, can occur in this application in two ways; in one, because that which is applied 
has the error within it, and in the other, because the application is faulty.” 106  He contends that 
the syllogistic structure of moral reasoning can err either from a faulty premise or from a faulty 
construction of the syllogism.  However, Aquinas is quick to add that the error occurs in only 
one of the premises, since synderesis, which provides the first principles, cannot err.107  Aquinas 
explains: 
We must remember that in some things conscience can never make a mistake, namely, 
when the particular act to which conscience is applied has a universal judgment about it 
in synderesis.  For, as in speculative matters, error does not occur when we are dealing 
with particular conclusion which are derived directly from the universal principles and 
expressed in the same terms—as for instance, no one is deceived in the judgment: “This 
whole is greater than its part,” just as no one is deceived in the judgment: “Every whole is 
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greater than its part”—so, too, no conscience can err in the judgments: “I should not love 
God” or “Some evil should be done.”108 
 
If one’s conscience can be in error, does that judgment still bind a certain action?  If, for 
example, a person with all sincerity of conscience believes that taking the life of someone else is 
truly a good to be pursued, is such a judgment binding?  Aquinas argues that a judgment of one’s 
conscience, even if it is in error, is binding.  If one acts against a false conscience, he sins, 
because even though his conclusion was wrong, his acting against his conscience violates his 
integrity.  However, even if he acts in accordance with a false conscience, he also violates his 
integrity since his act was still wrong.  Aquinas gives a scriptural example: “In John 16:2 we 
read: ‘The hour cometh, when whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth a service to God.’ 
Therefore, their conscience told those who killed the Apostles that they would please God by this 
action.  But this was a mistake.”109  If those who acted in this manner were mistaken, how could 
not committing murder be a violation of their consciences and therefore a bad act?  Or, as 
Aquinas puts it, how could such a faulty judgment of conscience bind this kind of action?  In 
both instances, a wrong is being committed against an individual or against the common good.  
How does Aquinas reconcile such a tension? 
 Aquinas takes up this challenge by considering how an exterior thing is bound, “for he 
who is bound must necessarily stay in the place where he is bound, and the power to go off to 
other places is taken away from him.”110  If the judgment of conscience (whether it is correct or 
erroneous) is binding, then its power to bind “has place only in things which are necessary with a 
necessity imposed by something else.”111  Conscience cannot bind by coercion, because coercion 
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“has no place in movements of the will, by only in physical things, because by its nature the will 
is free from coercion.”112  Aquinas emphasizes the free will of the human person; even if his 
judgment is erroneous, his interior freedom by his nature must remain intact.  Yet, a judgment of 
conscience still imposes necessity.  How does conscience impose necessity?  According to 
Aquinas, the judgment of conscience binds because of the knowledge of achieving some good or 
avoiding some evil, just as “no one is bound by the command of a king or lord unless the 
command reaches him who is commanded; and it reaches him through knowledge of it.”113 
 Thus, we are prompted to consider the very real possibility of ignorance or of erroneous 
knowledge.  How and why would the judgment of conscience based on false knowledge or 
ignorance impose necessity on a person?  In the ‘difficulties,’114 Aquinas gives a seemingly 
impenetrable argument: God’s law always trumps false conscience; one must obey a higher 
authority (such as an emperor) over a lower authority (such as a proconsul). The authority of 
conscience is lower than God.  Thus a mistaken conscience could never be above the law of God.  
But Aquinas argues to the contrary, arguing “sin is principally in the will [and anyone] who 
decides to transgress a divine commandment has an evil will.”115  Thus, if a person acts 
knowingly against conscience, this is evil.  However, if his conscience judges incorrectly 
“whether in things intrinsically evil or in anything at all,” and he “believes that what is opposed 
to his conscience is contrary to the law of God,” but disobeys his own conscience, he has still 
acted with an evil will.116  The authority of one’s individual conscience, at least as Aquinas is 
presenting it here, seems to trump even a divine command, for in not following one’s conscience 
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one violates one’s own integrity with respect to what one considers intrinsically evil.  However, 
Aquinas makes a very important remark, almost in passing: “Accordingly, although such a false 
conscience can be changed, nevertheless, as long as it remains, it is binding” [emphasis mine].117 
 Aquinas argues unapologetically for the respect for the judgment of the individual 
person’s conscience, as he views that person’s judgment in accordance with their personal 
freedom and moral integrity.  But he recognizes the very real possibility that any one person’s 
sincere and conscientious judgment can be wrong.  He explains the error in the context of the 
syllogism; one can wrongly apply a premise for many different reasons.  Even if some are not 
convinced about the syllogistic structure of moral reasoning with the knowledge of first 
principles and the major premise of the syllogism being supplied by synderesis, we can recall the 
example of Eichmann as one who judged wrongly about what was morally good.118  We can also 
consider those who defended moral societal evils such as slavery or genocide as having a faulty 
or even a defective conscience.  However, a faulty conscience can be changed.  How does one 
change a false conscience?  I argue that it is precisely here (i.e. change of an erroneous 
conscience) that the relational aspect of conscience is critically important.  I turn to Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s analysis in Dependent Rational Animals to explain this importance.   
 MacIntyre, like Aquinas and Aristotle, begins with an underlying vision of the human 
person’s nature as teleological, rational, and political: each human person by his nature is 
ordered toward a particular end, he is endowed with reason to judge by what means to attain that 
end, and he lives in community with other human persons seeking their final end, viz. beatitudo 
that according to Aquinas, consists of relationship with God.  He calls this human condition 
dependent, rational animality.  Human beings exist in a state of dependency on other human 
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beings for the fulfillment of their needs and flourishing, and, in a particular way, they are 
dependent upon others to help them become ‘independent practical reasoners.’  Aquinas shares 
this vision of the human person as existing in a state of dependency, that is, that man is by nature 
a rational animal and by means of this status he has need of relationship with other human 
persons.119  To become an ‘independent practical reasoner’ means to be able: 
 To evaluate, modify, or reject our own practical judgments, to ask, that is, whether what 
 we take to be good reasons for action really are sufficiently good reasons, and the ability 
 to imagine realistically alternative possible futures, so as to be able to make rational 
 choices between them, and the ability to stand back from our desires, so as to be able to  
 enquire rationally what the pursuit of our good here and now requires and how our  
 desires must be directed, and if necessary, reeducated, if we are to attain it.120 
 
Young children of course need to rely upon the guidance of parents and teachers to help them 
develop their capacities for independent practical reasoning as they grow and mature.  However, 
since human judgment is always subject to error, even once a person has become ‘an 
independent practical reasoner,’ one still needs the help of others to help correct erroneous 
judgments.  The social relationships that we have with families, friends, colleagues, and fellow 
citizens enable us to have either a confirmation or a challenge to our own judgments by those 
who know us well.121  To put this in another way, the formation of an individual conscience does 
not happen in isolation—we live in communities with others with whom we have relationships.  
The formation of one’s conscience, of both synderesis and conscientia is connected, at least on 
Aquinas’s account, to our practical reason.  And “practical reasoning is by its nature, on the 
generally Aristotelian view…reasoning together with others, generally within some determinate 
set of social relationships.  Those relationships are initially formed and then developed as the 
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relationships through which each of us first achieves and is then supported in the status of an 
independent practical reasoner.”122 
 MacIntyre, however, acknowledges that these relationships with others can lead us away 
from becoming an independent practical reasoner; “defective systems of social relationships are 
apt to produce defective character.”123  There is a tension in MacIntyre: human beings are 
dependent rational animals who must become independent practical reasoners in order to attain 
their telos, but do so only in view of their continued dependence on others and with 
consideration of the common good.  Acknowledgement of dependence on others, however, in no 
way attenuates human freedom, particularly the freedom of conscience.  I argue that this 
dependence is a constituent part of the freedom of conscience.  Aquinas deals with this tension in 
his final question on conscience in De Veritate.  Here Aquinas asks the question whether one’s 
conscience has more authority in indifferent matters than the command of a superior.124  Aquinas 
answers in the affirmative, placing the dignity and authority of an individual’s interior integrity 
and judgment of conscience over and above the authority of a superior, “a spiritual bond is 
stronger than a physical bond, and an intrinsic bond stronger than an extrinsic bond.  But 
conscience is an intrinsic spiritual bond, whereas the office of the superior is physical and 
extrinsic, since all his authority is based on a dispensation which is limited in time.”125  Although 
Aquinas is speaking here in the context of a religious order, it is not difficult to imagine its 
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application in political life.  Aquinas here advocates for the respect for the interiority of the 
individual human person, which no extrinsic authority can ever coerce.  The dignity of the 
individual conscience derives a person’s relation to the Divine.  Aquinas states, “Even natural 
habits exist in us because they were put there by God.  Consequently since conscience is an act 
proceeding from the natural habit of synderesis, God is said to have imprinted it in the way in 
which He is said to be the source of all knowledge of truth which is in us.  For God endows our 
nature with the knowledge of first principles.”126  However, in cases of a false conscience, 
Aquinas asserts that although a false conscience still binds over a superior authority, “one can 
and should change such a conscience.”127  To change a false conscience, one may need the aid of 
others; conscience should draw one out of oneself and toward others.  The relational aspect of 
conscience is derived from human relationships that enable us to develop the virtues in order to 
become independent practical reasoners, particularly the virtue of prudence.  In the Summa 
Theologiae, Aquinas gives a much comprehensive account of prudence.  We will next consider 
the account of conscience and the relationship between its judgments and the virtue of prudence 
as given in the Summa Theologiae.   
 
 
                                                 
126 Aquinas, Thomas.  De Veritate.  Q. 17, art 1, ad. 6, first series. 
127 Aquinas, Thomas.  De Veritate.  Q. 17, art 5, Corpus.   
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Chapter IV: Conscience, Law, Prudence, and the Common Good: Aquinas’s Account of 
Conscience in the Summa Theologiae and Super Romanos 
“Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of the things that are made by his art, so too in every 
governor there must pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are to be done by those who are 
subject to his government.”1 
“The interconnection between the whole and the individual—the bracing action exercised by my 
individual development upon the structure of the whole, and the corresponding effect exercised by the 
structure of the whole upon my individual development, as a result of God’s wisdom and love—is 
Providence.”2 
I. Reason as the Basis for Moral Choice and Freedom 
As discussed in the previous chapter, one of Aquinas’s major contributions to ethics in 
general and to conscience more specifically is his emphasis that conscience is connected to 
reason.  Reason is the distinguishing characteristic or differentia specifica of the human person; 
and it guides the human person in pursuit of his end.  According to Aquinas, reason is the 
summit of human liberty.3  It is the role of reason “to advance from one thing understood to 
another so as to know intelligible truth.”4  Reason is a kind of movement in understanding and 
directs the human person “by way of inquiry and discovery…[to] the first principles; and again, 
by way of judgment, returns by analysis to first principles in light of which it examines what it 
has found.”5  By means of reason, human beings “hold dominion over [their] acts, moving 
[themselves] freely in order to perform [their] actions.”6  In Thomas’s schema, reason presents to 
                                                 
1 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 93, art.1, Corpus. 
2 Guardini, Romano.  Conscience, 73-74.   
3 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 17, art.1, ad 2.  Aquinas states as follows: “The root of liberty is 
the free will as the subject thereof; but it is the reason as its cause.  For the will can tend freely towards various 
objects, precisely because the reason can have various perceptions of the good.  Hence, philosophers define the free 
will as being a free judgment arising from reason, implying that reason is the root of liberty.”  Aquinas is responding 
to an objection that the root of liberty is in the will.  Thus, he concedes that the freedom does exist in the will (hence 
the very notion of ‘free will’), but that the root is within the reason, which directs the will to an object or end judged 
as good.   
4 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I, Q. 79, article 8, Corpus.   
5 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I, Q. 79, article 8, Corpus. 
6 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, Chapter 111, 1.  For this explanatory section, I will turn 
particularly to book III of the Summa Contra Gentiles which includes Thomas’s teaching on the relationship 
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the will ends to pursue by discerning goods and ordering actions according to this discernment.  
Although the will freely chooses, Aquinas argues that the role of reason is primary in freely 
ordering goods; thus we see how Aquinas argues that the summit of human liberty exists in 
man’s rational nature.  Oscar James Brown explains:  
The cardinal role of reason within the creativity and self-motion that is free judgment is  
radically imputable to the giveness of that hierarchical parallelism that obtains between  
the set order of the psychic powers and the complex plurality (also objectively  
observable) of available human goods – even strictly within the world of immanent or 
secular values.  It is reason’s lot, precisely to endeavor to order these several given goods  
among each other, not by the purely arbitrary arrangements of a despotic rule, but, rather 
in response to the order already discernible among the psychic faculties themselves – an 
order that is given.7 
 
For Aquinas, the hierarchical structure of goods exists simply on account of the giveness of 
human nature, “Now there is a certain order of these various things that are man’s goods, based 
on the fact that what is primary is subordinated to what is more primary.”8  The ordering of 
goods leads human beings to their final end, which is happiness.   
 However, it is critical to understand Aquinas’s view of human happiness as man’s final 
end.  First, as discussed above, Aquinas posits a certain ‘giveness’ of nature, and that giveness 
applies no less to the nature of human persons.  This ‘giveness’ is on account of man’s 
createdness, and it is not merely “order embedded in a species as though individuals are moved 
by a kind of physical necessity.”9  Instead, it is the recognition that the nature of the human 
person “is not of his own making.  Rather this particular is discovered through experience and 
through the use of self-reflective intelligence [i.e. reason], which is already operative in man 
                                                                                                                                                             
between human freedom and Divine Providence.  The work, and particularly this section, is very helpful guide to the 
Thomistic understanding of human freedom.   
7 Brown, Oscar James.  Natural Rectitude and Divine Law in Aquinas: An Approach to an Integral Interpretation of 
the Thomistic Doctrine of Law.  (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1981), 16. 
8 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, Chapter 108, 6.   
9 Hittinger, Russell.  The First Grace: Rediscovering the Natural Law in a Post-Christian World.  (Wilmington, DE: 
ISI Books, 2003), xxiii. 
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himself.”10  Aquinas begins from a position of the human person as created, and he operates 
within a metaphysics of participation with the Divine, that is to say, rational beings—human 
beings, participate in the Divine Wisdom and Governance.11  Although this metaphysics (and the 
related theology and theological-philosophical anthropology) have largely been rejected by many 
contemporary political theorists, it is still important to understand Aquinas’s position and to 
discern whether this rejection is warranted or whether it might still be valid.   
 Aquinas views that the human person is created by “God, Who is all ways perfect in 
Himself, and Who endows all things with being from His own power, exists as the Ruler of all 
beings, and is ruled by none other.  Nor is there anything that escapes His rule, just as there is 
nothing that does not receive its being from Him.”12  The human person, like all other created 
beings, is ruled by the Divine.  Further, human freedom is rooted in this Divine rule and in the 
human person’s very created ‘giveness.’ Aquinas continues:  
 The result of this rule is manifested differently in different beings, depending on the 
 diversity of their natures.  For some beings so exist as God’s products that, possessing 
 understanding, they bear likeness and reflect His image.  Consequently, they are not only 
 ruled but also are rulers of themselves, inasmuch as their own actions are directed  
 toward a fitting end.13 
 
Because the human person is created and bears the Divine image, he participates in the Divine 
governance by ruling over himself, a rule that leads him to direct the attainment of his own end.  
But it is precisely on account of their unique participation in the Divine governance and with the 
aid of God that human beings can achieve their end.  The ‘fitting end’ toward which all human 
                                                 
10 Schall, James V.  At the Limits of Political Philosophy: From ‘Brilliant Errors to Things of Uncommon 
Importance.  (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 188. 
11 Cf. Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae I-II, Q. 93, art. 1.  Also see the introductory chapter to Russell 
Hittinger’s The First Grace: Rediscovering the Natural Law in a Post-Christian World.  Wilmington, DE: ISI 
Books, 2003.  
12 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, Chapter 1, 3.   
13 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, Chapter 1, 4.  
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beings tend, according to Aquinas is defined in terms of relationship with the Divine.14  Aquinas 
explains that, “there must some union of things for which there is one end, as a result of their 
being ordered to this end.”15  Since all human beings have the same final end, they are thus 
united to one another in several ways. Aquinas continues: 
 Thus, in a state men are unified by a certain concord, so that they may be able to  
 attain the public good, and soldiers in combat must be united and act with one accord, 
 so that victory, the common end, may be achieved.  Now, the ultimate end, to which man  
 is brought with the help of divine grace, is the vision of God in His essence, which is  
 proper to God Himself.  Thus, this final good is shared with man by God.  So, man  
 cannot be brought to his end unless he be united with God by the conformation of his  
 will.  And this is the proper effect of love, for ‘it is proper to friends to approve and 
 disapprove of the same things and to be delighted in and to be pained by the same  
 things.’”16 
 
Not only are human beings united to other human beings as in a political society or as soldiers 
fighting in combat, but each individual person is called into a relationship with the Divine; and 
the Divine is a person, with whom man engages in a relationship formed by love, a relationship 
that enables the human person to attain his final end.   
 It is my assertion that the human relationship with and dependency upon God that is so 
central in Aquinas’s work also applies to human relationships.  Human beings are united to 
others, because each one has been given the same rational nature and has been given the same 
Divine image.  Thus, each individual human person has been given the same freedom for self-
rule to pursue his end.17  Each man as a rational creature is directed by God in a distinct way, 
                                                 
14 Aquinas states that the highest and final end for the human person is contemplation of God (Cf. Summa Contra 
Gentiles, Book III, 1.  Chapter 37.  At first glance, this may not seem like relational terms.  However, the 
contemplation of God is based upon divine caritas, which draws the human person to God and enables the human 
person to respond in love of God.  Aquinas’s explanation of supernatural grace further illustrates the dependency of 
the human person upon another outside of himself.  See also Aquinas’s discussion of faith being formed by love in 
the Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 4, art. 2.  
15 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, Chapter 151, 3.   
16 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, Chapter 151, 3.  Aquinas quotes Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, 1165b, 27.   
17 Cf. Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, Chapter 117.   
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with an emphasis on his own particularity, “the rational creature is governed for his own sake, as 
is clear from what we have said.  And so, only rational creatures receive direction from God in 
their acts, not only for the species, but for the individual”18  Aquinas gives prominence to the 
relationship of the individual person to God.  He states: 
 God takes of each nature according to its capacity; indeed, he created singular creatures 
 of such kinds that he knows were suited to achieving the end under His governance. . . .  
 [T]he personal acts of a rational creature are properly the acts that stem off from the 
 rational soul.  Now, the rational soul is capable of perpetual existence, not only in 
 function of the species. . . but also in an individual sense.  Therefore, the acts of a rational 
 creature are directed by divine providence not only for the reason that they are important 
 to the species, but also inasmuch as they are personal acts.19 
 
But even as rational animals who freely order their own actions, human beings are unable to 
achieve their final end solely by their direction of their own reason.  For Aquinas, there is a 
necessity for divine revelation and of grace for the individual to achieve his end.   
 But reason must also be trained to make judgments about man’s end, for since “a man 
lives by reason, which he must develop by lengthy, temporal experience so that he may achieve 
prudence.”20  Aquinas explains: 
Hence children must be instructed by parents who are already experienced people. Nor 
are they able to receive such instruction as soon as they are born, but after a long time,  
and especially after they have reached the age of discretion.  Moreover, a long time is  
needed for this instruction.  Then, too, because of the impulsion of the passions, through 
which prudent judgment is vitiated, they require not merely instruction by correction.21 
 
Aquinas illumines the human dependency upon others, particularly within familial relationships, 
to inform and to develop capacities to reason and to make judgments.  Parents are responsible to 
form the reasoning capacities of their children, teaching them through instruction and correction 
                                                 
18 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, Chapter 113, 1.  
19 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, Chapter 113, 4.   
20 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, Chapter 122, 8.   
21 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, Chapter 122, 8.   
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about the appropriate manner of living.  For, by forming their children in reason, parents instill 
virtue in them, for “virtue consists in this: that both the inner feelings and the use of corporeal 
things be regulated by reason.”22  But does this same injunction apply to relationships among 
adults—among friends or fellow citizens?  Or, do human beings depend upon one another as a 
means for forming their rational capacity and growing in virtue?   
 Aquinas answers emphatically in the affirmative, stating that “one may be aided to this 
end by another man, both in regard to knowledge and to love.  For men are of mutual assistance 
to each other in the knowing of truth, and one may stimulate another toward the good, and also 
restrain him from evil.”23  What distinguishes Aquinas’s answer is his emphasis that human 
persons depend on one another both in knowledge and in love, particularly with respect to 
discerning good and evil.  Human persons exist in relationship with one another, and because of 
their shared nature, all are capable of participation in the divine vision of knowledge and love of 
God.  Again, Aquinas emphasizes the role of reason in this relational part of human nature, “it 
pertains to a well-disposed intellect to bring men back to things that are proper goods for men, 
namely the goods of reason.  Consequently, to lead them away from these goods, by diverting 
them to the least important goods, is the mark of an improperly disposed intellect.”24  Aquinas 
argues that despite a diversity of human types and abilities, each human person can “attain to the 
vision of the divine substance [that is, man’s final end], and the inferiority of its nature is no 
impediment.”25  This assertion radically distinguishes Aquinas from the Classical tradition, 
particularly Aristotle, from whom he draws so much in his own thinking about human nature.26 
                                                 
22 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, Chapter 121, 3.   
23 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, Chapter 128, 2.   
24 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, Chapter 106, 4.  As we see in this quote, Aquinas 
recognizes that human beings do need the aid of others to pursue their proper end, however, he also recognizes that 
they are capable of misleading one another.   
25 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, Chapter 57, 4.   
26 Cf. Chapter 2 of this dissertation.   
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Aristotle also does recognize the necessity of human relationships for human flourishing, for 
example, in the beginning of the Politics, he reflects on the essential role of friendship between 
men and women to form the foundation of political life, viz. the family.  Indeed, he recognizes 
that every city exists as a partnership between persons for the sake of a common good.27  
Aristotle dedicates two books in his Nicomachean Ethics to the necessity of friendship for human 
happiness, and he considers friendship to the basis for political society.28  To be sure, Aristotle 
recognizes the importance of man’s social and political nature.   
 However, for Aristotle, true friendship can only exist among the most virtuous men who 
are equal to each other.  So there can be no foundational friendship between human beings and 
the Divine, as Aquinas holds.  Further, we need to consider the characteristics of thespoudaios or 
man of highest moral and intellectual virtue as described by Aristotle, viz. the megalopsychos or 
the man who possesses magnanimity.  For Aristotle, magnanimity is “the crown… as it were, of 
the virtues: it magnifies them and cannot exist without them.”29  What is the character of this 
person?  Aristotle describes him as: 
The kind of man who will do good, but who is ashamed to accept a good turn, because 
the former marks a man as superior, the latter as inferior.  Moreover, he will requite good 
with a greater good, for in this way he will not only repay the original benefactor but put 
him in his debt at the same time by making him the recipient of an added benefit.   The 
[magnanimous] also seem to remember the goods they have done, but not those they have 
received…. They listen with pleasure to the good that they have done, but with 
displeasure to what good they have received.30 
 
Aristotle describes this person, one possessing the crown of the virtues with a character of radical 
independence, one who scorns any notion of dependency on another.  Dependency or aid 
bestowed upon him is a mark of inferiority.  He scorns his enemies, and if he is put in a position 
                                                 
27 Cf. Aristotle’s Politics.  Book I, Chapters 1-2.   
28 Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Book VIII, Chapter 9.   
29 Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics.  Book IV, Chapter 3, 1124a.   
30 Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics.  Book IV, Chapter 3, 1124b.   
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where he may need the aid of others, “he will not lament and ask for help.”31  He is self-
sufficient to the scorn of others.  Although in Book IX, Aristotle states that even the most 
supremely happy and virtuous person would still need friends, it seems as the megalopsychos has 
need of others only so that he can assert his goodness, for he certainly does not receive material 
goods or favors from others.   
 When we juxtapose this description of friendship and the virtue of magnanimity with 
Aquinas’s understanding of the human person existing in relationship to God and others as part 
of the giveness of their nature, it easy to see a more radical divergence between their respective 
conceptions of human relationships.32  But the question remains: how might this assessment 
relate to conscience and to moral choice in general?  Mary Keys points to a starting point for our 
investigation: 
 There is [in Aquinas’s work] the ground-up moral phenomenology beginning from 
 natural law and rooted in what Aquinas terms synderesis and conscientia.  The ethic 
 experience of each human being, Aquinas maintains, evolves in the context of an inborn 
 inclination toward good and aversion toward evil.  Natural knowledge of the first and 
 very general precepts of the natural law enjoins personal rational reflection on human 
 relationships, social norms, and the example and advice of others, and one’s concrete, 
 lived experiences, to deepen one’s understanding of the requirements of virtue and 
 upright conduct and the connection of these with beatitude, happiness or flourishing.33 
 
Keys posits that Aquinas begins his investigation acknowledging the giveness of human nature 
as endowed with a means, i.e. reason guided by synderesis and activated by conscientia, to 
discern generally between good and evil and that part of man’s moral learning process involves 
experience, relationships, and living in society with other human beings.  Such will enable to 
pursue and guide others in pursuit of both individual and common goods.  Let us then turn to 
                                                 
31 Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics.  Book IV, Chapter 3, 1125a.   
32 For an excellent account of Aquinas’s reformulation of Aristotle’s understanding of magnanimity, see Mary M. 
Keys Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Promise of the Common Good.  Chapter 6. 
33 Keys, Mary M.  Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Promise of the Common Good, 169. 
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consider Aquinas’s discussion of conscience first within the Summa Theologiae and in his 
scriptural commentary on St. Paul’s letter addressed to the Romans.  
II. Freedom, Law, Practical Wisdom, and the Place of Conscience in the Summa Theologiae and 
Super Romanos 
A. Synderesis and Conscientia in the Prima Pars and in Super Romanos 
As we turn to the analysis of conscience in Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, it is worth 
pointing out that Aquinas does not give in this work as extensive a discussion of synderesis and 
conscientia as he does in De Veritate.  Michael B. Crowe asserts: 
In the Summa theologiae, in which St. Thomas rehandles so many of the concepts found 
in his early works, one expects to find an extended discussion of synderesis.  But the 
term, outside of the single laconic article devoted to it, is scarcely referred to….  But 
what is not found in St. Thomas prior to the Summa is an analysis of the general notion of 
law.34 
 
And although Aquinas does not give as detailed an analysis of conscientia either, he makes 
frequent mention of the ‘tribunal of conscience’ throughout the rest of the Summa, especially in 
his discussion of the sacraments and his pastoral advice.  Crowe argues that Aquinas’s lack of 
careful attention to and analysis of the concept of synderesis signals that he has lost interest in 
the concept and no longer finds it a significant component of moral theory.  Crowe could be right 
in this speculation, or Aquinas could have considered his in-depth analysis in De Veritate 
sufficient, or, as Joseph Ratzinger points out, the precise meaning of synderesis has “remained 
unclear…and for this reason became a hindrance to a careful development of this essential aspect 
of the whole question of conscience.”35  Although Crowe implies that Aquinas’s interest in 
conscience declines with a shifting emphasis on lex, I argue that it is precisely this shift in 
                                                 
34 Crowe, Michael B.  The Changing Profile of the Natural Law.(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 138-139.   
35 Ratzinger, Joseph.  “Conscience and Truth.”  Obtained from http://www.ewtn.com/library/curia/ratzcons.htm.  
Many scholars have leveled this same critique.  We will consider Ratzinger’s and Eric Voegelin’s alternative term 
for synderesis in the final chapter.   
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emphasis toward lex that gives conscience its significance within Aquinas’s thought.  Aquinas 
makes an essential connection between the interiority of the human person, moral choice, human 
freedom, law, and the common good.  Let us then consider how he argues for this connection.  
It will be helpful in our analysis to give a brief consideration to the overall structure of 
the Summa Theologiae to contextualize Aquinas’s discussion of conscience in this work.  It was 
written as a textbook for beginning theology students; and as a work of the common medieval 
‘Summa’ genre, it was intended to be “a synthesis comprising the whole range of Catholic 
truth.”36  Significantly, Aquinas began this work originally as a revision of his Scriptum Super 
Libros Sententiarum, which Aquinas had considered to be “pedagogically deficient and 
systematically incompetent.”37  As a work meant primarily to address theological questions, 
Thomas sets out his plan to treat first the things of God “not only as He is in Himself, but also as 
He is the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures.”38  Aquinas 
proposes to first address knowledge of God, then the rational creature’s movement towards God 
and then Christ, who according to his humanity leads the rational creature toward union with 
God.39  The outline he gives for the work will aid in understanding how he frames the question 
of conscience.  The first discussion of conscience is given in the Prima Pars (First Part) which, 
according to Aquinas treats the “procession of creatures from God,” in particular their relation to 
God as imago Dei.40  His second treatment of conscience is found in the Prima Secundae (the 
First Part of the Second Part), which treats human beings in relation to their final end (i.e. 
beatitudo) and the means to achieve that final end.  The first discussion of conscience in this 
                                                 
36 Eschmann, I.T., O.P.  “A Catalogue of St. Thomas’s Works,” in The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.  
Etienne Gilson.  (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 385. 
37 Eschmann, “A Catalogue of St. Thomas’s Works,” 386.   
38 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae. I, Q. 2, Proe. 
39Ibid.  See also Torrell, Jean-Pierre.  Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work.  Vol.I, 148. 
40 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae. I, Q. 44, Proe. 
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section of the Summa Theologiae is found in the context of man’s means to his final end.  
Synderesis and conscientia are mentioned in the Treatise on Law (in the Prima Secundae) in 
questions relating to the natural law.  Synderesis is also mentioned in the Secunda Secundae (the 
Second part of the Second part) in the Treatise on Prudence.  The discussion of conscience in 
both the Treatise on Law and Treatise of Prudence are the two significant developments in 
Aquinas’s theory of conscience upon which we will focus.41 
Aquinas’s first mention of synderesis and conscientia in the Prima Pars is placed in the 
question addressing the intellectual powers of the soul.  Interestingly, it comes immediately 
following an article on whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers.  This 
placement is significant, because in earlier works, Aquinas places synderesis and conscientia in 
the less clear context of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ reason.42  Aquinas does dedicate one article to 
higher and lower reason in this same question, but he does not give nearly as extensive of a 
treatment, nor does he describe the role or function of synderesis and conscientia in these terms.  
When Aquinas addresses synderesis, he asks whether it is a special power in the soul.  Aquinas 
has now confidently determined that synderesis is not a power, but rather a habitus of practical 
reason.  Aquinas answers stating that since,  
Man’s act of reasoning…is a kind of movement, [it] proceeds from the understanding of 
 certain things—namely, those which are naturally known without any investigation on 
 the part of reason, as an immovable principle—and ends also at the understanding of  
those principles naturally known, we judge of those things which have discovered by  
reasoning.43 
 
                                                 
41Synderesis is not mentioned again this work, although conscientia is discussed in the Treatise on Charity and 
frequently in the discussions on sin and the sacraments.   
42 Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I. Q. 79, Art. 11 treats speculative and practical reason.  This is not to 
argue that the categories of higher and lower reason are no longer a concern for Aquinas.  Speculative and practical 
reason can be either higher or lower.  Oscar James Brown explains: ‘the division of reason into ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ 
properly and immediately pertains to the knowing power itself—whether as speculative or practical.” Cf. Natural 
Rectitude and Divine Law in Aquinas, 103. 
43 Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae. I, Q. 79, Art. 12, Corpus. 
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Aquinas begins by explaining the act of human reasoning proceeding from first principles and 
judging in a kind of movement to discovery.  He then appeals to speculative reason to provide 
the parallel framework for synderesis: “as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, 
so that practical reason argues about practical things.”44 
 Aquinas treats speculative and practical reason in the previous article and his discussion 
there will help us to understand how is defining the role of synderesis.  First, as discussed earlier 
in this dissertation, Aquinas draws the categories of ‘speculative’ and ‘practical’ reason from 
Aristotle and his commentators.  Aquinas considers whether the speculative and practical reason 
is one and the same power or is two separate powers.  If they are separate powers, one could 
easily separate “the practical reasoning of agents in particular situation…and a theoretical [i.e. 
speculative] knowledge of the human good…so that the latter cannot enter into the former, so 
that reflective reasoning about the human good cannot become practically and immediately 
relevant.”45  What are the implications of such a separation?  According to Aquinas, when we 
make moral judgments, we begin from our practical, lived experience, “For [man] possesses 
understanding and reason, and consequently he can grasp in what different ways a thing may be 
good or bad, depending on its suitability for various individuals, times, and places.”46  We 
consider the particular situation to inquire, “what reasons we have for doing this rather than that 
and whether they are sufficiently good reasons.”47  Alasdair MacIntyre explains: 
 We shall find that the good reasons for doing this rather than that are also good reasons  
 for becoming this kind of person rather than that, for acquiring this or that kind of  
 character.  Since what discriminates one kind of character from is how goods are rank 
 ordered by the agent, and since rank ordering of goods embodies some conception of 
 what the good life for human beings is, we will be unable to justify our choices until and  
                                                 
44 Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae, I., Q. 79, Art. 12, Corpus. 
45 MacIntyre, Alasdair.  “Aristotle against Some Modern Aristotelians,” in Ethics and Politics, Selected Essays.Vol. 
2.(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.), 26. 
46 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, Chapter 113, 4.   
47 MacIntyre, Alasdair.  “Aristotle against Some Modern Aristotelians, 36. 
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 unless we can justify some conception of the human good.  And to do this we will have to  
 resort to theory as the justification of practice.48  
 
It is for this reason that Aquinas explains that “the speculative intellect by extensions becomes 
practical.”49  At first this statement may seem to contradict MacIntyre’s description, since he 
describes a bottom-up method of moral judgment.  However, Aquinas teaches that moral 
judgment begins from practical experience, but we are not left entirely without first principles 
from which we begin, and as the “speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends…to the 
consideration of the truth; while the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to 
operation.”50  The practical intellect directs toward what it apprehends as a good to be pursued, 
but the two, that is the speculative and the practical intellect, being one power, work together 
since,   
 Truth and good include one another; for truth is something good, otherwise, it would not  
 be desirable; and good is something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible.   
 Therefore as the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the aspect of 
 good, for example, when someone desires to know the truth; so the object of the practical 
 intellect is good directed to operation and under the aspect of truth.  For the practical  
 intellect knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs truth known to operation.51 
  
For Aquinas, since the practical and speculative intellects are one power of the soul, although 
distinguished by the end to which it is directed, that is goodness or truth respectively, these ends 
include one another.  Thus, the consideration of the good for the human person as MacIntyre 
describes above is also something true about the human person.52 
 Aquinas provides a particular natural habit that enables the human person to grasp first 
principles, and he appeals to Aristotle’s assertion that since there is a special habit of speculative 
                                                 
48 MacIntyre, Alasdair.  “Aristotle against Some Modern Aristotelians,” 36. 
49 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I, Q. 79, Art. 11, sed contra. 
50 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I.  Q. 79, Art. 11, Corpus. 
51 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I.  Q. 79, Art. 11, ad 2. 
52 Cf. Summa Theologiae II-II, Q. 109, art 1, ad 3 where Aquinas discusses how truth can be considered a moral 
virtue.  
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reason, viz. understanding of principles, then there is special habit of practical reason by which 
we grasp the first practical principles, viz. synderesis.53  It is the role of synderesis to incite 
human beings toward good and to murmur against evil.54  Aquinas’s choice of words in the 
description (instigare ad bonum et murmurare de malo) are significant.  Synderesis is a directive, 
but it does not contain specifics: it can only instigate or murmur.  It is only by reason and free 
choice that the human person executes a judgment in a chosen action.  Since synderesis contains 
only a general knowledge of universal principles, it cannot dictate the specifics of all moral law 
for, “universals cause no movement, but particular things do, since actions go on in their area.”55 
Because it does not contain the whole of all moral law, Aquinas can confidently say that, “Those 
unchangeable notions are the first practical principles, concerning which no one errs; and they 
are attributed to reason as to a power, and to synderesis as to a habit.  Wherefore we judge 
naturally both by our reason and by synderesis.”56  We apply these judgments to particular 
actions by means of conscientia. 
 Aquinas’s question dedicated to conscientia is the familiar issue of whether it is a power.  
Given what he has answered in both Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum and De Veritate, we 
can anticipate his answer that is an act and not a power.  Since the very etymological root of the 
word conscientia implies “the relation of knowledge to something,” Aquinas concludes that it is 
an act.57  He also briefly summarizes its various functions “to witness, to bind, or incite [and] to 
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accuse, torment, or rebuke.”58  Conscientia judges whether something should or should not be 
done.  In this way, Aquinas states, it can be confused with the habit, synderesis.  But it also 
examines what we have or have not done or whether we have done these actions well or ill, that 
is, with a good or bad intention.  Aquinas elaborates later in the Prima Secundae where 
conscientia reappears in the discussion of man’s final end.  The two articles are not explicitly 
addressed to questions on conscientia, but rather they address the integrity of the will when it 
makes a choice based on an errant judgment of reason.59 
 In the Prima Secundae question 19, article 5, Aquinas addresses whether the will is if it 
goes against reason, even when reason errs.  Here, he readdresses whether an erring conscience 
(i.e. incorrect reason applied to an act) binds a person.  If the will chooses against the judgment 
of conscience, even if it be a wrong judgment, the act is evil since the person chooses under the 
auspices of violating his conscience.  Aquinas begins his explanation by making a distinction 
between three types of acts: acts that are intrinsically evil, acts that are intrinsically good, and 
acts that are morally indifferent.  He rejects the notion that if a person’s conscience errs for 
example, commanding a morally indifferent act as an evil to be avoided, then their will has not 
chosen to do evil if they perform the act so judged as evil.  Aquinas turns us toward the 
interiority of the human person, toward his own subjective judgment, to determine the rightness 
or wrongness of an act.  He explains: 
 And since the object of the will is that which is proposed by reason…from the very fact  
 that a thing is proposed by the reason as being evil, the will by tending thereto becomes  
 evil.  And this the case not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that are good or 
 evil in themselves.  For not only indifferent matters can receive the character of goodness  
 or malice accidentally; but also that which is good, can receive the character of evil, or  
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that which is evil, can receive the character of goodness, on account of the reason  
 apprehending it as such.60 
 
For Aquinas, to follow right reason is to follow the dictates of one’s conscience, as he defines 
conscience as a dictate of reason.  Reginald Doherty explains that this means “the error possible 
to the intellect in proposing an object to the will is identified with an error of conscience, and 
error already distinguished from the error of the judgment of election [i.e. choice]…, which [is] 
caused by a disorder of the appetite.”61  Thus, he can conclude that, “absolutely speaking, every 
will at variance with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil.”62 
 In the next article, Aquinas addresses whether the will can ever be good if abides by an 
erroneous judgment of reason.  For it would seem that if the will is evil if it goes against an 
erroneous conscience in a matter of intrinsic evil, then any choice made will always be wrong.  
He states that the previous article asked whether an erroneous conscience binds our actions, and 
this approach considers whether an erroneous conscience excuses when our judgment falls 
short.63  The answer hinges on whether a person is ignorant of something which would have 
allowed him to form a proper judgment, for as “moral good and evil consist in action in so far as 
it is voluntary…it is evident that when ignorance causes an act to be involuntary, it takes away 
the character of moral good and evil.”64  However, this excuse of ignorance does not apply if the 
ignorance is willed, “if then reason or conscience err with an error that is voluntary, either 
directly, or through negligence, so that one errs about what one ought to know…such an error of 
reason or conscience does not excuse the will.”65  What we see in Aquinas is a consistent 
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argument that conscience is a dictate of reason “that results from the actual application of 
knowledge to an act.”66  Aquinas has described the judgment of conscience as the conclusion of 
syllogism whose major is informed by the habit of synderesis, the habit containing the first 
practical principles and the minor premise is provided by knowledge of particulars.  Synderesis 
both provides “the principles from which conscience concludes, [and also] govern[s] the 
conclusion, conscience itself….  There are two effects of conscience.  In the first place 
conscience binds or obliges.  Secondly, a quasi-effect or property of conscience is that it may 
err.”67  Aquinas has argued that even when the judgment of conscience is in error, it must still be 
followed since, 
 Fundamentally conscience obliges because it brings the divine law into contact with 
 man’s acts.  As a result, the binding power of conscience is the binding power of the  
 divine precept.  Conscience then is a kind of subjective law.  More proximately, 
 conscience obliges because the will is moved by and elects the objects presented by the 
 intellect….  It is conscience applying the law to an act which obliges man to act.68 
 
It is the connection that the human person has to something outside of himself that obliges his 
conscience, viz. the divine law.  Yet, conscience is still a kind of subjective judgment.   
 Aquinas examines this tension in his commentary on St. Paul’s letter to the Romans, 
Super Romanos, with a few changes to his treatment in the Summa Theologiae.  First, he makes 
in this work no mention at all of synderesis, but discusses conscientia extensively.  He does not 
give a precise philosophical explication of conscientia as an act that applies the first principles of 
practical reason to a particular situation.  Rather, he discusses it within the context of St. Paul’s 
pastoral letter the main subject of which is a theological issue, viz. the relationship between the 
Jews and the newly converted gentiles with respect to following the rule of divine law of the 
                                                 
66 Doherty, Reginald, O.P. The Judgments of Conscience and Prudence, 57-58.  
67 Doherty, Reginald, O.P. The Judgments of Conscience and Prudence, 57-58 
68 Doherty, Reginald, O.P. The Judgments of Conscience and Prudence, 57 
144 
 
Jews: “For the Jews objected to the gentiles that when they lived without God’s law, they 
sacrificed to idols.  The gentiles on their part objected to the Jews that even though they received 
God’s law, they did not keep it.”69  It is precisely this tension between the Jew and Gentiles that 
leads Paul and his commentator Aquinas to reflect on the natural knowledge of right order given 
to each human person.  That Jewish and Gentile converts to Christianity came together to form a 
new community of faith emphasizes the important relational dimension to their common life 
together.  How these two as historically antagonistic communities were to be united under one 
faith in a transpolitical community was not an insignificant challenge in the early years of the 
Christian church, and it has certainly had political implications.   
It is by emphasizing their knowledge of God’s law through conscience that Paul seeks to 
illustrate the participation of the Gentile converts in the life of God’s law, “For when the 
gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law; they, having not the 
law, are a law to themselves, who show the work of the law written in their hearts, their 
conscience bearing witness to them.”70  Aquinas is careful not to argue that either Gentile or Jew 
has no need for divine grace (i.e. the Pelagian heresy), but he quotes Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics in his explanation of this text.  He argues that the Gentiles do have a natural knowledge of 
the good insofar as, 
They function as a law to themselves by instructing and inducing themselves to good 
because the Philosopher says: ‘law is a statement laying down an obligation and 
proceeding from prudence to understanding’….  Then when he [St. Paul] says ‘their 
conscience bearing witness’ he proves his statement that work of the law is written in 
their hearts by citing actions which announce its presence.  First, he mentions those 
actions, one of which is the witness of conscience.  He touches on this when he says 
‘their conscience bearing witness,’ conscience being the application of one’s knowledge 
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in judging whether some action was good or bad to do….  However, no one can testify 
that an action is good or bad, unless he has knowledge of the law.  Hence, if conscience 
bears witness about good or evil, this is a clear sign that the work of law has been written 
on man’s heart.71 
 
In this instance, Aquinas argues that all human persons have a kind of natural knowledge of good 
to be done and evil to be avoided, which he identifies as a knowledge of the law written into the 
very nature of the human person.72  He quotes, although does not necessarily explain, Aristotle’s 
emphasis on prudence and understanding.  This interpretation gives tremendous dignity to the 
human person, who by his very nature participates in the governance of God.  However, as in his 
other writings on conscience, Aquinas emphasize that natural human reason is very easily 
erroneous in its judgments, “man is called carnal, because his reason is carnal…from that fact 
that it is submissive to the flesh and consents to the things which the flesh urges it.”73  It is for 
this reason that “[Paul] said to do what he understands not to be done, acting against 
conscience.”74  Aquinas explains the tension St. Paul experiences, “For the good which I will I 
do not: but the evil which I will not, that I do,”75 as a failure of reason to rule in the individual 
human person.  Aquinas writes: 
But it is clear that man’s reason, considered in the light of what is proper to it, is not 
inclined to evil, but insofar as it is moved by concupiscible desire.  Therefore, the doing 
of evil, which reason does, inasmuch as it has been overcome by desire, is not attributed 
principally to reason…but rather to the desire or habit in virtue of which reason is 
inclined to evil.76 
 
Aquinas reconciles an erroneous judgment of reason with the sanctity of conscience, especially 
the human participation in the eternal law.  
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Toward the end of his commentary, Aquinas explicates an aspect of the relational aspect 
of conscience as it pertained to the early Christian community, and this discussion merits our 
critical attention.  The fourteenth chapter of the letter to the Romans treats an issue that seems 
almost incomprehensible to the modern reader, viz. casting judgment on a member of a 
community on account of the food he consumes.  Paul writes, “For if, because of food, your 
brother be grieved, you no longer walk according to charity.  Destroy not him with your food.”77  
Aquinas explains the meaning of this passage:  
There were among the Romans some Jews converted to Christ, who distinguished among 
foods according to the law; but others, having a perfected faith, used all food without 
distinction, which of itself was lawful….  On this point it should be known…that the 
Jewish people, boasting that they are God’s portion, call unclean the good which all men 
use, e.g. the flesh of swine, hares, and food of that sort.  Furthermore, the nations which 
used such foods were not God’s portion; consequently, such food was unclean.78 
 
Paul admonishes the Jewish and Gentile believers not to scandalize one another by the food that 
they eat, since they are now united in Christ.  Aquinas takes his meaning even further by 
showing the importance of community and relationships to the formation of conscience.  
Aquinas notes that St. Paul asks his readers not to scandalize or cause one another to sin by their 
actions; members of this new community of faith are responsible for one another and for the 
interior good of other members.  If another member of the community in their conscience truly 
believes that eating a type of food violates the law of God, Paul asks his readers to abstain from 
engaging in such behavior, even though in truth it does not violate God’s law, since the New 
Law of grace has perfected the Old Law.    
According to Aquinas, the judgment of an erroneous conscience is binding, since “the 
binding force of even an erroneous conscience and that of the law of God are the same.  For 
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conscience does not dictate something to be done or avoided, unless it believes that it is against 
or in accordance with the law of God.  For the law is applied to our actions only by means of our 
conscience.”79  Aquinas identifies the law of God with a judgment of conscience; human beings 
interpret and apply it by conscience.  But Aquinas is not simply speculating on the binding 
aspect of an erroneous conscience.  Aquinas argues that if another’s conscience is in error about 
a particular circumstance, such as the moral gravity of eating a particular food, then those whose 
conscience guides them correctly are obligated not to engage in the offensive behavior, at least 
until he can explain that it is not wrong since “someone can get rid of an erroneous 
conscience.”80  Aquinas explains that there is an obligation to inform the member of the 
community with an erroneous conscience.  In this particular case from the letter to Romans, he 
writes that “not to discriminate among foods is a good work; therefore, it should not be avoided 
just because someone with an erroneous conscience makes a stumbling block of it.  For 
according to this, Catholics would have to abstain from meat and marriage to prevent heretics 
from being offended according to their erroneous conscience.”81  Such an assertion has 
tremendous political implications, especially in debates about how to legislate about moral 
issues.  It points to an essential tension in a political community, viz. the tension between the 
individual and common good.  Aquinas argues that the judgment of one’s conscience is his 
application of the law of God within his life.  It binds him under the penalty of sin.  Yet, he must 
also be attentive to the conscience of his neighbor-even if the conscience of his neighbor is 
wrong.  The obvious question is how do we know who has the erroneous conscience?  The 
particular case given in St. Paul’s letter to Romans, viz. the eating of certain foods, hardly seems 
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to be a matter of moral consequence to most today; and in those religious traditions that do 
distinguish certain foods to be in accord with or against the divine law no longer have much 
public debate on the matter.  Moreover, Paul’s advice here is to a spiritual community.   
Let us, therefore, consider a more salient, political example—such as the question of the 
definition of marriage—an issue increasingly subject to contentious public debate and legislation 
in state governments and on the United States Supreme Court docket for the summer of 2013.  
Robert Vischer points to a recent New Mexico case involving Elane Photography and a woman 
named Vanessa Willock.  Willock was seeking a photographer for her same-sex ceremony and 
solicited the business Elane Photography for the job.  Owners Jonathan and Elaine Huguenin 
explained that they could not accept this job, since to support homosexuality was against their 
deeply-held, conscientious religious convictions.  In response, “Willock filed a complaint with 
the [New Mexico] state human rights commission, alleging a violation of the state’s public 
accommodation laws, which covers sexual orientation.”82  Willock argued that she was in shock 
and offended at the Huguenin’s conscience claims regarding her homosexuality, and the human 
rights commission agreed with her.  In this case, how might Aquinas’s ideas about conscience 
apply?  What are the criteria upon which one citizen’s conscience claims are trumped by 
another’s?  What is the responsibility of one citizen to another to inform them of an erroneous 
judgment of conscience, while still respecting their subjective application of the moral law to 
their own lives?  How might Aquinas reconcile such conflicting conscience claims?  
In the Super Romanos, Aquinas does point to one solution, although it hardly seems to be 
consistent with political tolerance that is so vital for contemporary liberalism.  He writes:  
Among matters of faith some have not been perfectly manifested by the Church, as in the 
early Church it had been perfectly declared to men that Jewish converts were not bound 
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to observe the practices of the law….  Hence in cases of this kind it is enough for a man 
to keep his faith between himself and God.  Nor should he manifest his faith, if it 
scandalizes his neighbor, except perhaps among those who have to decide about the faith.  
But certain things of faith have been decided by the Church.  In such matters it is not 
enough to keep one’s faith between oneself and God, but one should confess it before his 
neighbor, no matter what scandal might arise, because doctrinal truth must not be set 
aside on account of scandal, just as Christ did not set aside the truth of his teaching just 
because the Pharisees were scandalized.83 
 
Aquinas’s assertion may seem radical to the modern reader.  But let us consider: the Huguenin’s 
followed his advice.  They argued that their conscientious, religious convictions teach the moral 
wrongness of a certain behavior, i.e. homosexuality, and they openly confessed that conviction 
openly to their neighbor in their refusal to photograph her commitment ceremony.  Yet, Aquinas 
hardly seems to be tolerant of those neighbors whose consciences may instruct them differently. 
How would he recommend discernment of the correct judgment of conscience in the case of 
Elane Photography?  Elsewhere in his work, Aquinas takes up an issue that contradicts this 
seeming intolerance.  In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas examines the topic of religious 
toleration.  He answers questions regarding whether the religious rites of the Jews should be 
tolerated and whether children of Jewish parents should be forced into baptism against the will of 
their parents.  In the first case, he answers affirmatively and negatively in the second case.  He 
cites natural justice and natural law as the primary reasons children should not be forced into 
baptism.84  In this case of conflicting religious beliefs, Aquinas seems to be much more tolerant 
than what he says in Super Romanos.  His conflicting approaches point to a tension between 
individual good and the common good and  between the responsibility of individuals to both 
respect the consciences of others, but also to inform the consciences of others.  Some criterion, 
then, is needed upon which to make judgments about how to respect and to inform the 
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consciences of others.  Let us turn to the criteria that Aquinas discusses in the section of the 
Summa Theologiae known as The Treatise on Law.  
B. Conscience in the Prima Secundae Pars: The Treatise on Law 
In the prologue to the Treatise on Law, Aquinas states that he will address the extrinsic 
principles that influence human acts.  Conscience (synderesis and conscientia), since it pertains 
to the power of reason, is the intrinsic principle that guide human acts.  However, since human 
conscience is for Aquinas also the point of contact between the human person and divine law, it 
also has an extrinsic component since “the extrinsic principle moving us to good is God, Who 
both instructs us by means of His Law, and assists us by His Grace.”85  At the beginning of the 
Treatise on Law, Aquinas defines law in such a manner that we can anticipate that it is intimately 
related to his understanding of conscience. Before Aquinas gives his definition of law, he 
establishes four important aspects of law.  First, it pertains to reason; second it is ordained to the 
common good; third, it must be made by an authority entrusted to either “the whole people or to 
someone who is the viceregent of the whole people;”86 and fourth, it must be promulgated so that 
all citizens know its contents.  His argument about law being ordained to the common good is 
particularly significant for our purposes.  Aquinas argues: 
The law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and  
measure.  Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason itself there is  
something which is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore to this principle  
chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred.  Now the first principle in practical 
 matters, which are the object of the practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of  
human life is bliss or happiness…. Consequently the law must needs apply principally 
the relationship to happiness.  Moreover since every part is ordained to the whole, as  
imperfect to perfect; and since one man is part of the perfect community, the law must 
 needs regard properly the relationship to universal happiness.87 
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Aquinas begins his explanation of law and the common good by appealing to reason as the 
principle of human acts.  He then explains that the first principle in practical matters is the same 
for all persons and it is their final end – happiness (beatitudo).  Every human person makes 
judgments about what acts to pursue based upon their seeking happiness.  Since law directs 
human actions, it must relate to human happiness and flourishing.  But it cannot pertain to one’s 
man’s happiness alone; rather law directs to the common good and happiness of all.   
 Earlier in the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas has referred to conscientia as the law of our 
intellect88; conscience thus relates to reason as a law – and for Aquinas, law is ordained to the 
common good.  Law, then, according to Aquinas, is “an ordinance of reason for the common 
good, made by him who has the care of the community, and promulgated.”89  We can begin to 
ascertain how Aquinas reconciles the individual subjective aspect of conscience with the 
relational aspect of conscience through the connection to law.  Aquinas theorizes that there are 
four types of law, viz. eternal law, which governs the universe; natural law, which is derived 
from the eternal law as it relates to rational creatures; human law, which is derived from natural 
law as it relates to specific human communities; and divine law, or the revelation of God to man 
where nature is insufficient, or put differently, it reveals the order of grace that perfects nature.  It 
is important to emphasize that the definition of law that Aquinas articulates refers to each type of 
law that discusses.  Eternal law is simply the rational guidance of God for the universe, but its 
foundation is reason and not in will.  Eternal law is intelligible to the human person, and in fact 
the human person has a special mode of participation in the eternal law which Aquinas calls the 
natural law, “A law is in a person not only as in one that rules, but also as participation as in one 
that is ruled.  In the latter way each one is a law unto himself, in so far as he shares in the 
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direction that he receives from one who rules him.”90  Let us consider how this understanding of 
law more concretely relates to conscience.  
 As we have already seen, Aquinas defines the primary structural level of conscience, 
synderesis, as a “special natural habit” whereby human beings recognize “first practical 
principles, bestowed on us by nature.”91  The first practical principle is the first premise of the 
natural law, namely that good is to be pursued and evil is to be avoided.  The natural law governs 
rational creatures and it is inherent in the very substance of human beings by means of their 
inclinations, since the natural law supplies human “inclinations to their proper acts and ends…. 
Wherefore it [i.e. the rational creature] has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it partakes of 
a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others.”92  For Aquinas, natural 
law applies the “the first principle of natural justice, which is to seek good and to avoid evil, [and 
it] must primarily be determined by a rule which has reference to the whole state” and the whole 
human community.93  It is significant that the human participation in Divine Providence is a 
participation that extends to each human person – for Aquinas, each person is created with the 
same human nature that is oriented and directed by Divine Providence.  Thus, we see both the 
individual and relational aspect of law (and conscience) at work in Aquinas’s understanding of 
conscience and natural law, since the natural law is a share in providence for the individual 
person and for all persons.   
But Aquinas has mentioned something else that figures importantly in his theory of 
natural law, viz. inclinations: “Wherefore [the rational creature] has a share of the Eternal 
                                                 
90 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 90, Art.3, ad 1.  Interestingly, Aquinas immediately quotes Romans 2:15 
“Who show the work of the law written in their hearts,” which St. Paul calls conscience.  Aquinas 
uncharacteristically does not attribute this source, nor does he mention conscience here.   
91 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I, Q. 79, Art. 12, Corpus. 
92 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 91, Art.2, Corpus. 
93McCoy, Charles N.R.  The Structure of Political Thought, 27. 
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Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the 
eternal in the rational creature is called the natural law.”94  Human participation in the eternal 
law is manifested by inclinations to acts and ends proper to human persons, and our very 
participation relies upon something outside of ourselves that is “the light of natural reason, 
whereby we discern what is good and evil…[it] is nothing else than an imprint on us of the 
Divine light.”95  These inclinations have an order to them that is based upon man’s nature, and 
they are natural characteristics of man that point to the ends that he will endeavor to pursue in 
accordance with reason.  That end is good, which “is the first thing that falls under the 
apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an 
end under the aspect of good.”96  These precepts of the natural law are inclinations such as the 
first inclination to pursue good and to avoid evil, and the inclinations based upon the first: self-
preservation, procreation, education, and a desire to know the truth about God and to live in 
society.97  Since human beings by nature seek to know the truth about God and live in society, 
we see the foundation for the relational aspect of human persons, who, because he has: 
An inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to 
him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God and to live in society: 
and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for 
instance to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live.98 
 
Aquinas explains this particular inclination as unique to man—and it relates to his specifically 
relational nature.  To know the truth about God and to live in society include one another as part 
of man’s specific, rational nature.   
                                                 
94 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 91, Art.2, Corpus. 
95 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 91, art.2, Corpus. 
96 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 94, art.2, Corpus. 
97 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 94, art.2, Corpus. 
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Thomas’ insistence that the natural law is functionally integrated with human reason is at 
the center his theory of conscience since synderesis is the habit of practical reason by which we 
know the first principles, and conscientia is the means of applying those principles. However 
several perplexing problems seem to proceed from this particular theory, for example: If man 
knows by his reason through the habit of synderesis the first principle of all moral action, how is 
it that he can act erroneously?  Aquinas has examined this theme in every treatment of 
conscience throughout his corpus, and his answer reveals what seems to be an irreconcilable 
tension.  This tension is well illustrated in the Summa Theologiae when Aquinas poses the 
question whether the natural law is the same in all men.  He answers in the affirmative, stating 
that “to the natural law belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among 
these it is proper to be inclined to act according to reason.”99  The natural law appeals to 
common human experience, since the inclinations Aquinas describes are based in the very nature 
of the human person.100  However, since the natural law, known through the habit of synderesis, 
concerns practical reason, “which is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions 
are concerned: and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more 
we descend into matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects.”101  So, according 
to Aquinas, although human beings have a natural understanding of what is right or true action, 
the more they descend into matter of detail, the more likely they are to err.  He gives the example 
of the ancient Germans described in Caesar’s Gallic Wars who, since they share a common 
human nature with other persons, should have known that theft was contrary to the natural law, 
but they did not consider it an evil to be avoided.102  Thus, the general first principles of the 
                                                 
99 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q. 94, art. 4, Corpus. 
100 Cf. Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q. 94, art. 3.  Obj. 3.   
101Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q. 94, art. 4, Corpus 
102Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q. 94, art. 4, Corpus 
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natural law, or primary precepts, are self-evident and not changeable.  These are held and known 
through synderesis.  The application of the natural law to most cases—the secondary precepts 
that contain “certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn from the first principles” may not be 
applicable to every particular instance.103  One the level of the individual human person, this 
application of the first principles is conscientia.   
The natural law pertains to the individual good and to the common good, and it is 
promulgated to the human person through the habit of synderesis that directs man’s ethical action 
in concrete applications of conscientia.  Aquinas has argued that synderesis only contains the 
knowledge of general principles, and is therefore not fully equipped to dictate specific rules 
regarding human behavior.  Although its precepts are unchangeable because they are constitutive 
of human nature, they must be applied to concrete instances through the judgment of conscientia.  
Similarly, according to Aquinas, the natural law is unchangeable and it must be the foundation of 
all human law, since general principles and inclinations are insufficient to make particular 
determinations.  Aquinas explains: 
The human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate of Divine Reason, but 
according to its own mode, and imperfectly….  On the part of practical reason, man has  
a natural participation of the eternal law, according to certain general principles, but not 
as regards the particular determination of the individual case….  Hence the need for 
human reason to proceed further to sanction them by law.104 
 
Although the natural law directs the whole of human life, “For his part, St. Thomas argues that 
participation in the eternal law [i.e. natural law] includes individual judgment, social judgment, 
and political judgment,” its generality makes it necessary for human beings to formulate human 
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104 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 91, Art.3, ad 1.  Aquinas connects natural law (lex) with natural 
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laws.105  But even the natural law and the human law is not enough for the human person to 
attain his final end and flourishing, for they are based upon human reason and “human reason is 
not, of itself, the rule of things.”106  Human laws cannot direct the interior acts of an individual 
human person, even if their intended goal is to form good persons.107 
 Moreover, the inclinations that are the basis of the natural law are ordered to the 
fulfillment or telos of man’s nature, viz. happiness.  Human actions are guided by reason and 
will toward an end, “those things that are possessed of reason move themselves to an end; 
because they have dominion over their actions through their free will, which is the faculty of will 
and reason.”108  The movement toward the last end is, according to Aquinas, a movement from 
potentiality toward actuality; it is a movement that aims “so to fill man’s appetite, that nothing is 
left besides it for man to desire.”109  The human person’s potential is actualized through the 
fulfillment of his last end, which is common to all human persons.  Aquinas explains, “Now as 
the last end of man, simply as man, is to the whole human race, so is the last end of any 
individual to that individual.  Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally one last end, so the 
will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end.”110  This final end consists in “perfect 
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106 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 91, art. 4 ad 2.   
107 Cf. Summa Theologiae I-II, Q. 91, art. 4 and I-II, Q. 92 art 1.  In the former, Aquinas declares that ““Human law 
cannot sufficient curb and direct interior acts….  Human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while 
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108 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q. 1, art 2, Corpus.   
109 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q. 1, art. 5, Corpus. 
110 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 1, art.5, Corpus. 
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happiness” attained only “through union with God.”111  The movement toward the last end is 
man’s potential to be actualized through the exercise of right reason, a rightly-ordered will, and a 
life of virtue.  Aquinas explains that the human soul “is something existing in potentiality: for it 
becomes knowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually virtuous, from being 
potentially virtuous.”112  Aquinas recognizes that human persons can order themselves to lesser 
ends, which are good in themselves but not the summum bonum, goods such as wealth, honor, 
fame or glory, power, good of the body, pleasure, goods of the soul, or created goods.  The final 
end and actualization of the human person resides in none of these lesser goods, but rather in the 
happiness (beatitudo) that is attained “by knowing and loving God.”113 
I have posited that for Aquinas, the rational capacity of one human being is insufficient to 
reach his final end; he needs the guidance of fellow rational creatures to attain his end and to 
actualize his potential, for “humans at times cannot flourish without arguing with others and 
learning from them about human flourishing.”114  I call this the relational aspect of conscience.  
But Aquinas extends the argument further: human reason alone is not the rule of things.  Reason 
is prone to error, as is evident in Aquinas’s discussion of an erring conscience. Even though 
Aquinas argues that by means of our conscience (particularly synderesis), human beings have 
access to the unchangeable first principles of the natural law, our judgments often miss the mark; 
reason can very easily be hindered from properly applying the principles of synderesis to 
particular situations.  But this is not a matter “of confusing law and conscience or of letting the 
conscience be destroyed by the law.  The conscience, in the face of the clearest and most 
determinative law, always has the role and the value of interiorizing the law, to implant it by 
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112 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q.2, art.7, Corpus. 
113 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 1, art.8, Corpus. 
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making it personal.”115  It is at the level of “making it personal” that human beings tend to err for 
a variety of reasons: attachment to a particular vice, the inability for human beings to know the 
interior life of others, lack of knowledge of the facts, etc.   
Yet, Aquinas also argues that it is precisely human reason that is the means of 
participation in the rule of things—in the Divine Reason, “for the divine good is called the 
common good in which all things participate.”116  The Divine Reason is the transcendent source 
of order in nature, including human nature.  There is, then a tension in Aquinas’s thought: human 
beings are prone to error in their rational judgments, but their rational capacity is the means by 
which they participate in the Divine Reason that rules; human reason can err, and yet it is the 
source from which the human person seeks and experiences his transcendent and transpolitical 
end.  As such, the judgments of conscience are to be respected, since it by means of conscience, 
particularly synderesis, that the human person is most intimately connected to the Divine 
Reason.  Each human person participates in this Divine Reason.117  As such, respect for 
individual conscience is inseparable from respect for the relationships that inform our 
consciences.  The relational aspect of conscience does not just call human beings into 
community with other persons, but also calls them into communion with the Divine Being, who 
is the basis of their being and of their interpersonal relationships.  All human beings participate 
in the Divine Good, which is the basis of their common good because it is the basis of man’s 
final transpolitical end: 
Man is not ordained to the body politic, according to all that he is and has; and so it does 
not follow that every action of his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body 
politic.  But all that man is, and can, and has, must be referred to God: and therefore 
                                                 
115 Delhaye, Philippe. The Christian Conscience, 21. 
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every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires merit or demerit in the sight of God, 
as far as the action itself is concerned.118 
Aquinas understanding of the human person promotes an essential limitedness to politics, 
for “What pertains to the nature of man is not subject to human government.”119  There are some 
aspects of the human person that simply cannot be governed or subjected to legislation,120 
particularly the interior life of the individual human person that is directed by conscience.  The 
freedom of conscience is a primary freedom for Aquinas, since it is a realm of human life that 
cannot be dictated by any law because human law has no power over it other than unjust 
coercion or violence.  It is precisely for this reason that claims of conscience often clash with 
political regimes: a good man in tyrannical regime will likely not be a good citizen, and indeed it 
is quite likely that he will be an incarcerated citizen in such a society.  However, there is 
seemingly a tension in Aquinas’s view: for he does claim that human law binds a citizen in 
conscience.  This statement is qualified, however, for only just laws can bind the conscience of a 
man—for these laws are in accord with right reason, which is the basis of morality.121  For 
Aquinas, conscience is that by which we seek and act upon the means to attain our final end, an 
end that transcends any political regime.  It is a natural habit of reason (synderesis) and the 
application of that habit (conscientia) that enables human beings to become good.  Conscience is 
connected to a life of virtue for Aquinas, since the virtues are habits that enable human beings to 
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become good, and we become virtuous by acting according to conscience.  It is particularly the 
virtue of prudence that is most closely connected to conscience since by Aquinas’s account both 
prudence and conscientia “are practical judgments, both proceed in some way from synderesis, 
and both are described in terms of the operative syllogism.”122  Thus, we next turn to examine 
Aquinas’s discussion of conscience and prudence in the Summa Theologiae.   
C. Conscience in the Secunda Secundae Pars: Judgment of Conscience and the  
Virtue of Prudence 
There is an ambiguity about the difference between conscience and prudence in 
Aquinas’s work since “Thomas never attempted to explain the relationship between these two 
realities.  He never mentions prudence in his questions concerning conscience, nor does he 
mention conscience in the questions concerning prudence.”123  For Aquinas, both conscience and 
prudence relate to right reason.  However, while Aquinas does not mention conscientia in his 
discussion of prudence, he does mention synderesis, and in this way he does relate conscience to 
prudence.  Synderesis “moves prudence” to direct human action, and prudence then “decide[s] in 
what manner and by what means” to act according to right reason in a given situation.124  Like 
conscientia, prudence belongs to the practical reason and Aquinas defines prudence as a virtue 
that applies right reason to action.125 
In his analysis of prudence, Aquinas illustrates that in order for man to order his life in 
accord with right reason, “it is necessary that [the intellect, will, passions, sense, and other 
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faculties must] be governed by certain operative habits, the virtues.”126  This governance is 
achieved particularly through the virtue of prudence, which guides all the moral virtues by 
assessing whether a human act is in accord with right reason.127  However, for Aquinas, 
synderesis is a necessary step in this determination:  
In the first place then, moral virtue supposes the act of reason insofar as the tendency to  
the end and to the good presupposes knowledge of the end and of the good.  This 
first function of reason, however, does not pertain to prudence, but rather to synderesis. 
Synderesis provides the ends of the moral virtues.  Prudence, however, is concerned not 
with the ends of moral virtues, but with the means to those ends.128 
 
For Aquinas, synderesis supplies the very general first principles and inclinations, conscientia 
applies the first principle and then makes a judgment about what should or should not be done, 
and prudence dictates the particular means to carry out an action in accordance with right 
reason.129 
Aquinas’s description of prudence sounds similar to the way in which he has defined the 
function of conscientia: both draw from the first principles of practical reason contained in 
synderesis to make a judgment on how best to act in a particular situation, on how to act with 
right reason.  Aquinas does make a distinction between them, but it is difficult for even the most 
well-versed Thomists.  Reginald Doherty explains: 
Conscience is a norm of morality and St. Thomas treats it as such.  It in some way 
concerns the knowledge of the moral object which is necessary for a human act.  The 
problem of erroneous conscience is reduced to a problem of an error regarding the moral 
object.  When, however, St. Thomas begins to speak about the human act more in 
particular and about virtue, he abandons the concept of conscience [conscientia], and 
when it is a question of the intellectual elements of a singular human act, the entire 
reference is to prudence….  Conscience is oriented to synderesis at its root and 
                                                 
126 Doherty, Reginald, O.P. The Judgments of Conscience and Prudence, 61. 
127 Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae.  II-II, Q. 47, art. 8.   
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foundation, and the source of its proper effect, moral obligation.  Prudence, on the other 
hand, being oriented toward practical truth in order to produce operation, is focused upon 
the rectified appetite as its principle and source of motion.130 
 
To make the relationship between conscience and prudence even more difficult, Aquinas 
mentions the Aristotelian term synesis in connection with prudence.  Synesis, he states, is a virtue 
connected to prudence that “signifies right judgment, not indeed about speculative matters, but 
about particular practical matters, about which also is prudence.”131  It is a virtue that enables 
one to exercise ‘common sense’ to form right judgments about “a thing just as it is in reality.”132  
A right judgment of synesis seems to occur prior to the exercise of prudence, as prudence 
“commands aright” and gives the final word on the correct course of action to be pursued.133  It 
would seem that given the similarity between synderesis and synesis that Aquinas might connect 
the two concepts here, but he does not make this connection here or elsewhere in the Summa 
Theologiae.  What are we to make of this relationship between synderesis, conscientia, and 
prudence?  The fine distinctions are difficult to grasp, and even Aquinas himself seems not to 
have dedicated as much effort to explain this difficulty.  Perhaps it will be helpful to consider 
this problem in the context of the relational aspect of conscience that I have traced in Aquinas’s 
thinking.   
For Aquinas, the virtue of prudence is also other oriented; he argues that prudence is an 
essentially political and relational virtue, “since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge, 
and command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is evident that prudence regards 
                                                 
130 Doherty, Reginald, O.P. The Judgments of Conscience and Prudence, 85-86.   
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not only the private good of the individual, but also the common good of the multitude.”134  The 
exercise of prudence is one critical expression of conscience in political life, since according to 
Aquinas prudence and justice are political virtues par excellence. This is not to say that Aquinas 
reduces either prudence or justice to their political expressions only.  Rather, since these virtues 
are directed to the common good, they are particularly important for politics.  Even when 
directed toward the individual, prudence still has a political component:  
Prudence is in the reason.  Now ruling and governing belong properly to the reason; and 
therefore it is proper to man to reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling 
and governing….  Every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share in ruling 
according to the judgment of reason.135 
 
It is the notion of a share in ruling or governance that makes prudence so essential, for it is by 
means of self-governance that human beings participate in the Divine Governance, particularly 
by taking part in the “dignity of causality.”136  To explain what Aquinas means by this assertion, 
let us consider that Aquinas compares prudence (prudentia) with Divine Governance, or more 
properly, with Divine Providence (providentia).137  Providence, according to Aquinas, comes 
from porro videns, meaning “seeing from afar,” the same root from which prudentia is 
derived.138  Divine Providentia, by which God has ordered all things to their proper end,is 
expressed in individual human persons through the virtue of prudentia insofar as it directs man 
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to make judgments regarding his final end.139  It is by their participation in the Divine 
Providence, Aquinas argues, that God furnishes human beings with many of the necessary tools 
to attain their good while also allowing them to remain free.  Human beings participate in the 
‘dignity of causality’ by exercising their freedom in their individual lives and in their 
relationships and communities that shape the core of their convictions of conscience.  It is this 
share in the dignity of causality that gives the claim of conscience its place in politics as that 
which both limits and challenges politics.   
 The exact philosophical distinctions between synderesis, conscientia, and prudentia, 
although important, are not the focus of this study.140  It is enough to know that they are essential 
for how Aquinas understands not only human action, but also the dignity of human freedom.  
These, viz. synderesis, conscientia, and prudentia, direct human persons toward their final end—
an end that cannot be determined or realized politically.  Moreover, conscience, here being made 
up synderesis and conscientia, is not simply subjectivity or opinion; it is grounded in and guided 
by common human inclinations and experience, right reason, the pursuit of moral virtue, and it 
requires a life guided by prudence, prudentia, in the fullest sense.  Conscience points beyond 
politics: it directs us out of ourselves and orients our actions with the consideration of others and 
ultimately, according to Aquinas, with reference to a relationship to a Divine God with whom 
human persons are drawn into a friendship of faith formed in charity, “since there is a 
communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some 
kind of friendship must needs be based on this same communication….The love which is based 
on this communication, is charity; wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for 
                                                 
139 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  II-II, Q. 49, art.6, Corpus. 
140 Reginald Doherty, O.P. gives a concise summary of this debate from the mid-18th century through the mid-20th 
century on pages 86-89.   
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God.”141  For Aquinas, conscience is the place of participation in this friendship and it is the 
source of what binds human persons together in pursuit of the common good. 
 
 
 
                                                 
141 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  II-II, Q. 23, art.1, Corpus. 
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Chapter V: Thinking Together about the Common Good: Toward a Renewed 
Understanding of Conscience 
“Caritas autem qua nos Deum diligimus, dicitur in cordibus nostris diffusa, id est quia ad 
omnes mores et actus animae perficiendos se extendit.”1 
“The destruction of conscience is the real prerequisite for totalitarian followers and 
totalitarian rule. Where conscience prevails, there is a limit to the dominion of human 
command and human choice, something sacred that must remain inviolate and that in its 
ultimate sovereignty eludes all control, whether someone else’s or one’s own.  Only the 
unconditional character of conscience is diametrically opposed to tyranny; only the 
recognition that conscience is sacrosanct protects man from man’s inhumanity and from 
himself; only its rule guarantees freedom.”2 
I. Politics and Conscience 
 In this examination of Aquinas’s theory of conscience, I have sought to construct 
a holistic account of the development of his thought on the topic and in doing so, to offer 
a renewed sense of the importance of conscience, particularly as expressed in politics, 
such as respect for the freedom of conscience and the common good.  The beginning of 
this dissertation highlighted some historical and contemporary conflicts of conscience as 
manifested in Nazi Germany (historical) and in American political discourse 
(contemporary) such as conscientious objection to the recently promulgated HHS 
mandate by individuals, religious institutions, and businesses, and the question of 
homosexual marriage legislation.3  We considered the origins of conscience conflicts, 
which contemporary French scholar Pierre Manent argues can be summed up in a conflict 
between human will and reason.  In relation to the contemporary, liberal, democratic 
regime, he writes: 
                                                 
1 Aquinas, Thomas.  Commentary on Romans.  Chapter 5, Lecture 1.  392.   
2 Ratzinger, Joseph.  “Conscience in its Time: A Lecture Given to the Reinhold Schneider Society,” in 
Church, Ecumenism, and Politics: New Endeavors in Ecclesiology.  (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008).  
160.  (Original German edition published in 1987).  
3 Cf. Chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
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 It is the fact that in the liberal state, in its first project, or primary purpose, wants  
 to institutionalize the sovereignty of the human will.  Recognizing only free and  
 equal individuals, it has no legitimacy except that founded on their will: the  
institutions of this state have for their raison d’être the manifesting of this will 
through suffrage, then the putting of this will into action by representative 
government.4 
 
Manent’s assertion that the bedrock of contemporary politics is both the emancipation of 
the will and the imposition of the will institutionalized in a political regime at the expense 
of reason.  For the contemporary liberal regime, he argues that government based upon 
consent is only legitimate in so far as it is the expression of the will of the citizens in the 
regime, or at least of those who have the power to impose their will.5  But Aquinas offers 
a very different foundation that we have considered in this dissertation, viz. reason.   
It is precisely because of the centrality of the will that contemporary political discourse 
has a very difficult time discerning between conscience claims.  For Aquinas, however, a 
will not in accord with reason is a perversion of the will.   
In fact, the discussion about how to decide the legitimacy of these claims seems 
largely incomprehensible in the public sphere, and increasingly, at least in the United 
States, this task is being relegated to the courts.  In America today lawyers, lobbyists, and 
amici curiae battle with claimants to decide whose conscience claim is most publicly 
                                                 
4Manent, Pierre.  “Christianity and Democracy: Some Remarks on the Political History of Religion, or, on 
the Religious History of Modern Politics,” in Modern Liberty and its Discontents.  Trans. and Eds. Daniel 
J. Mahoney and Paul Seaton.  (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998),  99.  Manent’s cultural assessment 
as a Frenchman probably largely influences his interpretation of liberalism.  In the Anglo-American 
tradition, there is an interpretation of constitutionalism as a liberal regime informed by the tradition of lex-
ratio.  Cf. the beginning of Chapter III of this dissertation and See Ellis Sandoz’s A Government of Laws: 
Political Theory, Religion, and the American Founding for a detailed account of this interpretation.  
However, even in the American tradition, ‘ambition countering ambition’ can be seen as a conflict of 
human wills.  American constitutionalism is not immune from this kind of liberalism.  
5 Manent appeals to Tocqueville’s observation that such a democracy can easily derail into a tyranny of the 
majority or into despotism (cf. pages 105-106).  However, we can go back further to Plato’s admonition 
about the ease with which democracy can fall into tyranny. Cf. Republic Book VIII, 557B-571B.  
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palatable.6  Conscience conflicts in public discourse today are particularly contentious 
about moral and religious issues (e.g. school vouchers, school choice, religious freedom, 
sex, marriage, adoption, and abortion).  But there hardly seems to be much civil, rational, 
public discourse on these matters beyond talking points or ideological commitments.  
And without a rational public discourse, laws can easily become unjust.  Aquinas 
explains that “Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right reason 
[emphasis mine]; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived from the eternal law.  
But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not 
of law but of violence.”7  Some may argue that this inability to pass all encompassing 
legislation about matters of conscience contributes to protecting the freedom of 
conscience.  We need to be sure that the account of conscience claims also dictates 
“which claims of conscience are reasonable and which are not…. Apart from such an 
account, talk of conscience will remain elusive and malleable,” 8 and conflicts will 
continue to arise.  To discern what claims should be considered worthy of protection by 
the law or from unjust laws, Aquinas might argue, should be the role of prudence.  
Moreover, Aquinas would not argue that every moral evil can be outlawed: “Human law 
cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it 
would do away with many good things, and would hinder the advance of the common 
                                                 
6 Melissa Moschella argues in a recent article, “The HHS Mandate and Judicial Theocracy” that the danger 
of allowing the courts to deal with these matters, especially matters where claimants argue that a law 
violates their religious beliefs, is that the courts risk becoming a judge of the soundness of certain 
theological claims.  www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/01/7403.  Aquinas, with Aristotle, also argues that 
law should not be that judges should not be the primary framers or arbiters of the law. Cf. I-II, Q. 95, art. 1. 
ad 2.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
7 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 93, art.3, ad 2. 
8Moreland, Michael P.  “Practical Reason and Subsidiarity: Response to Robert K. Vischer Conscience and 
the Common Good.  Journal of Catholic Legal Studies 49 (2010), 323 
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good, which is necessary for human intercourse.”9  The decision about what human evils 
to outlaw is a matter left to prudential judgment, but prudence is oriented and guided by 
synderesis as a kind of ‘first illumination’ of the principles of practical reason.10 
II. The Enduring Problem of Synderesis 
We have seen Aquinas’s concept of conscience in its two-fold dimension, 
synderesis and conscientia, with synderesis as a habit of practical reason by which we 
know the first principles and conscientia that act by which we apply those principles to 
concrete experience.  Aquinas’s working out of this concept take into account many 
aspects, such as how can human persons know the good and not always do what is good?  
How is conscience related to other parts of the soul?  Is our conscience simply innate 
knowledge?  How does conscience relate to law, to community, to God?  What are the 
constraints on conscience?  Aquinas would not argue that conscience is synonymous with 
personal preference, opinion, or a radically individual autonomy.  His distinction of 
conscience as synderesis and conscientia helps clarify some of these questions.  
However, as many scholars have pointed out, synderesis remains an unclear concept, and 
Aquinas himself seems to move away from using it in his later work.11  Although it was 
at Aquinas’s time a traditional word for describing an element of moral knowledge, there 
is the problematic issue that synderesis is actually a deformation of a Greek word.  Oscar 
James Brown writes that:  
Aquinas is not at all averse to that traditional manner of speaking, and he retains 
the substance, at least, of the notion even in his later works–although no longer 
                                                 
9 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 91, art.4, Corpus.  There is, therefore, an implication of 
human progress in human knowledge and understanding for Aquinas; one that is based on his 
understanding of the actualization of human potential.   
10 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, 80, §2.   
11 Cf. Michael B. Crowe’s The Changing Profile of the Natural Law, Reginald Doherty’s The Judgments of 
Conscience and Prudence, and Oscar James Brown’s Natural Rectitude and Divine Law in Aquinas. 
170 
 
under the rubric of synderesis, a term he increasingly eschewed as he developed 
doctrines of natural law and legal epistemology. In any event, St. Thomas was to 
continue to make use of what he understood to be the content of the term 
synderesis, namely, the natural habit of the first practical principle (or principles, 
depending on whether it be viewed exactly or extensively). As such, synderesis 
corresponds to the understanding (intellectus) of principles in the speculative 
sphere in fact, synderesis is often similarly denominated (v.g. intellectus practicus 
or, simply, intellectus)….  So then, it is this natural cognitive habit, divine 
instilled and reaching to the plane of angelic intelligence, that contains the 
‘universal principles of the natural law’ and precontains, in a manner of speaking, 
the whole of the developing corpus of the quasi-legal conclusions of the natural 
ethical reason.12 
 
Brown argues that Aquinas, while retaining the concept of synderesis, drops the use of 
the term.  There is, however, a transcendental dimension acknowledged by the 
participatory rise to the dimension of ‘angelic intelligence’ regardless of whether the 
terminology is dropped.   
Douglas Kries finds the word term so problematic that he believes it should be 
abandoned altogether by scholars who are serious about resurrecting a natural law 
discourse that would enable the citizens of liberal regimes to think (or perhaps more 
precisely, to reason) together again about the common good.13  Moreover, Kries finds 
Aquinas’s use of synderesis “scandalously democratic, for the knowledge of first 
principles does not immediately depend on either the influx of increate light or the 
educational conventions of the city.”14  But it is precisely his pointing outside of the city 
that is Aquinas’s great contribution to political philosophy—conscience limits politics.   
One way in which conscience limits politics is expressed in religious liberty.  
Since conscience is based upon a friendship between God and man, man’s participation 
                                                 
12 Brown, Oscar James.  Natural Rectitude and Divine Law in Aquinas.(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Medieval Studies, 1981), 35. 
13 Cf. Kries, Douglas.  The Problem of Natural Law, chapter 4.   
14 Hittinger, Russell.  “Examination of Conscience.”  First Things, January 2009.  Obtained from 
http://www.firsthings/article/2008/12/004-examination-of-conscience-5. 
171 
 
in the life of the Divine, human persons will seeks to order their lives and their 
communities according to their conscientious and religious convictions.  It is critical to 
remember that “religious liberty extends beyond the freedom to believe and worship as 
one chooses.”15  For Aquinas, conscientia is an act; it is an act that involves the exercise 
of moral virtue and practical wisdom—it is an act that is lived in every day experience.  
Thus, to live according to one’s conscience means not just belief, but action.  This means 
that the individual man’s exercise of conscience becomes social, political, and relational.   
Since conscience points the individual human person both horizontally toward others in 
his relationships and vertically toward his Divine Creator, it both limits and challenges 
the power of political regimes.  “Put simply, conscience means acknowledging that 
man—oneself and the other—is a creation and respecting the Creator in him.  This 
defines the limit of every power and at the same time indicates its proper direction.”16  
Conscience is, as Vaclav Havel calls it, the very ‘power of the powerless,’ the only sure 
means of resistance against political injustice.17  Thus, “it is not just individuals that must 
be immune from coercion, but also communities…not just in private, but in public; not 
just in secret assent, but in open witness.”18 
But perhaps we are still left with many questions.  A conscience claim is always 
politically vulnerable, and perhaps with good reason, for “the more boldly men claim that 
                                                 
15 Müller, Gerhard Ludwig.  “Faith’s Political Witness.”  First Things.(April 2013), 35. 
16 Ratzinger, Joseph.  “Conscience in its Time,” 164. 
17 Havel, Vaclav.  “The Power of the Powerless,” in The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State 
in Central-Eastern Europe.  Ed. John Keane.  (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1985), 23-96. Cf. page 41: “It 
seems that the primary breeding ground for what might, in the widest possible sense of the word, be 
understood as an opposition in the post-totalitarian system is living within the truth.  The confrontation 
between these opposition forces and the powers that be, of course, will obviously take a form essentially 
different from that typical of an open society or a classical dictatorship.  Initially, this confrontation does 
not take place on the level of real, institutionalized, quantifiable power which relies on the various 
instruments of power, but on a different level altogether: the level of human consciousness and conscience, 
the existential level.”[emphasis mine]. 
18 Müller, Gerhard Ludwig.  “Faith’s Political Witness.”  First Things.(April 2013), 35. 
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conscience is, directly or vicariously, a divine lawgiver and the ‘spotless mirror of God’s 
majesty,’ the more troublesomely aware they are they must become that this lawgiver 
gives different laws to different men; this mirror reflects different faces.”19  Conflicts of 
conscience claims still remain, and attributing one’s conscience claims to the sacred 
realm of God’s law certainly can and does lead to political violence.  As discussed at 
length in the beginning of this dissertation, conscience claims may seem to be either “the 
principle of subjective self-will, taken as an absolute” or “the principle of incapacitating 
the ego and substituting a generality of an outside ego.”20  Claims of conscience are 
therefore “to be made carefully and honestly, in the knowledge that what is great is 
misused when it is called into action prematurely.”21  Thus, “the concept of conscience 
has to be purified constantly;”22 it must be grounded in reason and its claims must be 
made and heeded with respect to the natural inclinations of each human person’s unique 
relationships as they inform their individual conscience. 
Aquinas offers a grounding of conscience in common reason that is guided by 
synderesis as a solution to such a problem.  But we must also consider if Aquinas’s 
assessment of conscience, particularly of synderesis is convincing—is the term too 
philosophically imprecise to convince anyone that there is some kind of natural 
knowledge of right that is grounded in common human experience and in reason?  Can 
we argue for a convincing reconsideration of the natural law without this account of 
conscience as Douglas Kries suggests but does not develop?23  Can a reconsideration of 
how conscience relates to the natural law enable us to think and to reason together about 
                                                 
19 Lewis, C.S.  Studies in Words, 199. 
20 Ratzinger, Joseph.  “Conscience in its Time,” 164. 
21 Ratzinger, Joseph.  “Conscience in its Time,” 164. 
22 Ratzinger, Joseph.  “Conscience in its Time,” 164. 
23 Cf. footnote 13 supra 
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the common good?  Some scholars have pointed out that the term synderesis needs 
further clarification and development.  For example, J. Budziszewski describes 
synderesis as ‘deep conscience’; he writes, “synderesis—some prefer to call it anamnesis, 
remembrance—[…] might be called ‘deep conscience.’  Deep conscience is the interior 
witness to the most general norms of practical reason.”24  In this short passage, 
Budziszewski points to two different ways of defining synderesis: anamnesis or ‘deep 
conscience.’  While his explanation of the function of synderesis sounds familiar, 
Budziszewski does not, however, tell us who prefers to call synderesis by another Greek 
term anamnesis.   
This suggested new term is found in a speech given by then Joseph Cardinal 
Ratzinger in 1991 to his fellow Catholic bishops.  Though a speech given in a theological 
context, Ratzinger’s reflections primarily address a philosophical investigation of 
conscience.  Following Aquinas, he too posits that conscience has two component parts:  
The medieval tradition was right, I believe in according two levels to the concept 
of conscience.  These levels, though they can be well distinguished, must be 
continually referred to each other.  It seems to me that many unacceptable theses 
regarding conscience are the result of neglecting either the difference or the 
connection between these two.  Mainstream scholasticism expressed these two 
levels in the concepts ‘synderesis’ and ‘conscientia.’25 
 
But synderesis, Ratzinger argues, “remained unclear in its exact meaning, and for this 
reason became a hindrance to a careful development of this essential aspect of the whole 
question of conscience.  I would like, therefore…to replace this problematic word with 
the much more clearly defined Platonic concept of anamnesis.”26  Here, Ratzinger does 
                                                 
24 Budziszewski, J.  The Line Through the Heart: Natural Law as Fact, Theory, and Sign of Contradiction.  
(Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2011), 14-15.   
25 Ratzinger, Joseph.  “Conscience and Truth.”  On Conscience.(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 30. 
26 Ratzinger, Joseph.  “Conscience and Truth.”  Pp. 30-31.  For the use of the term in Plato, Cf. Phaedo 72e 
and 92d and Philebus 34c. 
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not give much of an explanation about how this concept is more clearly defined, but he 
points to two passages, viz. Romans 2:14-15 and a passage from the monastic rule of St. 
Basil to define what he means by anamnesis.27  Ratzinger writes: 
[Anamnesis] means that the first so-called ontological level of the phenomenon of 
conscience consists in the fact that something like an original memory of the good 
and true…has been implanted in us, that there is an inner ontological tendency in 
within man, who is created in the likeness of God, toward the divine.  From its 
origin, man’s being resonates with some things and clashes with others.  This 
anamnesis of the origin, which results from the god-like constitution of our 
being…is, so to speak, an inner sense, a capacity to recall.28 
 
Like Aquinas, Ratzinger follows a philosophical anthropology that views the human 
person as constituted and defined by his relation to God and to others as imago Dei.  He 
proposes the word ‘anamnesis’ as a kind of ‘original memory’ of the good that exists in 
each person by nature.  It is an awareness or a ‘recollection’ of one’s origin that orients 
the human person toward what is true and good.  Ratzinger has called it a Platonic 
concept, and it is used in the Phaedo first by Cebes to describe how Socrates has 
described the process of learning and again referred to in this context by Socrates when 
he speaks to Simmias about the immorality of the soul.29  Thus anamnesis is a 
recollection of what is somehow already known.  
What are the implications of such new terminology for this level of conscience?  
The term suggests a kind of ‘giveness’ or arche from which the human person is able to 
reflect and to recollect based upon that reflection.  To recollect suggests that there is in 
fact something to be recollected—that is the giveness to which we refer.  Of what does 
                                                 
27 From St. Basil: “The love of God is not founded on a discipline imposed on us from outside, but is 
constitutively established in us as the capacity and necessity of our rational nature.” Quoted in “Conscience 
and Truth,” P. 31.   
28 Ratzinger, Joseph.  “Conscience and Truth.”  P. 32. 
29Cf. Plato’s Phaedo 72e and 92d; cf. also Philebus 34c.   
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this giveness consist?  We could look to Aquinas’s Treatise on Law for part of the 
answer: 
All those things to which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended 
by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their 
contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance.  Wherefore according to the order of 
natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law.  Because in 
man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with nature which he 
has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the 
preservation of its own being, according to its nature….  Secondly, there is in man 
an inclination to things that pertain to him more specifically, according to the 
nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this 
inclination, those things which nature has taught all animals, such as sexual 
intercourse, education of offspring, and so forth.  Thirdly, there is in man an 
inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper 
to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live 
in society.30 
 
Aquinas gives an account of self-evident inclinations as part of the giveness of man’s 
created nature and as expressed in the natural law.  He grounds these inclinations and the 
natural law in God’s Providentia, the order of created nature, and man’s created 
participation in Divine Providentia.  But such a concept may be more difficult for a 
secular political culture to grasp—how can a pluralist society agree on the nature and 
scope of Divine Providentia?  If a pluralist society and culture cannot accept the 
grounding in a common and particular view of Divine Providentia, Aquinas’s pointing 
toward the natural inclinations seem a much more reasonable starting point; and it is a 
starting point that leaves human inquiry open to transcendence and inquiry about the 
Divine, “there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, 
which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about 
                                                 
30 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 94, art.2, Corpus. 
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God, and to live in society.”31  It is therefore natural for the human person to seek the 
supernatural, the transcendent, the Divine.   
Perhaps anamnesis is a more helpful term to explain the primary role of 
conscience: we must first recall this very giveness in which the human person exists, 
including his participatory role in the Divine.  To explain how anamnesis might be more 
instructive, I turn to political philosopher Eric Voegelin, who develops a theory of 
consciousness in his work entitled Anamnesis.  Voegelin, a German scholar who was 
confronted with the Nazi regime, spent his career both diagnosing and seeking a solution 
what he calls the ‘pneumopathology’ of modernity.32  This ‘pneumopathology’ or ‘illness 
of the spirit’ is the ideological thinking that willfully forgets and rejects the giveness of 
the reality in which a human person both exists and participates in favor of its own 
constructed (and distorted) view of reality.  In the case of a willful forgetfulness, an 
anamnesis of the giveness of reality is absolutely an appropriate solution.  But what has 
this to do with conscience?  Let us return briefly to Aquinas.   
Recall that in the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas explains Divine Providence in 
terms of Divine governance, which is simply the rule and order of being, “it must be that 
God, Who is in all ways perfect in Himself and Who endows all things with being from 
His own power, exists as the Ruler of all beings, and is ruled by none other.”33 
 Aquinas continues: 
The result of this rule is manifested differently in different beings, depending on 
the diversity of their natures.  For some beings so exist as God’s products that, 
                                                 
31 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 94, art.2, Corpus. 
32 Cf. Voegelin, Eric.  Science, Politics, and Gnosticism, 76.  Here Voegelin cites Schelling, who coined the 
term.  Voegelin writes, “it will be advisable to use the term ‘pneumopathology,’ which Schelling coined for 
this purpose.”  Voegelin describes the pneumopathological condition as one in which a person “revolt[s] 
against the world as it has been created by God, arbitrarily omits an element of reality in order to create his 
fantasy of new world.” 
33 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, Chapter 1, 3.  
177 
 
possessing understanding, they bear likeness and reflect His image.  
Consequently, they are not only ruled but also are rulers of themselves, inasmuch 
as their own actions are directed toward a fitting end.34 
 
Aquinas underscores that the human creature, who possesses understanding—intellectus 
(i.e. the capacity for rational reflection) participates in the Divine Governance.  It is 
precisely a consciousness of the human capacity for rational reflection that, to turn back 
to Eric Voegelin, is in need of being recollected.  Voegelin describes this consciousness 
as a “ceaseless act of expanding, ordering, articulating, and correcting itself; it is an event 
in the reality in which partakes.”35  There are several preliminary observations to make.  
First, we note the similar root of the word conscience with Voegelin’s choice, viz. 
consciousness.  Both words imply something with knowledge; and Aquinas cites that a 
kind of consciousness is linked to the term conscience.  He explains:  
Some say that conscience (conscientia) can have three meanings.  For, at times it 
is taken for the thing itself of which one is conscious, just as faith is taken for the 
thing believed.  Sometimes it is taken for the power by which we are conscious, 
and sometimes for the habit.36 
 
Aquinas, of course, does not accept these definitions of conscientia, but instead defines it 
as an act.  Yet, he still retains the idea of conscientia as a kind of consciousness or 
awareness of something: 
But the name conscience, according to common usage, seems at times to be used 
for the thing of which one is conscious, as when one says: ‘I will reveal my 
conscience to you,’ that is, what is in my conscience.  But this title cannot 
properly be given to the power or habit, but only to the act.  For all things which 
are attributed to conscience fit only this meaning.  37 
 
                                                 
34 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Contra Gentiles.  Book III, Chapter 1, 4. Also quoted page 127 of this 
dissertation. 
35 Voegelin, Eric.  Anamnesis.  Trans. and Ed. Gerhart Niemeyer.(Columbia: University of Missouri Press), 
4. 
36 Aquinas, Thomas.  De Veritate.  Q. 17, art. 1, Corpus. 
37 Aquinas, Thomas.  De Veritate.  Q. 17, art. 1, Corpus. 
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Aquinas explicitly links conscientia with consciousness: “Hence to be conscious 
(conscire) means to know together (simul scire).  But any knowledge can be applied to a 
thing.  Hence, conscience cannot denote a special habit or power, but designates the act 
itself.”38  Voegelin describes consciousness in much the same way that Aquinas defines 
conscientia, viz. as an act.39  In both cases, however, there is something about which the 
human person is conscious or aware.  Aquinas calls this ‘something’ the first principles 
of practical reason, the content of synderesis.   
 Like Aquinas, Voegelin also explicitly connects his theory of consciousness with 
reason (which he calls the constituent of human beings at all times) and begins his 
analysis of ethics and moral choice with concrete human experience.  This emphasis on 
experience is perhaps the most important component for Voegelin’s understanding of 
human consciousness, and in this regard, both Voegelin and Aquinas rely upon the 
Aristotelian tradition.40  Voegelin theorizes that reason is, 
The process in reality in which concrete human beings, the ‘lovers of wisdom, the 
philosophers…were engaged in an act of resistance against the personal and 
social disorder of their age.  From this act [emphasis mine] there emerged the 
nous as the cognitively luminous force that inspired the philosophers to resist and, 
at the same time, enabled them to recognize the phenomena or disorder in the 
light of a humanity ordered by the nous.  Thus reason in the noetic sense was 
discovered as both the force and the criterion of order.41 
  
Voegelin’s description of consciousness and reason emphasize the act of particular 
human persons from which reason is expressed as being ‘cognitively luminous,’ 
something that enables human persons to resist disorder.  In this context, Voegelin refers 
particularly to Plato and Aristotle, whose philosophical inquiries emerge as a response to 
                                                 
38 Aquinas, Thomas.  De Veritate.  Q. 17, art. 1, Corpus. 
39 Cf. footnote 27 supra.   
40 See Voegelin’s The New Science of Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pages 34 and 
64-66 where Voegelin discusses Aristotle’s grounding of his own theoretization in practical experience. 
41 Voegelin, Eric.  Anamnesis, 89. 
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a corrupt and crumbling Athenian polis.42  Voegelin believed this analysis of reason 
(nous) as a means to resist disorder to be particularly apt to his own time in the late 
twentieth century, and perhaps it is still a message for us in the early twenty-first century.  
Indeed, it is a message that all persons in all times are in need of hearing, viz. that reason 
properly understood enables human beings to resist disorder in their individual lives, in 
their relationships, and in their communities.  Right reason properly orders conscience 
(and the persons to whom those consciences belong) toward pursuing a life of virtue.  But 
let us give more attention to the idea of right reason.   
 According to Voegelin, a recollection of the entire scope of reason’s (nous or 
noetic interpretation) ability to discern the truth about God, man, and society is necessary 
to ensure a just political order.  This is the content of anamnesis—recollecting what 
reason is capable of achieving through participation; “the noetic exegesis lifts the logos 
of participation into the light of consciousness by interpreting the noetic experience of 
participation.”43  Voegelin argues that a resurrection of reason’s capabilities, particularly 
through a reconsideration of the Greek insights, will give reason its proper dignity of 
seeking and knowing.  Drawing from Aristotle, Voegelin asserts that man comes closest 
to the transcendent divine through the exercise of nous:  
A man whose activity is guided by intelligence (nous), who cultivates his 
intelligence and keeps it in the best condition, seems to be most beloved by the 
gods. For if the gods have any concern for human affairs—and they seem to 
have—it is to be expected that they rejoice in what is best and most akin to them, 
and that is our intelligence44 
 
                                                 
42 Cf. Voegelin’s excellent volume, Plato, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000.   
43 Voegelin, Eric.  Anamnesis, 183 
44 Aristotle.  Nicomachean Ethics, 1179a.   
180 
 
Moreover, reason (nous) gives man his proper dignity, since “reason [is] the source of 
order in the psyche of man.”45  Reason as the source of order is on account of its “content 
of openness toward reality.”46  Voegelin continues—reason alone does not order the 
human person.  Rather, it is “the bond between reason and existential philia, between 
reason and openness toward the ground.”47  Voegelin’s language ‘the ground of reality’ is 
what Aquinas calls the Divine, God.  Thus, both thinkers reach the same conclusion—
reason is the means by which man participates in something other than himself.  It 
extends the human person beyond himself not only to others, but to the transcendent, 
Divine source of his being through a between reason and philia (or, for Aquinas, caritas) 
that directs all of our moral habits and choices through conscience.48  This bond between 
reason and philia or caritas necessitates an awareness in the human person about who he 
is in his createdness—and that awareness can only occur in the context of right 
relationship: with oneself, the Divine, and others.  Man is pulled toward the divine 
ground of his being, and it is through the exercise of his reason (nous) that he comes to a 
greater degree of clarity and luminosity concerning the nature of his own existence and 
his relation to the divine. 
 If the human person (or an entire society) turns away from the bond of reason and 
love, then disorder, irrationality, and injustice result.  According to Voegelin, such a turn 
risks objectifying or ideologizing truth, since the human person always remains in tension 
with his finite existence and his transcendent end. Voegelin describes this tension within 
the context of political society:  
                                                 
45 Voegelin, Eric.  Anamnesis, 89, see also page 149: “With a view to the thus complete exegesis, we may 
speak of the ratio as the material structure of consciousness and its order.” 
46 Voegelin, Eric.  Anamnesis, 98. 
47 Voegelin, Eric.  Anamnesis, 98. 
48 Cf. Aquinas, Thomas.  Commentary on Romans.  Chapter 5, Lecture 1.  392 
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The tension in political reality, which historically produces the phenomenon of 
the noetic interpretation, is not a thing about which objective propositions could 
be formed.  Rather, it must be traced back to its origin in the consciousness of 
men who desire true knowledge of order….  The experience of concrete-human 
order, too, is not of an object but itself a tension, insofar as man experiences 
himself as ordered through the tension to the divine ground of his existence.49 
 
Voegelin refers to this process of objectifying the noetic insights of philosophy as the 
process of ‘derailment,’ a process that is a “conscious, deliberate, and painstakingly 
elaborated obstruction of ratio.”50  The obstruction of ratio (i.e. reason) at the level of a 
political society leads to a society that easily becomes subject to totalitarian ideologies.51  
Voegelin speaks with the authority of one who lived under and escaped Nazi Germany: 
What we have to deal with is not the National Socialists and their heinous crimes, 
nor the atrocities…these are all phenomena situated in the continuity and 
causality of history; but our problem is the spiritual condition of a society in 
which the National Socialists could come into power.52 
 
Aquinas points to the way in which such a spiritual condition can happen, and to how in 
it can be prevented.   
Aquinas, like Voegelin, grapples with the problem of evil, one that is both 
individually and politically experienced as the obstruction of ratio, which leads to 
disorder.  According to Aquinas, moral evil resides in the human will, man’s free elective 
power, whereby he “desire[s] something for the sake of obtaining something else.”53  
But, in order to freely choose to do those things which are good, the will must be 
informed by right reason.  Right reason is habituated through the exercise of virtue, “the 
rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determined to one particular action, but 
                                                 
49 Voegelin, Eric.  Anamnesis, 147. 
50 Voegelin, Eric.  Science, Politics, and Gnosticism.(Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2004), 17. 
51 Cf. Voegelin, Eric.  Science, Politics, Gnosticism, part II, pages 61 and following. 
52 Voegelin, Eric.  Hitler and the Germans.  Trans. and Eds. Detlev Clemens and Brendan Purcell.  
Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999.  P. 77. 
53Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I, Q. 83, art.4, Corpus. 
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are inclined differently to many; but they are determined to acts by means of habits. . . .  
Therefore, human virtues are habits.”54  Just as virtue habituates right reason, so vice 
habituates faulty reason. Thus, moral evil is a defection of the will, and it is the result of 
an improperly formed or obstructed rational capacity.   
One way to prevent defection of the will is a proper education that is aimed at 
formation of character and virtue, of reason, and of conscience; and, as I have argued, 
right relationship is a critical component of this formation. Through his participation in 
the moral life, man is brought into the life of the community.  But it also requires an ever-
present awareness of the fundamental tension of the human person, viz. that the reality of 
man is his orientation toward that which is beyond himself, whether it is through 
relationships with other human beings, or a desire for communion with the Divine.  The 
two are intimately connected, and both call man to a life beyond himself, which in turn 
calls him to pursue a vision of reality based on a primacy of morality and ethics.  Both 
also signal that every human person is part not only of a political community, a family, or 
institutions of civil society, but also of a spiritual community that transcends any earthly 
community.  Aquinas calls this community the corpus mysticum, or the ‘mystical body of 
Christ.’  He writes: 
This is the difference between the natural body of man and the Church's mystical 
body, that the members of the natural body are all together, and the members of 
the mystical are not all together--neither as regards their natural being, since the 
body of the Church is made up of the men who have been from the beginning of 
the world until its end--nor as regards their supernatural being, since, of those 
who are at any one time, some there are who are without grace, yet will 
afterwards obtain it, and some have it already. We must therefore consider the 
members of the mystical body not only as they are in act, but as they are in 
potentiality. Nevertheless, some are in potentiality who will never be reduced to 
act, and some are reduced at some time to act; and this according to the triple 
class, of which the first is by faith, the second by the charity of this life, the third 
                                                 
54 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  I-II, Q. 55, art.1, Corpus. 
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by the fruition of the life to come. Hence we must say that if we take the whole 
time of the world in general, Christ is the Head of all men, but diversely.55 
 
Aquinas’s vision of a human community is one based in the reality of the Incarnation, 
that is, of the Divine who became a human person and so radically transforms the 
meaning of human relationships and of the relationship between God and man.   
Augustine puts this idea into political language, calling it the tension between the 
city of man and the City of God—two cities in which the every human person exists.  The 
city of man is by its nature limited in its scope and accomplishments. The City of God is 
not of the world, but the Incarnation has brought its order (the order of grace, divine love, 
and redemption) to the world.  The bond of the mystical body of Christ—one that 
includes all human persons in all times—is grounded in Aquinas’s view of the human 
person exists under “the presence of God, and the presence of God in the world.”56  If 
these truths about the human person are not acknowledged, what ensues is a “spiritual 
disorder [consisting] in the universal awareness of what ought to be done, combined with 
the universal refusal to do it and the pervasive flight toward rationalizations.  Without 
this inner process of psychic disintegration, the external process of uninhibited political 
destruction could never occur.”57  The problem of moral evil (and in particular political 
evil) is particularly difficult for contemporary, liberal political societies to confront 
because of “the loss of contact with the ordering spiritual traditions of Western 
civilization, and the resulting necessity of reestablishing the connection or discovering 
                                                 
55 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  III, Q. 8, art. 3, Corpus. 
56Voegelin, Eric.  Hitler and the Germans, Trans. and Ed. Detlev Clemens and Brendan Purcell.  
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999), 202 
57 Walsh, David, After Ideology, 90.   
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new spiritual sources of order.”58  To resist political disorder calls for a recollection of 
these spiritual sources—resistance calls for anamnesis.   
III. An Anamnetic Politics: A Reorientation toward the Common Good 
Let us consider this analysis into the context of conscience and political order.  
First, we have considered the connection between anamnesis and reason.  While, as many 
scholars have rightfully pointed out, the term synderesis remains philosophically 
imprecise, it is very clear by our analysis that this concept is connected to reason.  
Synderesis has a very particular meaning for Aquinas, viz. the special natural habit by 
which human beings know the first principles of practical reason.59  Aquinas calls it a 
natural ‘habit’ “to avoid conflating natural habits with innate knowledge.”60  Does the 
more Platonic term anamnesis run the risk of calling the content of synderesis innate 
knowledge?  By Ratzinger’s and Voegelin’s analysis, the answer is negative.  For 
Ratzinger, anamnesis is, “the capacity and disposition for observing all divine 
commandments” and the “ontological tendency within man, who is created in the 
likeness of God, toward the divine.  From its origin, man’s being resonates with some 
things and clashes with others.”61  Like Aquinas, Ratzinger refers to anamnesis as the 
primary level of conscience, and describes it as a disposition or a capacity, a tendency or 
an inclination toward what is good and repulsion from what is not good.  Aquinas, while 
he does not expound a philosophical concept of anamnesis does recognize the importance 
of memory (memoria) as a part of prudence—which is a virtue of practical reason which 
                                                 
58 Walsh, David.  After Ideology, 258. 
59 Cf. Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae, I, Q. 79, art. 12. 
60 Hittinger, Russell.  “Examination of Conscience.”  First Things, January 2009.  Obtained from 
http://www.firsthings/article/2008/12/004-examination-of-conscience-5.P. 3.  Also quoted in chapter 3, 
page 110 of this dissertation.   
61 Ratzinger, Joseph. “Conscience and Truth,” 32. 
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treats “contingent matters of action” “wherein there is no fixed way of obtaining the 
end.”62  Aquinas’s emphasizes the important role of memory to guide human action 
because it enables human beings to recall experience.  He explains: 
Prudence regards contingent matters of action… Now in such like matters a man 
can be directed, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true, but by 
those which occur in the majority of cases: because principles must be 
proportionate to their conclusions, and like must be concluded from like (Ethics, 
vi).  But we need experience to discover what is true in the majority of 
cases[emphasis mine]…. Now experience is the result of many memories as 
stated in Metaph. i, 1, and therefore prudence requires the memory of many 
things.63 
 
Aquinas emphasizes the experiential basis as the starting point for moral knowledge and 
action, recognizing that innate ideas or ‘those things which are simply and necessarily 
true’ are not always an appropriate starting point for contingent, human matters.  Thomas 
understood “that a habitual grasp of first principles hardly constitutes a morality.  The 
agent needs the facts drawn from experience and inquiry; conclusions need to be framed 
in the manner of adequate propositions; and conclusions need to be drawn from facts,”64 
because human actions always deal with particulars.  The content of conscience 
(anamnesis or synderesis in particular) provides a critical part of the framework in which 
to analyze experience and to direct inquiry.   
Similarly, Voegelin’s theory of consciousness as anamnesis is “a process which 
we know from within” and has “the character of an inner ‘illumination’; i.e. it is not blind 
but can be experienced in its inner dimensions of a past and future.”65  The process of 
consciousness is “the only experiential [emphasis mine] model to serve as the orientation 
                                                 
62First quotation Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  II-II, Q. 49, art.1, Corpus; second quotation II-II, 
Q. 47, art.2, ad. 3.   
63 Aquinas, Thomas.  Summa Theologiae.  II-II, Q. 49, art.1, Corpus. 
64 Hittinger, Russell.  “Examination of Conscience.”  First Things, January 2009.  Obtained from 
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65 Voegelin, Eric.  Anamnesis, 20, 21. 
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point of the conceptual apparatus through which we must also grasp the processes that 
transcend consciousness.”66  Voegelin emphasizes that individual human beings only 
have access to their own consciousness.  Human understanding about reality is always 
perspectival; man can never fully know all Truth, for his knowledge is experientially 
based, and that experience is incomplete.  It is prone to error and incorrect judgments just 
as Aquinas describes.  For Voegelin, the recognition of the incomplete knowledge of 
Truth ought to guard human beings from subscribing to any particular dogmatic ideology 
that claims absolute Truth.  Human beings “cannot descriptively grasp ‘pure’ 
consciousness as process; rather [they] can only interpretively grasp a human 
consciousness as consciousness in the body and the world.”67  However, it must be noted 
that Voegelin’s theory of consciousness does not end up in solipsism or autonomous 
subjectivism—it too has a relational and transcendent component.  What is common to 
human beings is the life of the spirit that is to be sought within anamnetic consciousness; 
it is the Heraclitean xynon, or the Christian understanding of man as imago Dei.  
Voegelin states,  
Through the life of the spirit, which is common to all, the existence of man 
becomes existence in community.  In the openness of the common spirit there 
develops the public life of society.  He, however, who closes himself against what 
is common, or who revolts against it, removes himself from the public life of the 
human community.68 
 
Voegelin’s theory of consciousness, like Aquinas’s theory of conscience, is one that aims 
to illustrate the nature of the human person as oriented into relationships with others that 
are ultimately based in the common pursuit of relationship with the Divine—which 
Aquinas calls man’s final end and perfection.  It constitutes an understanding of human 
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67 Voegelin, Eric.  Anamnesis, 31. 
68 Voegelin, Eric. “On the German University and German Society: A Reconsideration of the Nazi Era,” 7.   
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relationships as communion wherein individuals who are “equal in dignity…are fulfilled 
as persons in relationship to other persons.”69  Neither consciousness nor conscience is an 
object, but rather, the means by which human persons participate in reality, and are 
oriented toward the common good, a common good that is lived “by flesh-and-blood 
persons constituting the community.  It is the well-being of those persons and their 
families and other associations of persons…of which they are members.”70 
The essence of Voegelin’s theory of consciousness is anamnesis, for the very 
modes of consciousness, according to Ellis Sandoz, are knowledge, forgottenness, and 
recollection.  Sandoz writes: 
 What is remembered. . . is what has been forgotten; and the troublesome task of  
 recollecting the forgotten must be assayed because it should not remain forgotten. 
Through recollection of the forgotten that which ought to be remembered is 
brought to the present of knowledge; and the tension to knowledge shows 
forgotteness to be the situation of not-knowing, the ignorance (agnoia) of the soul 
in Plato’s sense. Knowledge and not-knowing are situations of existential order 
and disorder.  What is forgotten can, however, only be remembered because it is a 
knowledge in the mode of a forgottenness whose presence in forgottenness stirs 
existential discontent in a man, and this discontent presses toward conscious 
knowledge.  Recollection [anamnesis] is, therefore, the activity of the 
consciousness through forgottenness; and this means that the latent knowledge of 
the unconscious is aroused through recollection and returned in an observable 
manner into specific presence in consciousness where it is articulated….  [W]hat 
is recollected that preeminently ought to be known (and not remain forgotten) is 
the sources of man’s humanity and the order of society and history in 
participatory attunement to the divine reality of the Ground.71 
 
According to Sandoz, what is ‘forgotten’ is what must not remain forgotten—it is the 
reality of the human person’s participatory existence; man is the epitome of being, for he 
                                                 
69 Müller, Gerhard Ludwig.  “Faith’s Political Witness.”  First Things.(April 2013), 34. 
70 George, Robert P.  “Ruling to Serve.”  First Things.(April 2013), 40. 
71 Sandoz, Ellis.  The Voegelinian Revolution: A Biographical Introduction.  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1981), 182-183. 
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participates in all modes of reality from the highest to the lowest strata.72  Human 
participation in reality requires an openness to reality, in particular to the giveness of 
human nature as oriented to a final transcendent end.  If we consider the term anamnesis 
as the primary level of conscience, then the primary act of conscience is one of 
recollection.  However, there is more work to be done to determine with greater 
philosophical precision the full scope of implications for replacing synderesis for 
anamnesis, for using a Platonic concept (anamnesis) for ultimately a Pauline concept 
(syneidesis) albeit one whose spelling was corrupted.  It is important to realize that 
anamnesis is probably not a one-to-one substitution for Aquinas’s understanding of 
synderesis, since for Aquinas, synderesis is a habit, and least by Voegelin’s description, 
anamnesis itself is an act – an act of recollection.  The impetus for the recollection is an 
awareness, a consciousness of something other than oneself, stirred by an ‘existential 
discontent in a man, and this discontent presses toward conscious knowledge’—
ultimately leading one on a search for the summum bonum.73   What we can conclude is 
that this recollection—an act of conscience—draws man out of himself and toward his 
fulfillment in authentic relationship.  No political regime has the power to interfere or to 
dictate the act of conscience, even if there remains a central paradox that conscience is 
constant need of purification and must continue to be corrected and expanded.74  The 
work of the purification of conscience is done largely at the level of concrete human 
relationships and within the context of pre-political or extra-political institutions, e.g., 
                                                 
72 Cf. especially Voegelin’s Anamnesis pp. 113-115, Sandoz’s Voegelinian Revolution, Chapter 7, and 
Aquinas’s description of the inclinations in Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q. 94, art. 2, Corpus. 
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marriage, family, civic associations.  Freedom of conscience is an important basis for 
human freedom, and for self-government.  In those places where law conflicts with the 
claims of conscience, we should remember that, “’Law needs no human testimony; its 
basis is above man, not in him.  But when they are not in agreement, they can ask their 
conscience for advice, and if they do so without hatred or rancor, their conscience will 
help them.’”75 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 Schneider, Reinhold, Las Casas vor Karl V from a speech by Las Casas to Bernadino.  Quoted in Joseph 
Ratzinger’s “Conscience in its Time,” 170. 
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